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This Article compares the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability with Minnesota products liability
law. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability provides a yardstick for measuring products liability
law in each individual state. Minnesota's law is largely similar to the rules set out in the Restatement. While
Minnesota has not yet adopted all of the positions in all of the rules, the Minnesota Supreme Court has taken
positions on the rules governing liability, which are substantially the same. It no longer seems possible to
argue that negligence principles do not control in cases involving design defect and failure to warn. The strict
liability vernacular may still be used in design defect cases, but the important question is whether the supreme
court's statement in Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., that proof of a feasible alternative is not part of the plaintiff 's
prima facie case in a design case, establishes a meaningful wall between the theories. This article proceeds on a
section-by-section basis, explaining each section of the Restatement (Third) and comparing it to Minnesota
law.
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INTRODUCTION

Minnesota adopted strict products liability law in 1967 in
l
McCormack v. Hankscraft Co. McCormack sanctioned section 402A of
2
the Restatement (Second) of Tarts as the law in Minnesota. Since
then, the Minnesota courts have developed a comprehensive, yet
incomplete, products liability scheme. In so doing, the courts have
addressed issues such as the basic liability rules applicable in products liability cases, the relationship between negligence and strict
liability theories, the interaction between the Uniform Commercial
Code and products liability law, and the principles of loss alloca•
8
llon.
1. 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967).
2. See id. at 338, 154 N.W.2d at 500.
3. See, e.g., Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984) (addressing
the basic liability rules applicable in products liability cases and the relationship
between negligence and strict liability theories); SJ. Grove & Sons V. Aeropatiale
Helicopter, 374 N.W.2d 431 (Minn. 1995) (addressing the interaction between
the U.C.C. and products liability law); Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d
377 (Minn. 1977) (addressing principles ofloss allocation).
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The Restatement (Second) of Torts was the Reporters' vision of the
law, as it existed in 1965. Section 402A and its seventeen comments stated the law of strict liability.4 It was a rudimentary effort
to solidify basic products liability principles. The Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liability, building on thirty years of case law, overshadows the Restatement (Second) in its comprehensiveness. It attempts to reach consensus on the status of products liability law in
a politically charged environment pOfulated by interest groups
with distinct and conflicting interests. The Restatement (Third) of
Torts includes twenty-one sections that discuss liability standards for
sales of products by commercial sellers, post-sale obligations of
6
sellers, and loss allocation principles. It offers detailed guidance
on the kinds of transactions and products to which products liabil7
ity law will apply.
Generally speaking, current Minnesota law and the Restatement
(Third) of Torts seem to be a good fit. Both deal with the perpetual
tension between negligence and strict liability principles. The Restatement (Third) emphasizes that negligence concepts are at the
8
base of design defect and failure to warn claims in its rules. Minnesota law helps to reinforce that conclusion.
There are gaps, however, between Minnesota law and the Restatement (Third). For example, Minnesota law regarding post-sale
obligations of product sellers is not fully formed, despite its similarities to the Restatement (Third).9 As well, there are some differences in the way claims for economic loss and property damage are
10
treated.
This Article will compare the Restatement (Third) of Torts with
See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OFToRTS § 402A (1965).
See Products Liability Symposium, 30 MICH.J.L. REF. 197 (1997).
6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 1-21
(Proposed Final Draft, April 1, 1997) [hereinafter Proposed Final Draft].
7. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 19 (defining a product); §§ 3, 6,
8,11-14 (addressing various transactions).
8. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2.
9. The Restatement (Third) imposes a post-sale duty to warn only when a reasonable person in the product seller's position would provide the warning. See
Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 10. Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that a continuing duty to warn post-sale arises only in special cases where the
circumstance create the duty. See Hodder v. Goodyear Rubber & Tire Co., 426
N.W.2d 826, 833 (Minn. 1988) (holding that Goodyear's continued sale of tires
fitting a discontinued tire rim created the duty to warn), ceTt. denied, 492 U.S. 926
(1989).
10. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Nishika Ltd., 565 N.W.2d 16 (Minn.
1997) (explaining that purchasers of goods may sue for economic damage but
other parties must show physical injury).
4.
5.
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Minnesota products liability law. The comparison proceeds on a
section-by-section basis, explaining each section and comparing it
to Minnesota law.
§ 1. LIABILI1Y OF COMMERCIAL SELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR FOR HARM
CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS

One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject
to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the product
defect. II
Commentary
Section 1 "states a general rule of tort liability arplicable to
commercial sellers and other distributors of products. "I It is based
ls
on both warranty and tort law. Likewise, Minnesota products li14
ability law has both tort and warranty origins.
Section 1 does not use the term "strict liability," unlike section
15
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
This reflects the ALI's
judgment that true "strict liability" principles are not readily applicable to cases involving defective design and failure to warn cases:
"[S] trict products liability" is a term of art that reflects the
judgment that products liability is a discrete area of tort
law which borrows from both negligence and warranty. It
is not fully congruent with classical tort or contract law.
Rather than perpetuating confusion spawned by existing
doctrinal categories, §§ 1 and 2 define the liability for
each form of defect in terms directly addressing the various kinds of defects. As long as these functional criteria
are met, courts may utilize the terminology of negligence,
strict liability or the implied warranty of merchantability,
or simgly define liability in the terms set forth in the black
letter.
Justice Simonett posited essentially the same argument in his
11. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § l.
12. [d. cmt. a.
13. See id.
14. See, e.g., McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488
(1967); Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970); Beck
v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543,99 N.W.2d 670 (1959).
15. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
16. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 1 cmt. a.
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concurring opinion in Bilotta v. Kelley CO.,17 which was later incorls
porated in the Minnesota Civil Jury Instructions.
With that in
mind, one need not determine whether the theory of recovery is
negligence or strict liability, so long as the plaintiff receives the
benefit of the strongest and broadest theory of recovery, at least in
design and failure to warn cases. 19
Ultimately, Section 1 reflects the general treatment of product
defects by the Minnesota Supreme Court, dividing products liability cases into manufacturing flaw, design defect, and failure to warn
•
20
categones.
Minnesota limits the application of strict liability to product
sellers, including product manufacturers and other parties in the
21
chain of distribution. In certain situations, however, Minnesota
statutorily exempts sellers in the chain of manufacture and distribution from liability. Section 544.41 of the Minnesota Statutes
reads as follows:
Subdivision. 1. In any product liability action based
in whole or in part on strict liability in tort commenced or
maintained against a defendant other than the manufacturer, that party shall upon answering or otherwise pleading file an affidavit certifying the correct identity of the
manufacturer of the product allegedly causing injury,
death or damage. The commencement of a product liability action based in whole or part on strict liability in
tort against a certifying defendant shall toll the applicable
statute of limitation relative to the defendant for purposes
of asserting a strict liability in tort cause of action.
Subd. 2. Once the plaintiff has filed a complaint
against a manufacturer and the manufacturer has or is required to have answered or otherwise pleaded, the court
shall order the dismissal of a strict liability in tort claim
against the certifying defendant, provided the certifYing
defendant is not within the categories set forth in subdivision 3. Due diligence shall be exercised by the certifying
17. 346 N.W.2d 616, 626 (Minn. 1984).
18. See MINNESOTA DrST. JUDGES Ass'N COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDE:S,
MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES (CIVIL) JIG 117-119 (Michael K. Steenson,
rep.) in 4 MINN. PRACTICE 1, at 81-90 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter JURY INSTRUCTION
GUIDES].
19. See JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 18,jIG 117, Authorities at 83.
20. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 6 cmt. a.
21. See Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149, 156 (Minn. 1982);
O'Laughlin v. Minnesota Natural Gas Co., 253 N.W.2d 826,830-32 (Minn. 1977);
Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 353, 361,216 N.W.2d 859, 864 (1974).
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defendant in providing the plaintiff with the correct identity of the manufacturer and due diligence shall be exercised by the plaintiff in filing a law suit and obtaining jurisdiction over the manufacturer.
The plaintiff may at any time subsequent to dismissal
move to vacate the order of dismissal and reinstate the
certifying defendant, provided plaintiff can show one of
the following:
(a) That the applicable statute of limitation bars the
assertion of a strict liability in tort cause of action against
the manufacturer of the product allegedly causing the injury, death or damage;
(b) That the identity of the manufacturer given to
the plaintiff by the certifying defendant was incorrect.
Once the correct identity of the manuf~cturer has been
given by the certifYing defendant the court shall again
dismiss the certifying defendant;
(c) That the manufacturer no longer exists, cannot
be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, or,
despite due diligence, the manufacturer is not amenable
to service of process;
(d) That the manufacturer is unable to satisfy any
judgment as determined by the court; or
(e) That the court determines that the manufacturer
would be unable to satisfy a reasonable settlement or
other agreement with plaintiff.
Subd. 3. A court shall not enter a dismissal order
relative to any certifying defendant even though full compliance with subdivision 1 has been made where the plaintiff can show one of the following:
(a) That the defendant has exercised some significant control over the design or manufacture of the product, or has provided instructions or warnings to the manufacturer relative to the alleged defect in the product
which has caused the injury, death or damage;
(b) That the defendant had actual knowledge of the
defect in the product which caused the injury, death or
damage; or
(c) That the defendant created the defect in the
product which caused the injury, death or damage.
Subd. 4. Nothing contained in subdivisions 1 to 3
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shall be construed to create a cause of action in strict liability in tort or based on other legal theory, or to affect
the right of any person to seek and obtain indemnity or
22
contribution.
Minnesota requires proof of three basic elements in a products liability case: (1) that the defendant's product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its intended use, (2)
that the defect existed when the product left the defendant's control, and (3) that the defect was the proximate cause of the injury
2s
sustained.
The elements in Section 1 are similar to Minnesota
law, but a subtle difference exists. Section 1 eliminates use of the
term "unreasonably dangerous" and now requires proof that the
product was in a "defective condition.,,24 The Minnesota Supreme
Court traditionally adheres to the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement,25 but has not used it as a dispositive element in all
26
products liability cases. Even so, whether the term "unreasonably
dangerous" is used seems irrelevant. The critical factor is how the
27
term is defined, rather than the term itself. Consequently, eliminating the "unreasonably dangerous" language from jury instructions would not change the substance of the standards used to determine liability issues.

§ 2. CATEGORIES OF PRODUCT DEFECT
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution,
it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A product:
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended design even though all possible care was
exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product;
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of
22. MINN. STAT. § 544.41 (1996).
23. See Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 623 n.3 (Minn. 1984); Aby v. St.
Paul Union Stockyards, 373 N.w.2d 810, 812 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Smits v. E-Z
Por Corp., 365 N.W.2d 352, 354 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); see also Worden v.
Gangelhoff, 308 Minn. 252, 254-55, 241 N.W.2d 650, 651 (1976) (stating that
these basic elements are common to strict liability, negligence, and implied warranty theories ofrecovery).
24. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 1 cmt. a.
25. See Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 623 n.3.
26. See, e.g., Hudson, 326 N.W.2d at 155; Kerr v. Coming Glass Works, 284
Minn. 115, 117, 169 N.W.2d 587, 588 (1969).
27. See Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 626 (Simonett,j., concurring specially).
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harm posed by the product could have been reduced by the
adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of
distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders
the product not reasonably safe;
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product
could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution,
and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the
28
product not reasonably safe.
Commentary
The Restatement (Thinl) utilizes different standards for each
type of product defect. With respect to manufacturing defects, the
Restatement (Third) imposes liability even if the manufacturer exer29
cises reasonable care in its quality control efIorts. Strict liability in
this context fosters several objectives such as promoting safety, discussing consumption of defective products, and reducing litigation
costs. Specifically, the Restatement (Third) notes:
On the premise that tort law serves the instrumental function of creating safety initiatives, imposing strict liability
on manufacturers for harm caused by manufacturing defects encourages greater investment in product safety than
does a regime of fault-based liability under which, as a
practical matter, sellers may escape their appropriate
share of responsibility. Some courts and commentators
also have said that strict liability discourages the consumption of defective products by causing the purchase prices
of products to reflect, more than would a rule of negligence, the costs of defects. And by eliminating the issue
of manufacturer fault from plaintiff's case, strict liability
reduces the transaction costs involved in litigating that is30
sue.
In addition, there are important fairness concerns that support the imposition of liability on a manufacturer. Liability results
28.
29.
30.

Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2.
See id. cmt. a.
[d.
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even when the plaintiff cannot prove that the manufacturer's quality control standards are unreasonable. The Restatement (Third)
provides:
In many cases manufacturing defects are in fact caused by
manufacturer negligence but plaintiffs have difficulty in
proving it. Strict liability therefore performs a function
similar to the concept of res ipsa loquitur, allowing deserving plaintiffs to succeed notwithstanding what would
otherwise be difficult or insuperable problems of proof.
Products that malfunction due to manufacturing defects
disappoint reasonable expectations of product performance. Because manufacturers invest in quality control at
consciously chosen levels, their knowledge that a predictable number of flawed products will enter the marketplace entails an element of deliberation about the amount
of injury that will result from their activity. Finally, many
believe that consumers who benefit from products without suffering harm should share, through increases in the
prices charged for those products, the burden of unavoidable injury costs that result from manufacturing de31
fects.
While not clearly articulated in Minnesota cases, some of the
above reasons have motivated the supreme court's application of
strict liability in products liability cases involving manufacturing de32
fects.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 327-28,
188 N.W.2d 426, 431 (1971); McConnack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 338,
154 N.W.2d 488, 500 (1967). In McCormack, the supreme court adopted the theory of strict liability and noted:
This rule of strict tort liability, as it is appropriately called, qualifies as a
tested legal theory along with the traditional theories of negligence and
breach of warranty where the latter meet the purpose for which liability
should be imposed upon a supplier of a product. However, in our view,
enlarging a manufacturer's liability to those injured by its products more
adequately meets public-policy demands to protect consumers from the
inevitable risks of bodily hann created by mass production and complex
marketing conditions. In a case such as this, subjecting a manufacturer
to liability without proof of negligence or privity of contract, as the rule
intends, imposes the cost of injury resulting from a defective product
upon the maker, who can both most effectively reduce or eliminate the
hazard to life and health, and absorb and pass on such costs, instead of
upon the consumer, who possesses neither the skill nor the means necessary to protect himself adequately from either the risk of injury or its
disastrous consequences.
McCormack, 278 Minn. at 338, 154 N.W.2d at 500.
In Lee, the court summarized the policy concerns noted in McCormack and
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The Restatement (Third) posits that liability cases involving design defects and defects based on inadequate instructions or warnings are predicated on concepts different from manufacturing de33
fect cases. Whether there is a design defect cannot be decided
using the manufacturer's own design standards, as in manufacturing defect cases, because the plaintiff attacks the standard itself as
34
unreasonable.
Therefore, some form of risk-utility balancing is
necessary to determine whether the design standard is unreason35
able. Furthermore, a product is not defective just because it pres36
ents an element of danger. A manufacturer must balance a variety of factors when selecting a particular design, and any standard
of liability should focus on those tradeofIs to determine if the design is flawed or the warnings or instructions are inadequate.
The Restatement's definition of "defective condition" coincides
37
with the Minnesota definition adopted in Bilotta. The policy considerations are the same. Both permit a jury to evaluate the utility
as well as the risk created by a particular product in order to deelsewhere, as follows:
(1) The public interest in safety will be promoted by discouraging the
marketing of defective products which constitute a menace to consumers
not equipped to protect themselves from products they are induced to
purchase through modern advertising methods by persuasive representations that the product is suitable and safe for its intended use; (2) the
burden of loss caused by placing a defective product on the market
should be borne by the manufacturer, who is best able to distribute it by
insuring against inevitable hazards as a part of the cost of the product;
(3) maximum legal protection should be afforded the consumer to
promote product safety and to encourage the growing practice of reputable manufacturers and sellers of settling valid claims without litigation;
and (4) one injured by a defective product should be entitled to bring
action directly against the party responsible for putting the product on
the market without becoming involved in the delay and expense of joining other sellers in the chain of distribution, as frequently occurs when
liability is sought to be determined under warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Lee, 290 Minn. at 327-28, 188 N.W.2d at 431-32.
The Lee court noted that the greatest impediment to establishing strict liability under the Restatement (Second) rule is proving that the product was defective
and that the defect existed when it left the manufacturer's hands. See id. at 329,
188 N.W.2d at 432. The court held that the core of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is
sufficient to take a case involving an exploding bottle to a jury on a theory of strict
liability, as well a negligence theory. See id. at 329-30, 188 N.W.2d at 432-33. The
court intended to ease the plaintiff's burden of proof in such cases.
33. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. a.
34. See id. § 2 cmt. d.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. § 2; Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 1984).

HeinOnline -- 24 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 10 1998

1998] RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS UABIUTY

11

38

termine which costs should be fairly borne by the manufacturer.
The &statement (Third) rejects the consumer expectation standard
s9
as a means of determining whether a product is defective. The
4O
Minnesota Supreme Court did the same in Bilotta.
Prior to Bilotta, the standard approach to products liability
cases was reflected in the second edition of the Civil Jury Instruction
Guides.
A product is in a defective condition if, at the time it
leaves the seller's hands, it is in a condition which is unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary user.
A condition is unreasonable dangerous if it is dangerous
when used by an ordinary user who uses it with the
knowledge common to the community as to the product's
characteristics and common usage.
The defect may be in the design of the product itself or in
41
the instructions necessary for its safe use.
The instruction, although rudimentary, appeared allencompassing. Use of the instruction, when coupled with other
42
standards, occasionally resulted in inconsistent jury verdicts.
Prior to Bilotta, the Minnesota Supreme Court edged toward a
comprehensive theory in defective design cases. In 1982, the supreme court rejected obviousness of a product danger as a bar to
4s
recovery in Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc. The Holm decision overruled
Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick CO.,44 which held only six years
earlier that obviousness could bar recovery.45 The current Minne46
sota approach is reflected in the Restatement. Obviousness of the
danger is only one factor among many in determining whether a
. 47
. d e£ectIve.
prod uct IS
38. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. a; Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at
622.
39. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. a.
40. See Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 622.
41. MINNESOTA DlSf. JUDGES Ass'N COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES,
MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES (CML) JIG II 118 (Hetland & Adamson,
reps.) in 4 MlNN. PRACTICE 1, at 98 (2d ed. 1974).
42. See, e.g., Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 307 Minn. 48, 240
N.W.2d 303 (1976) (reversing jury verdict that danger of electrocution was obvious), overruled on other grounds by Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207
(Minn. 1982).
43. 324 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982).
44. 307 Minn. 48, 240 N.W.2d 303 (1976).
45. See id. at 57,240 N.W.2d at 308.
46. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. d.
47. See Holm, 324 N.W.2d at 212.
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Bilotta was a design defect case involving an allegedly defective
48
dockboard.
The manufacturer made conscious design choices
49
when it adopted the design in question. The trial court instructed
the jury using the Restatement (Second) of Torts' consumer expecta50
tion standard. The result was in a plaintiff's verdict. On appeal,
the supreme court reversed, holding that the standard was unduly
narrow in design cases:
JIG II 118 was formulated for the qualitatively different
product defect of inadvertent manufacturing flaws. In
such a case an objective standard exists-the flawless
product-by which a jury can measure the alleged defect.
Thus, in manufacturing-flaw cases, the defect is proved by
focusing on the condition of the product. The JIG II 118
consumer expectation instructions, which focus only on
the condition of the product, are appropriate for this type
of case, since the manufacturer's conduct is irrelevant.

In a design defect case, however, there is no doubt that
the product is in the condition intended by the manufacturer. In such a case, the "defect" lies in a consciously
chosen design. The manufacturer has deliberately added
or omitted the challenged component and has presumably made that decision after balancing a variety of factors.
A jury must, appellant contends, be told to weigh these
same factors and decide whether the risk-utility balance
struck by the manufacturer was or was not reasonable. In
Holm v. Sponco, we adopted as an objective standard the
reasonable care balancing test, which focuses on the conduct of the manufacturer in evaluating whether its choice
of design struck an acceptable balance among several
•
c:
51
competmg J.actors.
The position taken in the Civil Jury Instruction Guides attempts
to outline the court's decision. The instruction reads as follows:
A manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care when
designing a product, so as to avoid any unreasonable risk
of harm to (anyone who) (property that) is likely to be
exposed to harm when the product is put to its intended
use or to any use that is unintended but is reasonably
foreseeable.

48.
49.
50.
51.

See Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 619 (Minn. 1984).
See id.
See id. at 621.
[d. at 621-22.
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What constitutes reasonable care will vary with the surrounding circumstances. Reasonable care is the care that
a reasonably prudent person would exercise under the
same or similar circumstances.
The reasonable care to be exercised by a manufacturer
when designing a product will depend on all the facts and
circumstances, including, among others, the likelihood
and seriousness of harm against the feasibility and burden
of any precautions which would be effective to avoid the
harm. You are instructed that the manufacturer is obligated to keep informed of scientific knowledge and discoveries in its field.
If the manufacturer did not use reasonable care when
designing the product in question, then the product is in
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
(user or consumer) (user's or consumer's property).52
With this approach, the plaintiff receives the same instruction
53
whether the theory alleged is strict liability or negligence. The instruction informs the jury that the product is defective if the manu54
facturer failed to use reasonable care in designing the product.
Unless other distinctions between strict liability and negligence surface, these theories are simply different labels without any substan55
tive distinctions between them. In Bilotta, the court stated that,
"the distinction between strict liability and negligence in designdefect and failure-to-wam cases is that in strict liability, knowledge
of the condition of the product and the risks involved in that condition will be imputed to the manufacturer, whereas in negligence
n56
these elements must be proven.
The implication is that knowledge of product dangers is imputed to product manufacturers irrespective of whether they reasonably know or should have known of
the dangers. The issue is whether the court really meant what it
said.
The Restatement (Third) notes that foreseeability of the risk is
rarely an issue in design defect cases that involve mechanical product:
Once the plaintiff establishes that the product was put
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
18, JIG

JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 18,JIG 117, at 82.
See id. Authorities at 83.
See id. Authorities at 82-83.
See id.
Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 622; see also JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note
117, Authorities at 83.
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to a reasonably foreseeable use, physical risks of injury are
generally known or reasonably knowable by experts in the
field. It is not unfair to charge a manufacturer with
knowledge of such generally known or knowable risks.
The issue of foreseeability of risk of harm is more
complex in the case of products such as prescription
drugs, medical devices, and toxic chemicals. Risks attendant to use and consumption of these products may, indeed, be unforeseeable at the time of sale. Unforeseeable
risks arising from foreseeable product use or consumption by definition cannot specifically be warned against.
Thus, in connection with a claim of inadequate design,
instruction, or warning, plaintiff should bear the burden
of establishing that the risk in question was known or
should have been known to the relevant community. 57
The Civil Jury Instruction Guides take the following position on
the issue:
In a case where the design defect was the result of an error, or where the decision was not made with clear knowledge of its ramifications, it may be appropriate to add to
the jury instruction language incorporating the imputed
knowledge concept. The following addition to the jury
instruction would incorporate that concept:
You are to assume that the manufacturer knew of the
condition of the product and the risks involved in the
product's condition in determining whether reason58
able care was exercised in the design of the product.
The concern expressed in the accompanying comments lS
similar to the Restatement So
If the imputed knowledge language is applied literally
in either design defect or failure to warn cases, then the
manufacturer's conduct in either design defect or failure
to warn cases would be judged according to knowledge of
product dangers that the manufacturer did not discover
and could not have discovered. However, the Committee
is of the opinion that the supreme court did not intend to
impute to a product manufacturer knowledge of a danger
that was not and could not have been discovered at the
time the product was manufactured. To avoid applying
the imputed knowledge language in such cases, the sug57. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. m.
58. JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 18,jIG 117, Authorities at 84.
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gested instruction incorporating the imputed knowledge
language should be utilized only where there is evidence
that the manufacturer either knew or should have known
of the dangers created by the product in question. 59
Under the Restatement standard, the plaintiff must show that
foreseeable risks of harm could be reduced by the adoption of "a
reasonable, safer design."60 The Restatement notes that "state of the
art":
has been variously defined to mean that the product design conforms to industry custom, that it reflects the safest
and most advanced technology developed and in commercial use, or that it reflects technology at the cutting
edge of scientific knowledge. This Section states that a
design is defective if the product could have been made
safer by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design.
If such a design could have been practically adopted at
time of sale and if failure to adopt such a design rendered
the product not reasonably safe, the plaintiff establishes
defect under Subsection (b). When a defendant demonstrates that its product design was the safest in use at the
time of sale, it may be difficult for plaintiff to prove that
an alternative design could have been practically adopted.
Defendant is thus allowed to introduce evidence with regard to industry practice that bears on whethe.r an alternative design was practicable. Industry practice may also
be relevant to whether the omission of an alternative design rendered the product not reasonably safe. While
such evidence of industry practice is admissible, it is not
necessarily dispositive. If plaintiff introduces expert testimony to establish that a reasonable alternative design
could practically have been adopted, a trier of fact may
conclude that the product was defective notwithstanding
that such a design was not adopted by any manufacturer,
or even considered for commercial use, at the time of
61
sale.
In apparent contrast, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Kallio
62
v. Ford Motor CO. took the position that "existence of a safer, practical alternative design is not an element of an alleged defective

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. d.
Id.
407 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1987).
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product design prima facie case.,,63 In Kallio, the trial court used
JIG 117 of the third edition as the base instruction and instructed
the jury that it could consider other factors, including "state of the
art" and the "practices of the automotive industry" at the time the
64
truck was sold. The court approved the instructions, noting that
the "tenor, if not the literal wording, of the instructions permitted
the jury to consider availability of, and failure to use, an alternative,
safer design as a factor.,,65
Ford Motor Co. 's requested instruction was lengthier, and it
was framed in mandatory terms:
For you to conclude that the design of the park system in
the subject Ford vehicle was defective and unreasonably
dangerous at the time of sale by Ford Motor Company,
the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time the vehicle was designed, there was
available to the defendant a feasible practicable alternative design and that that design, if it had been chosen by
Ford, would have avoided or materially reduced the plaintiff's injury. If the plaintiffs fail to prove the existence of
such a feasible, practicable alternative design, they will be
unable to prove that Ford's choice of design was unreasonable. The plaintiff cannot carry his burden in this regard merely by showing that an alternative design was
possible. To succeed in this case the plaintiffs must establish that such a design would have been feasible and practicable, and that it would have avoided or materially reduced the plaintiff's injury.66
63. Id. at 97.
64. See id. at 96.
65. Id. at 97.
66. Id. at 94 nA. The Civil Jury Instruction Guides contain a suggested jury instruction on the feasible alternative issue, should a court choose to instruct on the
issue:
In deciding if the suggested alternative design was feasible at the
time the product in question was manufactured, there are several factors
you must consider. First, was the suggested alternative design technologically feasible? This means that, given the technology available at the
time the product was manufactured, the suggested alternative was technicallyavailable.
Second, you must consider the safety of the suggested alternative.
Does it provide overall safety as good as or better than that of the product in question, and does it provide better protection against the particular hazard or risk of injury created by the product in question.
Third, you must consider the cost of the suggested alternative. Will
the suggested alternative significantly increase the cost of the product in
question.
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The supreme court found the requested instruction overly
broad for two reasons. First, it elevated the feasible alternative requirement to part of the plaintiff's prima facie case. Second, it
67
tended to overemphasize the reasonable alternative factor.
The supreme court sanctioned the trial court's instruction, because it included "state of the art" as a factor in design defect cases.
Despite this sanction, the court clearly noted the importance of
68
state of the art evidence in design litigation. First, the court noted
that "as a practical matter, successful plaintiffs, almost without fail,
introduce evidence of an alternative safer design.,,69 Second, the
court noted that a plaintiff normally presents such evidence, and it
is appropriate for the jury to consider state of the art evidence.
The court explained:
As in other tort cases, plaintiffs asserting a strict liability
tort claim based upon alleged defective design of a product ultimately have the burden to prove the elements of
the asserted claim. Generally in a case based upon alleged improper design, one of those elements requires
production of evidence that the design employed was unreasonably dangerous. To establish a prima facie case
that it was unreasonably dangerous normally requires
production of evidence of the existence of a feasible, al. d
' 70
ternatIve
eSlgn.
The court concluded that while the evidence is relevant and
may be pivotal in deciding design cases, "it is not necessarily required in all cases. "71 If there is any potential difference between
the Restatement and Minnesota positions on design defect, it is in

Fourth, you must consider whether the suggested alternative will affect the performance of the product.
Before you find the suggested alternative to be feasible, you must
find that any increases in the cost of the product or changes in the performance and function of the product are outweighed by the added
safety of the alternative design.
JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 18, JIG 117, Authorities at 85. The instruction is based on Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978). See id.
67. See Kallio, 407 N.W.2d at 97. The Minnesota pattern jury instructions include an instruction on custom, stating that the evidence is not conclusive on the
due care issue, but is to be considered by the jury, "along with all the other evidence in the case in deciding whether the (plaintifi) or (defendant) exercised
reasonable care." JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 18,JIG 101.1, at 51.
68. See Kallio, 407 N.W.2d at 96-97.
69. [d. at 96 n.6.
70. [d. at 96.
71. [d. at 96-97.
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72

this language in Kallio. The court footnoted the statement and
referred to two cases: Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,73 a 1978 Oregon
Supreme Court case, and O'Brien v. Muskin Corp.,74 a 1983 New Jersey Supreme Court case. The court prefaced the citation to those
cases by stating that, "[c]onceivably, rare cases may exist where the
product may be judged unreasonably dangerous because it should
be removed from the market rather than be redesigned.,,75
Wilson reflects the Minnesota Supreme Court's concern, but
without being specific. The court stated:
If, for example, the danger was relatively severe and the
product had only limited utility, the court might properly
conclude that the jury could find that a reasonable manufacturer would not have introduced such a product into
the stream of commerce. We hold here only that, given
the nature of the product and of the defects alleged, it was
improper to submit the issue of a defect in the engine design to the jury in the absence of appropriate evidence
76
that the safer alternative design was practicable.
77
O'Brien, however, is more specific. Central to the case was the
7s
feasible alternative requirement. The court rejected the necessity
of proving a feasible alternative in all cases. It stated:
The evaluation of the utility of a product also involves
the relative need for that product; some products are essentials, while others are luxuries. A product that fills a
critical need and can be designed in only one way should
be viewed differently from a luxury item. Still other
products, including some for which no alternative exists,
are so dangerous and of such little use that under the
risk-utility analysis, a manufacturer would bear the cost of
liability of harm to others. That cost might dissuade a
manufacturer from placing the product on the market,
even if the product has been made as safely as possible.
Indeed, plaintiff contends that above-ground pools with
vinyl liners are such products and that manufacturers who
market those pools should bear the cost of injuries they
cause to foreseeable users.
72. See id. at 97 n.B.
73. 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978).
74. 463A.2d 298 (NJ. 1983).
75. Kallio, 407 N.W.2d at 97 n.8.
76. Wilson, 577 P.2d at 1328 n.5.
77. See O'Brien, 463 A.2d at 298 (involving an above-ground swimming pool
that utilized a vinyl liner).
78. See id. at 306.
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A critical issue at trial was whether the design of the
pool, calling for a vinyl bottom in a pool four feet deep,
was defective. The trial court should have permitted the
jury to consider whether, because of the dimensions of
the pool and slipperiness of the bottom, the risks of injury
so outweighed the utility of the product as to constitute a
defect. In removing that issue from consideration by the
jury, the trial court erred. To establish sufficient proof to
compel submission of the issue to the jury for appropriate
fact-finding under risk-utility analysis, it was not necessary
for plaintiff to prove the existence of alternative, safer designs. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, even if there are no alternative methods of making bottoms for above-ground pools, the jury might have
found that the risk posed by the pool outweighed its utility.
In a design-defect case, the plaintiff bears the burden
of both going forward with the evidence and of persuasion that the product contained a defect. To establish a
prima facie case, the plaintiff should adduce sufficient
evidence on the risk-utility factors to establish a defect.
With respect to above-ground swimming pools, for example, the plaintiff might seek to establish that pools are
marketed primarily for recreational, not therapeutic purposes; that because of their design, including their configuration, inadequate warnings, and the use of vinyl liners, injury is likely; that, without impairing the usefulness
of the pool or pricing it out of the market, warnings
against diving could be made more prominent and a liner
less dangerous. It may not be necessary for the plaintiff to
introduce evidence on all those alternatives. Conversely,
the plaintiff may wish to offer proof on other matters
relevant to the risk-utility analysis. It is not a foregone
conclusion that plaintiff ultimately will prevail on a
risk-utility ana~sis, but he should have an opportunity to
prove his case.
The Restatement disagrees. The fourth illustration, in comment
d to section 2, reads as follows:
XYZ Co. Manufactures above-ground swimming pools
that are four feet deep. Warnings are embossed on the
outside of the pools in large letters stating "DANGER-DO
NOT DIVE." In disregard of the warnings, Mary, age 21,
79.

Id.
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dove head first into an XYZ pool and suffered serious injury. Expert testimony establishes that when Mary's outstretched hands hit the pool's slippery vinyl bottom her
hands slid apart, causing her to strike her head against the
bottom of the pool. For the purposes of this Illustration it
is assumed that the warnings were adequate and that the
only issue is whether the above-ground pool was defectively designed because the bottom was too slippery. All
the expert witnesses agree that the vinyl pool liner that
XYZ utilized was the best and safest liner available and
that no alternative, less slippery liner was feasible. Mary
has failed to establish defective design under Subsection
(b) .80

The next comment and illustration of the Restatement (Third)
outline its position on the issue. The comment explains that a
product might be defective even though there is no feasible alternative that would not impair the product's utility:
Several courts have suggested that the design of some
products are so manifestly unreasonable, in that they have
low social utility and high degree of danger, that liability
should attach even absent proof of a reasonable alternative design. In large part the problem is one of how the
range of relevant alternative designs is described. For example, a toy gun that shoots hard rubber pellets with sufficient velocity to cause injury to children could be found
to be defectively designed within the rule of Subsection
(b). Toy guns unlikely to cause injury would constitute
reasonable alternatives to the dangerous toy. Thus, toy
guns that project ping pong balls, soft gelatin pellets, or
water might be found to be reasonable alternative designs
to a toy gun that shoots hard pellets. However, if the realism of the hard-pellet gun, and thus its capacity to cause
injury, is sufficiently important to those who purchase and
use such products to justify the court's limiting consideration to toy guns that achieve realism by shooting hard pellets, then no reasonable alternative will, by hypothesis, be
available. In that instance, the design feature that defines
which alternatives are relevant - the realism of the hardpellet gun and thus its capacity to injure - is precisely the
feature on which the user places value and of which the
plaintiff complains. If a court were to adopt this characterization of the product, and deem the capacity to cause
80.

Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 illus. 4.
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injury an egregiously unacceptable quality in a toy for use
by children, it could conclude that liability should attach
without proof of a reasonable alternative design. The
court would declare the product design to be defective
and not reasonably safe because the extremely high degree of danger posed by its use or consumption so substantially outweighs its negligible social utility that no rational, reasonable person, fully aware of the relevant facts,
would choose to use, or to allow children to use, the
81
product.
.
The flfth illustration, following comment e, reads as follows:
ABC Co. manufactures novelty items. One item, an
exploding cigar, is made to explode with a loud bang and
the emission of smoke. Robert purchased the exploding
cigar and presented it to his boss, Jack, at a birthday party
arranged for him at the office. Jack lit the cigar. When it
exploded, the heat from the explosion litJack's beard on
flre causing serious bums to his face. If a court were to
recognize the rule identifled in this Comment, the flnder
of fact might find ABC liable for the defective design of
the exploding cigar even if no reasonable alternative design was available that would provide similar prank characteristics. The utility of the exploding cigar is so low and
the risk of injury is so high as to warrant a conclusion that
the ciJPr is defective and should not have been marketed
at all.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet had its exploding
cigar case, but the court has structured desiW defect law in Minnesota to provide for it when the match is lit. That does not mean
that the need for a reasonable alternative design is irrelevant in
Minnesota. The court's decision in Kallio clearly notes the general
84
need for that proof in a design case. While Minnesota differs in
minor respects, Minnesota law in general seems consistent with the
Restatement (Third) position on design defect cases. The Restatement
does not take a position on "the specifics of how a jury should be
instructed."85 As long as the instructions "are generally consistent
with the rule of law set forth in Subsection (b), their specific form

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. cmt. e.
Id. illus. 5.
See Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 96 (Minn. 1987).
See id.
See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. f.
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and content are matters of local laW.,,86 Minnesota's instructions
seem to incorporate the important elements of the Restatement view.
Failure to Warn
The Restatement requires a seller to warn only of dangers that
87
were or should have been known by the manufacturer.
The
Bilotta court stated that in design defect and failure to warn cases
"knowledge of the condition of the product and the risks involved
in that condition will be imputed to the manufacturer."ss The supreme court's decisions in failure to warn cases, however, are
equivocal. The supreme court has stated that strict liability principles apply in failure to warn cases and has required claimants to
elect between negligence and strict liability theories. Yet, the court
has also stated that negligence principles apply in strict liability
89
context. As a result, absent any indication that the court intends
to establish real distinctions between negligence and strict liability
in failure to warn cases, the underlying basis of recovery is the
same, regardless of the label. At a minimum, it seems clear that the
court's statement that negligence principles govern in failure to
warn cases means that knowledge of the risks created by the prod90
uct will not be imputed to the product manufacturer.
The duality of the court's approach to failure to warn theory is
reflected in the pattern jury instructions. The instructions state
that a claimant is entitled to a single instruction on failure to warn
theory and receives the same instruction for either a strict liability
91
or negligence claim.
The instructions attempt to accommodate
the court's requirement that plaintiffs elect one theory by the close
of the case,92 where a distinction between the theories has not been
86. Id.
87. See id. § 2.
88. Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 1984).
89. See Forster v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn.
1989); Huber v. Niagara Mach. and Tool Works, 430 N.W.2d 465, 467 n.1 (Minn.
1988); Germann v. F.L. Smithe Co., 395 N.W.2d 922,926 nA (Minn. 1986).
90. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
91. See JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note I8,JIG 119, at 91.
92. See Hauenstein v. Loctite Corp., 347 N.W.2d 272 (Minn. 1984):
[W]e hold that ... where a plaintiff seeks damages for both negligence
and strict liability based solely upon failure to warn, the plaintiff may
submit the case to the jury on only one theory. The plaintiff can plead
and prove at trial either or both theories, but by the time the parties rest,
the plaintiff must announce whether the case will be submitted to the
jury on negligence or strict liability.
Id. at 275. The Hauenstein court faced an inconsistent verdict when the jury found
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93

clearly established.
The warning obligation under the Restatement (Third) requires
the instructions to inform users and consumers on ways to avoid
risks. It also requires warnings that inform of the existence and na94
ture of product risks. Minnesota law is substantially similar. 95
The Restatement declares that generally, a product seller is not
subject to liability for failure to warn or instruct as to "risks and risk
avoidance measures that should be obvious to, or generally known
by, foreseeable product users. "96 The comment explains:
When a risk is obvious or generally known, the prospective addressees of a warning will or should already know
of its existence. Warning of an obvious or generally
known risk in most instances will not provide an effective
additional measure of safety. Furthermore, warnings that
deal with obvious or generally known risks may be ignored by users and consumers and may diminish the significance of warnings about non-obvious, not-generallyknown risks. Thus, requiring warnings of obvious or generally known risks could reduce the efficacy of warnings
generally. When reasonable minds may differ as to
whether the risk was obvious or generally known, the issue
is to be decided by the trier of fact. The obviousness of
risk may bear on the issue of design defect rather than
f::"':1
dllure to warn. 97
The Minnesota courts take the same position, typically holdin~
that warnings are not required in such cases as a matter of law.
the product in question was not defective, but the manufacturer was negligent in
causing the injury. See id. at 275. The Hauenstein court held that the verdict was
not reconcilable, but that the jury's finding of no causation on the negligence
question made the inconsistency irrelevant. See id. at 276.
93. The Hauenstein court held that under both strict liability and negligence
theories a manufacturer's duty to warn extends to all reasonably foreseeable users.
See id. at 275.
94. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. i.
95. See Frey y. Montgomery Ward & Co., 258 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 1977)
(stating that the duty to warn consists of the duty to give adequate instructions for
safe use and to warn of dangers inherent in improper usage); JURY INSTRUCTION
GUIDES, supra note 18,jIG 119, at 90.
96. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt.j.
97. [d.
98. See Mix v. MTD Products, Inc., 393 N.W.2d 18, 19-20 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986) (referring to Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207, 212 (Minn.
1982), which states that obviousness of the risk is only one factor to consider in a
design defect case, does not apply in a failure to warn case); Willmar Poultry Co.
v. Carns Chern. Co., 378 N.W.2d 830, 835 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that
plaintiff had knowledge of risk, and as a question of fact, the jury was instructed
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There is probably no duty to warn a sophisticated product user of
99
the dangers associated with the product. The Restatement (Third)
notes that in an appropriate case the manufacturer may have a duty
to warn the ultimate user of the product, rather than an intermediary, such as the plaintiff's employer.loo Minnesota law is to the
same effect. 101
Under Minnesota law, the supreme court has held that the ex102
istence of a duty to warn is a question of law"for the court.
The
adequacy issue is then for the jury. 103 Under the Restatement (Third)
standard, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that adequate instructions were not provided. 1M The Restatement states that a product "is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could
have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller ... and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.,,105
The Restatement does not indicate how the standard would be
structured for jury instruction purposes, nor does it intend to do
so. It does not state the issue in terms of either negligence or strict
liability theory. Instead, the standard focuses on whether the foreseeable risks of harm created by the product could have been
avoided by the provision of reasonable warnings or instructions. 106
Arguably, the standard requires a focus on adequacy of the warning, once a foreseeable risk of injury is presented by the product.
In addition, one could argue that because the issue is whether the
provision of reasonable warnings or instructions would reduce or
there is no duty to warn where the user knows the danger, which the court held
was a jury issue as a matter oflaw).

99. See, e.g., Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assoc. Architects,
Inc., 354 N.W.2d 816, 821 (Minn. 1984); Todalen v. United States Chern. Co., 424
N.W.2d 73, 78 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Tyroll v. Private
Label Chems., Inc., 505 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1993).
100, See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. i.
101. See Hill v. Wilmington Chern. Corp., 279 Minn. 336, 341-45, 156 N.W.2d
898, 902-04, (1968); Todalen, 424 N.W.2d at 80; Cf. Huber v. Niagara Mach. &
Tool Works, 430 N.W.2d 465, 468 n.2 (Minn. 1988) (recognizing the obligation to
warn ultimate users, but holding that no duty existed in the instant case to warn
the ultimate user of the consequences of the failure of the plaintiff's employer to
follow certain safety regulations).
102, See, e.g., Huber, 430 N.W.2d at 467; Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts, 354
N.W.2d at 821; Todalen, 424 N.W.2d at 78.
103. See]URYINsTRucnoN GUIDES, supra note 18,]IG 119, at 90.
104. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. i.
105. [d. § 2(c).
106. See id. § 2.
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avoid the risk, the question must be one of the reasonableness of
the warning. That, of course, is how adequacy is measured.
The Restatement does not appear to say in the black letter of
section 2 that liability for failure to warn is judged by a reasonable
manufacturer or seller standard, one similar to a risk-utility standard. There are, however, situations where the Restatement clearly
l07
takes the position that warnings are not required.
For example, a
warning is not mandated where the danger is obvious and generl08
ally known.
Another example is the Restatement's approach to a
product manufacturer's responsibility in cases involving post-sale
warning obligations. log
Minnesota's standard seems to be consistent with the Restatement (Third) standard. However, under both negligence and strict
liability standards, adequacy is the only issue the jury will resolve.
The jury will not determine whether a reasonable manufacturer
would have provided warnings and if so, what warnings would have
been adequate. The pattern jury instructions use the following
language:
A product (manufacturer) (seller) must
(Provide adequate warnings of dangers inherent in
improper use of the product, if the use is one that the
(manufacturer) (seller) should reasonably foresee.)
(Provide adequate instructions for the safe use of the
product.)
For a warning to be adequate it must be set out in such
a way that heeding the warning will make the product reasonably safe for use. [The warning must be in a form
which could reasonably be expected to catch the attention
of, and be understood by, the ordinary user.] 110
The issue is whether the warnings render the product reasonably
safe for consumer use.
Justice Simonett, writing later on the warning issue, thought
the key to the warning issue to be relatively simple. He stated:
The trial court must decide, of course, based on the evidence, whether to submit the issue of failure to warn to
the jury. This is a question of law for the court. Put another way, it is a question of law for the judge whether
107.
lOS.
109.

See id.
See id. cmt. j.
See id. § 10.

1l0.

JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note lS,JIG 119, at 90.
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there is a question of fact for the jury. In submitting a
failure to warn claim to the jury, the trial court ordinarily
is instructing the jury to determine from all the evidence
if, in fact, the risk to be warned against was reasonably
foreseeable, so that a duty to warn was necessary; and if so,
whether any warnings were adequate or could have been
effective (which relates to the scope of the duty); and, finally, whether the duty was breached and causation was
present. In a particular case, one or more of these questions may be decided by the trial court as a matter of law
and the jury so told. But otherwise, generally, the Jury decides if a duty to warn exists and if it was breached. 11
If Justice Simonett's approach is taken, the trial court will decide whether there is sufficient evidence to submit the warning issue to the jury. If so, the jury would then decide whether a reasonable product manufacturer would have provided a warning, and if
warnings were provided, whether they were adequate. The key
conceptual question that has to be answered is whether the manufacturer's choices with respect to warnings will be evaluated according to the same risk-utility standard that is utilized to evaluate the
reasonableness of its design choices.
If warning cases are treated similarly, the trial court's initial
determination that a manufacturer has a duty to act reasonably
with respect to product warnings means that the jury will be entitled to evaluate the reasonableness of the manufacturer's actions
with respect to product warnings, including any decision not to
give a warning, unless, of course, the case is strong enough that the
trial court would be prepared to direct a verdict on the warning issue in cases where the manufacturer has not provided a warning. 112
Ill. John E. Simonett, Dispelling the Products Liability Syndrome: Tentative Draft
No.2 of the Restatement (Third), 21 WM. MITCHELLL. REv. 361, 365 (1995).
112. See George W. Soule & Jacqueline M. Moen, Failure to Warn in Minnesota,
The New Restatement on Products Liability, and the Application of the Reasonable Care
Standard, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 389, 403-04 n.61 (1995) (citation omitted).
The authors suggested the following instruction:
A manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care in providing an
adequate warning of any danger involved in the use of a product which
poses an unreasonable risk of harm to persons or property when the
product is put to its intended use or to any use that is unintended but is
reasonably foreseeable.
What constitutes reasonable care will vary with the surrounding circumstances. Reasonable care is the care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.
In determining whether reasonable care requires the manufacturer
to provide a warning, you may consider all the facts and circumstances,
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The Restatement (Third) says that there should not be separate
instructions on multiple theories of recovery where there is a single
allegation of design defect or failure to warn.1I3 If the plaintiff asserts a design defect theory, the plaintiff should be entitled to a
single instruction on that theory, not one based on strict liability
and one based on negligence.1l4 Minnesota takes the same posill5
tion.
However, if the plaintiff asserts separate theories of defect,
one based on design defect and the other on failure to warn, the
ll6
plaintiff is entitled to instructions on both theories.
In manufacturing flaw cases, the plaintiff is entitled to both negligence and
strict liability instructions on the theory.ll7 Those cases do not involve the risk-utility balancing approach that is at the core of both
negli{!ence and strict liability analysis in design and warning
'118
cases.

including, among others, the likelihood and seriousness of harm and the
feasibility, burden and effectiveness of a warning.
A manufacturer may be required to provide a warning only if the
manufacturer knew or through the exercise of reasonable care could
have discovered the danger involved in the use of the product. A manufacturer is not required to warn of a danger which would ordinarily be
known and appreciated by those who would be expected to use the
product.
For a warning to be adequate it must be set out in such a way that
heeding the warning will make the product reasonably safe for use. The
warning must be in a form which could reasonably be expected to catch
the attention of, and be understood by, the ordinary user.
If the manufacturer did not use reasonable care in providing an
adequate warning, then the manufacturer is negligent.
[d. (citation omitted).
113. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. n.
114. Seeid.
115. See JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 18, JIG 117, Authorities at 81-87,
and JIG 119, Authorities at 90-93. Implied warranty of merchantability is also
merged with strict liability and negligence in design defect cases. See Westbrock v.
Marshalltown Mfg. Co., 473 N.W.2d 352, 356 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Gross v.
Running, 403 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). The Eighth Circuit has
taken the same position in interpreting Minnesota law. See Piotrowski v. Southworth Prod. Corp., 15 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 1994).
116. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. n; Kallio v. Ford Motor
Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 94 n.2 (Minn. 1987).
117. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. n; JURY INSTRUCTION
GUIDES, supra note 18,jIG 118, Authorities at 88-89, and Special Verdict Forrn No.
2, at 455-56.
118. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. n; JURY INSTRUCTION
GUIDES, supra note 18,jIG 118, Authorities at 88-89, and Special Verdict Form No.
2, at 455-56.
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CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING INFERENCE OF
PRODUCT DEFECT

It may be inferred that the hann sustained by the plaintiff was
caused by a product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution, without proof of a specific defect, when the incident that
hanned the plaintiff:

(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect; and
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes
other than product defect existing at the time of sale or distri.
119
b utlOn.
Commentary
120

Minnesota law is the same.
In Holkestad v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co.,l2l the Minnesota Supreme Court explained:
When a plaintiff has proved that he was injured by a
product claimed to have been defective, and where the
claimed defect is such that there is circumstantial evidence from which it can be inferred that it is more probable than not that the product was defective when it left
defendant's hands, absent plaintiff's own want of care or
misuse of the product, there is an evidentiary basis for
submitting the issue of liability to the jury on both the
theory of negligence and strict liability in tort. Of course,
the factor essential to the application of res ipsa loquitur-that it must be the kind of event which does not occur in the absence of negligence-is a circumstance tending to prove a defect and not a prerequisite for the
application of strict liability in tort. However, the inference from the circumstantial evidence taken as a whole,
which we repeat is the underlying basis of the doctrine of
res ipsa, would pennit recovery against both manufacturer
119. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 3.
120. See Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 328-30, 188
N.W.2d 426, 432 (1971); Holkestad v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Minnesota, 288
Minn. 249, 254-55, 180 N.W.2d 860, 864-65 (1970); Kerr v. Corning Glass Works,
284 Minn. 115, 117, 169 N.W.2d 587, 588 (1969); Western Sur. & Cas. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 433 N.W.2d 444, 447 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), review denied, (Minn.
Feb. 22, 1989).
121. 288 Minn. 249, 180 N.W.2d 860 (1970).
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and retail seller on the theory of strict liability.... 122
The supreme court, however, has noted restrictions on the use of
23
the res ipsa concept. In Cerepak v. Revlon, Inc./ the plaintiff was injured while attempting to open the cap of a deodorant bottle
124
manufactured by Revlon.
The injury occurred when the bottle
broke while she was trying to twist off the cap.125 The plaintiff alleged that the bottle was defective and that the defendant was negligent in its manufacture and design.126 The jury found that Rev127
Ion was negligent and that the plaintiff was not.
The plaintiff offered no affirmative evidence demonstrating
that Revlon was negligent in the manufacture of the bottle. I
There was no expert testimony to establish any defect in the botl29
tle.
The only evidence was that introduced by the plaintiff and
her mother concerning the purchase and use of the bottle, which
showed that they had done nothing to cause the bottle to break. 130
The court distinguished the exploding bottle cases in holding that
the plaintiff had not met her burden of proof on the res ipsa issue:
The dispositive issue is whether plaintiffs met their
burden of proof on the factual issue of negligence where
the issue was submitted solely on theory of res ipsa loquitur, absent any affirmative evidence that the deodorant
bottle was negligently manufactured. Plaintiff had the
burden of proving that there was a defect in the bottle
which caused it to break under normal use, that this defect was present when defendant surrendered possession
of the bottle to the retailer, and that the defect was the result of defendant's negligence in its manufacture. Although the burden of proof has been less strict in cases of
spontaneous explosion of carbonated beverage bottles
than in the case of other glass containers, no case based
on negligence has wholly removed this burden of proof or
held it discharged merely by proof that the plaintiff had
not mishandled the product.
The reason for less strictness in adhering to this bur122.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

130.

[d. at 257, 180 N.W.2d at 865-66.
294 Minn. 268, 200 N.W.2d 33 (1972).
See id. at 269; 200 N.W.2d at 34.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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den of proof in exploding bottle cases is more pragmatic
than conceptual. Dean Page Keeton . . . after reviewing
some of the defective bottle cases, concludes that courts
have been less strict in requiring proof of negligence in
cases involving explosions of beer bottles and carbonated
beverage bottles. It is his view that 'the existence of a defective in a bottle cannot be inferred simply from evidence on the part of plaintiff of careful conduct coupled
with an explosion or break' and that plaintiff, in order to
get to the jury, must introduce 'direct evidence of a defect
by an expert who examined the bottle. . . . He suggests
that requiring that requiring less proof in cases involving
explosions of beer bottles or carbonated beverage bottles
may be justified by the fact that often the explosion destroys the bottle, making it more difficult for plaintiff to
· was d
e · 131
prove th at It
eJ.ectlve.
In Cerepak, the plaintiff had possession of the bottle and the
132
ability to establish a specific defect in the bottle.
Under the circumstances, the absence of direct evidence on the defect issue precluded the plaintiff from recovering. The moral of the story is
clear. If the plaintiff has the ability to establish the existence of a
defect by direct evidence, res ipsa loquitur will not be available. The
Restatement (Third) approach, mirrored in Minnesota, does not create an exception to the liability rules of section 2 that will be read
or applied broadly by the courts.

§ 4.

NONCOMPLIANCE AND COMPLIANCE WITH PRODUCT SAFElY
STATUTES OR REGULATIONS

In connection with liability for defective design or inadequate
instructions or warnings:
(a) a product's noncompliance with an applicable product
safety statute or administrative regulation renders the product
defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by the
statute or regulation; and
(b) a product's compliance with an applicable product
safety statute or administrative regulation is properly considered in determining whether the product is defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by the statute or regula131.
132.

[d. at 270-71,200 N.W.2d at 35 (citations omitted).
See id. at 273, 200 N.W.2d at 36.
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tion, but such compliance does not preclude as a matter of law
133
a finding of product defect.
Commentary
In Minnesota, violation of a statute is negligence per se if the
statute satisfies the standard statutory purpose analysis:
It is well settled that breach of a statute gives rise to negligence per se if the persons harmed by that violation are
within the intended protection of the statute and the
harm suffered is of the type the legislation was intended
134
to prevent.
The violation of regulations or ordinances may also result in negli135
gence per se.
The black letter of the Restatement (Third) refers to an
"applicable product safety statute or administrative regulation. "136
The Reporters' Note makes clear that the standard statutory purpose analysis must be followed for a violation of the statute or regulation to justifY a finding of product defect as a matter of law. 137
The statute or regulation has to do more, however:
[T]he safety statute or administrative regulation must be
such that compliance reduces the risk that caused the
plaintiffs harm. Thus, when a plaintiff complains that the
design of a product should have been more stable to prevent the product from tipping over, a safety statute or
regulation is relevant if it addresses the issue of stability in
such a way that compliance with the statute or regulation
reduces the risk of the product tipRing over in the manner that caused the plaintiffs harm. 38
Compliance with a statute or ordinance is not conclusive evidence on the negligence issue, but rather is only evidence of rea139
sonable care. The comments, however, suggest that in certain
circumstances it may be appropriate for a court to hold that a
133. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 4.
134. Aldennan's Inc. v. Shanks, 536 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Minn. 1995).
135. See id. at 7.
136. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 4.
137. See id. Reporters' Note, at 145 (stating that, "[iJn order for the violation
to support a conclusion of defectiveness as a matter of law, the safety regulation in
question must relate both to the risk that materializes in hann and to the person
or persons who suffer that hann").
138. [d. § 4 cmt. c.
139. See id. § 4(b).
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product in compliance with a statute or regulation is not defective
as a matter of law:
Such a conclusion may be appropriate when the safety
statute or regulation was promulgated recently, thus supplying currency to the standard therein established; when
the specific standard addresses the very issue of product
design or warning presented in the case before the court;
and when the court is confident that the deliberative
process by which the safety standard was established was
full, fair, and thorough and reflected substantial expertise. Conversely, when the deliberative process that led to
the safety standard with which the defendant's product
complies was tainted by the supplying of false information
to, or the withholding of necessary and valid information
from, the agency that promulgated the standard or certified or approved the product, compliance with regulation
l40
is entitled to little or no weight.
Minnesota has taken the position that compliance with a statute only evidences reasonable care and is not conclusive on the isHI
sue.
No Minnesota court has yet taken the position suggested in
the Restatement comment, but such a position is not inconsistent
with any settled principles in Minnesota products liability law.
§ 5. LIABILI'IY OF COMMERCIAL SELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR OF
PRODUCT COMPONENTS FOR HARM CAUSED BY PRODUCTS INTO
WHICH COMPONENTS ARE INTEGRATED
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing product components who sells or distributes a component is
subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by a
product into which the component is integrated if:
(a) the component is defective in itself, under §§ 1-4, and
the defect causes the harm; or
(b) (1) the seller or distributor of the component substantially participates in the integration of the component into
140. Id. cmt. e.
141. See, e.g., Hellman v. Julius Kolesar, Inc., 399 N.W.2d 654, 655-56 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987) (holding a party may be negligent while complying with a statutory
standard if special circumstances require additional instructions); Steinbrecher v.
McLeod Coop. Power Ass'n, 392 N.W.2d 709,712 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
safety statute setting out requirements does not constitute final word on necessary
measures).
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the design of the product; and
(2) the integration of the component causes the product to be defective as defined under §§ 1-4; and
(3) the defect in the product causes the harm.

142

Commentary
Section 5 includes as product components "raw materials, bulk
products, and other constituent products sold for integration into
other products."143 In general, the Restatement (Third) says that
component sellers should not be held liable unless the component
itself is defective according to sections 1-4 of the Restatement.
Comment b notes:
If the component is not itself defective, it would be unjust and inefficient to impose liability solely on the
ground that the manufacturer of the integrated product
utilizes the component in a manner that renders the integrated product defective. Imposing liability would require the component seller to scrutinize another's product which the component seller has no role in developing.
This would require the component seller to develop sufficient sophistication to review the decisions of the business
entity that is already charged with responsibility for the integrated product.
The refusal to impose liability on sellers of nondefective components is expressed in various ways, such as the
"raw material supplier defense" or the "bulk
sales/ sophisticated purchaser rule." However expressed,
these formulations recognize that component sellers who
do not participate in the integration of the component
into the design of the product should not be liable merely
because the integration of the component causes the
l44
product to become dangerously defective.
The same principles apply when the issue concerns the component seller's obligation to warn.
The component seller is required to provide instructions
and warnings regarding risks associated with the use of
the component product. . . . However, when a sophisti142.
143.
144.

Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 5.
Id. cmt. a.
Id.
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cated buyer integrates a component into another product,
the component seller owes no duty to warn either the
immediate buyer or ultimate consumers of dangers arising because the component is unsuited for the special
purpose to which the buyer puts it. To impose a duty to
warn in such a circumstance would require that component sellers monitor the development of products and systems into which their components are to be integrated .... Courts have not yet confronted the question
of whether, in combination, factors such as the component purchaser's lack of expertise and ignorance of the
risks of integrating the component into the purchaser's
product, and the component supplier's knowledge of
both the relevant risks and the purchaser's ignorance
thereof, give rise to a duty on the part of the component
supplier to warn of risks attending integration of the
component into the purchaser's product. Whether the
seller of a component should be subject to liability for
selling its product to one who is likely to utilize it dangerously is governed by principles of negligent entrust145
ment.
Minnesota products liability law permits the imposition of lil46
ability on component parts manufacturers.
The problems that
arise are indicative of the concerns expressed in the Restatement
147
(Third). The predominant problem is in failure to warn cases.
Minnesota's solutions have been based on a common sense resolution of the ability of a manufacturer to warn of dangers in varied
circumstances. The law seems to be consistent with the Restatement.
§ 6. LIABILI1Y OF SELLER OR OTHER DISTRIBUTOR FOR HARM
CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND MEDICAL DEVICES

(a) A manufacturer of a prescription drug or medical device who sells or otherwise distributes a defective drug or medical device is subject to liability for harm to persons caused by
145. [d. cmt. b.
146. See Huber v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 430 N.W.2d 465,467 (Minn.
1988); Hill v. Wilmington Chern. Corp., 279 Minn. 336, 342-44, 156 N.W.2d 898,
903-04 (1968).
147. See, e.g., Huber, 430 N.W.2d at 467 (holding that component part manufacturer only has a legal duty to warn against foreseeable misuses); Hill, 279 Minn.
at 344, 156 N.W.2d at 904 (holding that where plaintiff had adequate knowledge
of the dangerous propensities of the component product, defendant had no further duty to give an additional warning).
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the defect. A prescription drug or medical device is one that
may be legally sold or otherwise distributed only pursuant to a
health care provider's prescription.
(b) For purposes of liability under Subsection (a), a prescription drug or medical device is defective if at the time of
sale or other distribution the drug or medical device:
(1) contains a manufacturing defect as defined in §

2(a); or
(2) is not reasonably safe due to defective design as defined in Subsection (c); or
(3) is not reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions
or warnings as defined in Subsection (d).

(c) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably
safe due to defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the drug or medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable
health care providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and
therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical
device for any class of patients.
(d) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably
safe because of inadequate instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of
harm are not provided to:
(1) prescribing and other health care providers who are

in a position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with
the instructions or warnings; or
(2) the patient when the manufacturer knows or has
reason to know that health care providers will not be in a
position to reduce the risk of harm in accordance with the
instructions or warnings.

(e) A retail seller or other distributor of a prescription drug
or medical device is subject to liability for harm caused by the
drug or device if:
(1) at the time of sale or other distribution the drug or

medical device contains a manufacturing defect as defined
in § 2(a); or
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(2) at or before the time of sale or other distribution of
the drug or medical device the retail seller or other distributor fails to exercise reasonable care and such failure
148
causes harm to persons.
Commentary
Section 6 encompasses both traditional and nontraditional
approaches to the question of manufacturer liability for the sale of
I49
drugs or medical devices.
It incorporates liability for manufacturing defects and recognizes that manufacturers may also be held
liable for failure to properly warn health care providers or, where
I50
appropriate, directly warn patients.
It incorporates a new provision that justifies the imposition of liability on manufacturers for
defective design,I51 but on the basis of legal principles separate and
distinct from section 2 (b) . The rationale for the difference in
treatment is as follows:
The obligation of a manufacturer to warn about risks
attendant to the use of drugs and medical devices that
may be sold only pursuant to a health care provider's prescription traditionally has required warnings directed to
health care providers and not to patients. The rationale
supporting this "learned intermediary" rule is that only
health care professionals are in a position to understand
the significance of the risks involved and to assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of a given form of prescription-based therapy. The duty then devolves on the
health care provider to supply to the patient such information as is deemed appropriate under the circumstances
so that the patient can make an informed choice as to
therapy. Subsection (d)(l) retains the "learned intermediary" rule. However, in certain limited therapeutic relationships the physician or other health care provider has a
much diminished role as an evaluator or decision-maker.
In these instances it may be appropriate to impose on the
manufacturer the duty to warn the patient directly. See
Subsection (d)(2).
The traditional refusal by courts to impose tort liability
for defective designs of prescription drugs and medical
148.
149.
150.
151.

Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 6.
See id. cmt. a.
See id.
See id.
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devices is based on the fact that a prescription drug or
medical device entails a unique set of risks and benefits.
What may be harmful to one patient may be beneficial to
another. Under Subsection (c) a drug is defectively designed only when it provides no net benefit to any class of
patients. Courts have concluded that as long as a drug or
medical device provides net benefits to some persons under some circumstances, the drug or device manufacturer
should be required to instruct and warn health care providers of the foreseeable risks and benefits. Courts have
also recognized that the regulatory system governing prescription drugs is a legitimate mechanism for setting the
standards for drug design. In part, this deference reflects
concerns over the possible negative effects of judicially
imposed liability on the cost and availability of valuable
medical technology. This deference also rests on two further assumptions: first, that prescribing health care providers, when adequately informed by drug manufacturers,
are able to assure that the right drugs and medical devices
reach the right patients; and second, that governmental
regulatory agencies adequately review new prescription
drugs and devices, keeping unreasonably dangerous designs off the market.
Nevertheless, unqualified deference to these regulatory
mechanisms is considered by a growing number of courts
to be unjustified. An approved prescription drug or
medical device can present significant risks without corresponding advantages. At the same time, manufacturers
must have ample discretion to develop useful drugs and
devices without subjecting their design decisions to the
ordinary test applicable to products generally under §
2(b). Accordingly, Subsection (c) imposes a more rigorous test for defect than does § 2 (b), which does not apply
to prescription drugs and medical devices. The requirement for establishing defective design of a prescription
drug or medical device under Subsection (c) is that the
drug or device have so little merit compared with its risks
that reasonable health care providers, possessing knowledge of risks, would not have prescribed the drug or device for any class of patients. Thus, a prescription drug or
medical device that has usefulness to any class of patients
IS not defective in design even if it is harmful to other patients. Because of the special nature of prescription drugs
and medical devices, the determination of whether such
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products are not reasonably safe is to be made under Subsections (c) and (d) rather than under §§ 2(b) and 2(C).152
The standard for manufacturing defects is section 2(a), which
questions whether the product departed from its intended design.153 There are separate standards for determining liability for
inadequate warnings or instructions and design defects. The design standard does not incorporate section 2(b)'s design standard,
which states that a product is defective "when the foreseeable risks
of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided
by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design... and the
omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe. "154 Section 6 of the Restatement (Third) differs. It asserts that a prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably
safe because of defective design only when the foreseeable risks of
harm are sufficiently great in relation to its therapeutic benefits
and when a reasonable health care provider would not prescribe
the drug or device for any class of patients. 155
The rationale for the difference is as follows:
Subsection (c) reflects the judgment that, as long as a
given drug or device provides net benefits for a class of
patients, it should be available to them, accompanied by
appropriate warnings and instructions. Learned intermediaries must generally be relied upon to see that the right
drugs and devices reach the right patients. However,
when a drug or device provides net benefits to no class of
patients-when reasonable, informed health care providers would not prescribe it to any class of patients-then
the design of the product is defective and the manufacturer should be subject to liabiiity for the harm caused.
A defendant prescription drug or device manufacturer
defeats plaintiffs design claim by establishing one or
more contexts in which its product would be prescribed
by reasonable, informed health care providers. That
some individual providers do, in fact, prescribe defendant's product does not in itself suffice to defeat plaintiffs
claim. Evidence regarding the actual conduct of health
care providers, while relevant and admissible, is not necessarily controlling. The issue is whether, objectively
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. cmt. b.
See id. § 2(a).
Id. § 2(b).
See id. § 6(c).
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viewed, reasonable providers, possessing the knowledge
that a reasonable drug manufacturer had or should have
had about the risks and benefits attendant to the use of
the drug or medical device, would prescribe it for any
class of patients. Given this very demanding objective
standard, liability is likely to be imposed only under unusual circumstances. The court has the responsibility to
determine when the plaintiff has met the burden of pro156
duction for this demanding standard.
The Reporters' Note expands on the position taken in the
comments:
Subsection (c) reflects the view that, as long as a given
drug or device provides net benefits for some category of
patients, it should be available to that group, albeit with
adequate warnings and instructions supplied to learned
intermediaries. Learned medical intermediaries must be
relied upon to direct the appropriate drugs to the appropriate patients. However, when a drug or device provides
no net benefits to any ascertainable patient class-when
reasonably informed medical providers would not prescribe the drug and no reasonable, informed manufacturer would place it on the market-then the product design is defective and the manufacturer should be liable for
the harm caused by selling it.
The proposed rule in § 6(c) best advances the policies
and values explicated in Comment h. It shows appropriate deference to the regulated market, where the FDA
and learned intermediaries select which drugs should be
available to the public generally and which drugs should
be given to individual patients, respectively. It does not,
on the other hand, wholly exempt defendants from liabil156.

Id. cmt. f. The following illustration shows the application:
ABC Pharmaceuticals manufactures and distributes D, a prescription
drug intended to prolong pregnancy and thus to reduce the risks associated with premature birth. Patricia, six months pregnant with a history
of irregular heart beats, was given D during a hospital stay. As a result,
she suffered heart failure and required open heart surgery. In Patricia's
action against ABC, her expert testified that, notwithstanding FDA approval of D, the drug did not prolong pregnancy for any class of patients
and posed serious risks of heart failure in patients with a history of irregular heart beats. Notwithstanding a finding by the trier of fact that
ABC gave adequate warnings to the prescribing physician, the trier of
fact can find that reasonably informed health care providers would not
prescribe D for any class of patients, thus rendering ABC subject to liability.
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ity simply because other institutions have taken steps to
improve product safety. Subsection (c ) is a significant
departure from the general defective design rules espoused in §§ 1 and 2, in recognition of the unique characteristics of prescription drugs and medical devices. Unlike most products, which confer essentially the same
benefits to all users, prescription drugs and medical devices have the capacity to do great harm or great good
depending on the particular patient. Accordingly, liability will attach onl); if the design cannot be justified for any
class of patients.!
The liability of drug manufacturers for defective design and
failure to warn was covered by comment k in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, section 402A:!58
There are some products which, in the present state of
human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made
safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies,
which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and use of the vaccine are fully justified,
notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk
which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared,
and accompanied by proper directions and warnings, is
not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same
is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many
of which for this very reason cannot be legally sold except
to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It
is also tn,le in particular of many new or experimental
drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity
for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients,
but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and
use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable
risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and
proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is
not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has un[d. illus. l.
157. [d. Reporters' Note, at 186-87.

158.

See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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dertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful
and desirable product~ attended with a known but appar15
ently reasonable risk.
The Minnesota courts, while dealing with drug cases involving
the failure to warn,l60 have not had occasion to consider a drug or
medical device company's liability for defective design.
The
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota made that
determination in a diversity case against G.D. Searle & Co. for defective design of an intrauterine device.
In Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co. 161 the court predicted that
Minnesota would adopt comment k, given the opportunity.162 The
court also held that comment k was inapplicable to all prescription
drugs as a matter of law,163 and that the issue had to be resolved by
a jury according to the following factors:
(i) whether the product could have been designed in a
safer manner;
(ii) whether a safer alternative product could have been
available [at the time of manufacture and sale] to accomplish the same intended purpose as the product in question; and
(iii) whether the benefits of the product outweigh the interest in promoting enhanced accountability on the part
l64
of the manufacturer.
In a second opinion on the issue, the Kociemba court concluded that the policy considerations underlying its first order on
l65
the question were correct. However, in a shift, the court said that
it "now finds that these policy considerations are implicitly reflected in the negligence-based 'reasonable care' balancing standard adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in strict liability de159. Seeid.
160. See, e.g., Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 698 (Minn. 1977)
(affirming the trial court's dismissal of the drug manufacturer because the alleged
deficiency in the manufacturer's warning did not cause the injuries); Mulder v.
Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 335-36, 181 N.W.2d 882, 885 (1970) (holding that a
drug manufacturer was not liable for failure to warn because the doctor prescribing the drug was fully aware of the drugs hazards).
161. 680 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Minn. 1988).
162. See id. at 1300.
163. See id.
164. [d. at 1301 (citing Patten v. Lederle Lab., 676 F. Supp. 233 (D. Utah
1987».
165. See Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 695 F. Supp. 432, 433 (D. Minn.
1988).
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sign defect cases."I66 In addition, the court held that because of the
importance of those policy considerations in prescription drug
cases, the jury should be explicitly instructed "that it may consider
the reasonable but unavoidable side effects of a prescription drug
at the same time it considers the reasonableness of a design de,,167
£ec.
t
In its supporting analysis, the Kociemba court noted the history
of Minnesota products liability law, beginning with the supreme
court's sanction of Restatement (Second), section 402A in McCorl68
mack.
The court noted the policy reasons for section 402A, including the use of the Restatement (Second)'s consumer expectation
standard to determine the defect issue, and the concern expressed
in many jurisdictions about the problem of imposing unreasonable
liability on drug manufacturers. The latter concern was blunted by
the adoption of comment k, which in effect makes a manufacturer
liable only if it fails to adequately warn of the dangers associated
169
The court noted the policy reasons unwith the use of its drugs.
derlying comment k:
First, manufacturers should be encouraged to develop
products such as prescription drugs even though such
products are incapable of being made safe given the present state of knowledge. Such encouragement can only be
accomplished by limiting the manufacturer's liability to
instances where the manufacturer acted in an unreasonable manner which, in comment k terms, occurs when the
manufacturer fails to adequately warn the user of the reasonable dangers inherent in the product.
Second, holding drug manufacturers up to a consumer
expectation standard for injuries caused by unavoidably
unsafe but necessary prescription drugs can increase
product liability insurance rates and litigation costs to the
extent that drug manufacturers are not able to sell phar170
maceutical products at affordable prices.
The court noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court had not
adopted comment k, but that it had adopted a balancing test much

166.
Holm v.
167.
168.
169.
170.

[d. at 433 (citing Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984) and
Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982».
[d.
See id.
See id.

[d. at 433-34.
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like the one required by comment k.171 The court then concluded
that the comment k policy considerations are, in effect, incorporated in Minnesota's negligence-based standards for design defects:
Analysis of the texts of JIG 117 and comment k reveals
that both require a risk/utility balancing test to determine
the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct in producing a given product. The major difference between
the tests is that comment k explicitly provides that a
manufacturer may act reasonably in manufacturing an
unavoidably unsafe product while JIG 117 merely implies
the same.
Because the balancing tests are essentially the same, it
became clear that the Court should not give separate special verdict questions to reflect each balancing test. To do
so would require the jury to conduct the same risk/utility
balancing test twice. Moreover, the jury's possible decision to tip the balance in different directions could lead
to perverse verdicts.
Rather, this Court adopted a position in which the jury
can consider unavoidable but reasonable risks of a desirable product at he same time it considers the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct. To accomplish this,
the jury received only one special verdict question on
whether the Cu-7 was defectively designed. The jury was
then given an instruction based on JIG 117 followed by an
instruction which states:
A product prescribed by a physician is not negligently designed merely because it may have side effects.
Some products, given the present state of human
knowledge cannot be made totally safe for their intended and ordinary use. Because of the nature of
the ingredients or natural characteristics of the
product, their use involves substantial risk of injury,
and some users will necessarily be harmed. Thus a
manufacturer is not negligent merely because it supplies the public with an apparently useful and desirable product that has a known but apparently reasonable risk.
In taking this course of action, the Court reduces the
possibility of perverse verdicts because the jury is only
171.

See id. at 434.
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considering one balancing test. More importantly, these
instructions strike a fair balance between the policy encouraging a manufacturer to produce useful but unavoidably dangerous products and the policy that a manufacturer be held accountable for unreasonable conduct.
The manufacturer of a desirable yet unavoidably unsafe
product is protected in that it will not be held liable if it
uses reasonable care in manufacturing an inherently dangerous product. On the other hand, the consuming public is protected in that a manufacturer continues to be
held accountable for its unreasonable behavior.
The need for this balanced approach is readily apparent given the evidence of this case. Defendant has
brought forth evidence that all IUDs are unavoidably
dangerous in that the insertion procedure unavoidably
increases the chance of pelvic infection. Plaintiffs have
brought forth evidence that the specific Cu-7 design unreasonably increases the risk of infection above and beyond the risk associated with the insertion procedure. If, .
for example, the jury accepts the above-cited evidence as
true, the jury can, and should, consider Searle's reasonable conduct in developing an unavoidably unsafe but desirable product as well as its unreasonable conduct in not
172
developing the safest possible IUD.
The court's prediction of the position the Minnesota courts
would take on the issue of defective design in drug cases has yet to
be verified. The fact that the Minnesota Supreme Court has
adopted a risk-utility standard to evaluate design cases does not
mean that the Minnesota courts would strike the balance the same
way as the court in Kociemba and reject comment k in favor of the
risk-utility approach.
The court's opinion in Forsterv. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co.J7g provides some insight into Kociemba's prediction. Forster claim was
brought by a plaintiff suffering lung cancer against RJ. Reynolds
174
and others.
The suit alleged a variety of theories, including the
175
defective design of cigarettes.
The principal issue in the case
concerned the preemption of the plaintiff's tort claims by the Ciga176
rette Labeling and Advertising Act. The supreme court held that
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 435 (citations omitted).
437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989).
See id. at 656.
See id. at 661.
See id. at 657 (citing Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C.
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the plaintiffs claim for defective design was not preempted by the
177
federal act.
The defendant argued that the Minnesota design
claim was preempted because Congress had performed its own risk178
utility analysis and concluded that cigarettes could be used.
The
court saw no conflict, however, because the congressional policy
differed from "what products liability has in mind." The court
noted:
Strict liability assumes the product is useable and asks only
if it has been safely designed. So understood we see no
conflict between the state tort action and the Act. We
hold that plaintiff's claim in strict liability for unsafe design is not preempted. The complaint also alleges that
defendant's product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for use. It is unclear what plaintiffs
have in mind here, but if plaintiffs can prove a defective
condition or a defective design-apart from any claim of
inadequa9' of warning-we see no conflict with the federal Act. 179
In a footnote, the court explored the relationship between the
plaintiffs claim and the Restatement (Second):
The claims of unsafe design and defective condition
remain exposed to defendants' asserted defense, yet to be
ruled on, that they fail to state a claim for relief under
state law. Defendants, for example, point to the discussion of a defective condition for food and drink products
in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). The Restatement takes the position that products like tobacco and
whiskey, though addictive and harmful to health, are not
"defective," unless foreign substances are added.
Id.
comment i. In any event, the parties have not yet set out
their positions on unsafe desi~ and defective condition
beyond the pleading stage .... 80
The court in Forster noted that the risk-utility approach is used
181
in Minnesota to decide design cases. That fact alone seems insufficient to speculate on the issue of whether the Minnesota courts
would adopt the Restatement (Second) position or reject it, whether
the issue is comment k or comment i of the Restatement.
§§1331-1339 (1994».
177. See id. at 661.
17S. See id.
179. [d.
ISO. [d. at 661 n.S.
lSI. See id. at 661.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court would assess its pOSItIon in
light of what other jurisdictions have done. There is sugport elsewhere for use of a risk-utility balancing approach, I perhaps
stronger and more in accord with the risk-utility approach than
that taken in Minnesota. However, any analysis of what the supreme court might do remains a prediction. Kociemba is a studied
prediction, but nothing more.

§ 7. LIABILl1Y OF COMMERCIAL SELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR FOR HARM
CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE FOOD PRODUCTS

One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing food products who sells or distributes a defective food product
under § 2, § 3, or § 4 is subject to liability for harm to persons or
property caused by the defect. Under § 2(a) a harm-causing ingredient of the food product constitutes a defect if a reasonable consumer would not expect the food product to contain that ingredi183
en.
t
Commentary
The ordinary rules applicable to other defective products are
also applicable to claims arising out of harm caused by defects in
l84
commercially distributed food products.
The potential defects in
food are the same as in other products. Food products can contain
manufacturing flaws or design defects, or they may be sold with inadequate warnings. Section 3 may permit recovery when the plaintiff is unable to point to a specific injury-causing defect, and section
4 may apply if a food product does not conform to applicable safety
185
regulations.
If the plaintiff claims the harm suffered resulted
from the presence of foreign matter in food, a pebble in a can of
peas for example, then the claim is readily handled under section
186
2(a). Section 2(a) deals with liability for manufacturing flaws.
There are special problems, however, when the plaintiff is injured by an ingredient in a food product and it is unclear whether
the injury-causing ingredient is an inherent aspect of the product
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See Proposed Final Draft, sUfrra note 6, § 6 Reporters' Note, at 183-84.
Id. § 7.
See id. ernt. a.
See id.
See id. ernt. b.
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187

or an unanticipated adulteration of the product.
The &statement
(Third) uses the example of a one-inch chicken bone in a chicken
enchilada and asks whether it is a manufacturing defect or simply
an inherent aspect of the product:
The analytical problem stems from the circumstance
that food products in many instances do not have specific
product designs that may be used as a basis for determining whether the offending product component constitutes
a departure from design, and thus a manufacturing defect. Food recipes vary over time, within the same restaurant or other commercial food-preparation facility, from
facility to facility, and from locale to locale.
Faced with this indeterminacy, some courts have attempted to rely on a distinction between "foreign" and
"natural" characteristics of food products to determine liability. Under that distinction, liability attaches only if the
alleged adulteration is foreign rather than natural to the
product. Most courts have found this approach inadequate, however. Although a one-inch chicken bone may
in some sense be "natural" to a chicken enchilada, depending on the context in which consumption takes
place, the bone may still be unexpected by the reasonable
consumer, who will not be able to avoid injury, thus rendering the product not reasonably safe. The majority view
is that, in this circumstance of uncertainty, the issue of
whether a food product containing a dangerous but arguably natural component is defective under § 2(a) is to
be determined by reference to reasonable consumer expectations within the relevant context of consumption. A
consumer expectations test in this context relies upon culturally defined, widely shared standards that food products ought to meet. Although consumer expectations are
not adequate to supply a standard for defect in other contexts, assessments of what consumers have a right to expect in various commercial food preparations are sufficiently well-formed that judges and triers of fact can
sensibly resolve whether liability should be imposed using
th IS stan d ard .188
Standards aside, the food cases present difficult proof problems. One of the issues is whether the defendant may introduce
evidence that its quality control methods were such that the food
o

187.
188.

See id.
Id.
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189
could not have been adulterated or contaminated.
The Reporters' Note indicates that a substantial number of courts permit quality control evidence to be introduced as circumstantial proof that
the food product was not contaminated at the time of sale. 190
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet taken a position on
the question of standards in this line of cases. The court of appeals
visited the issue in Kneibel v. RRM Enterprises, 191 but without taking a
clear position on the issue. The plaintiff in the case suffered dental
injuries when he bit down on a hard object while eating ribs at a
192
restaurant.
He was unable to identify the object that allegedly
broke his tooth because he reflexively swallowed the evidence after
193
he was injured.
His negligence suit against the restaurant was
dismissed by the trial court, aEparently because of his inability to
1
satisfy the foreign-natural test. 4
The court of appeals noted both the foreign-natural and rea195
sonable expectations tests.
The foreign natural test distinguishes
"'between injury caused by spoiled, impure, or contaminated food
or food containing a foreign substance, and injury caused by a substance natural to the product sold. ",196 If the substance is natural,
there is no liability.197 The reasonable expectation test determines
the consumer's reasonable expectations of the food as it is served,
rather than the natural occurrences in the food ingredients before
198
preparation. The issue is usually decided by a jury. 199
The court of appeals failed to take a position on the appropriate test for Minnesota because of its conclusion that the plaintiff
200
failed to satisfy either test.
The plaintiff argued that the tests differ because under the reasonable expectations test the plaintiff
201
need not identify the harmful object.
He argued that there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether a person eating ribs

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
1966».
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See id. Reporters' Note, at 194.
See id.
506 N.W.2d 664 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
See id. at 665.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 661H>7.
[d. at 666 (quoting Hunt v. Ferguson-Paulus Enters., 415 P.2d 13, 14 (Or.
See id.
See id.
See id. (citing Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 103 N.W.2d 64, 69 (Wis. 1960».
See id.
See id. at 667.
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202
would expect to chew on a hard object that would break a tooth.
The court of appeals concluded that where the reasonable expectations test is used in a negligence action, there must be a way
of determining whether the defendant had breached its duty of ordinary care to eliminate or remove harmful objects in the prepara203
tion of the food.
The court concluded that in absence of evidence identifying the harmful object there was no way to prove that
204
the restaurant breached its duty of care.
The plaintiff relied on
20
the exploding bottle cases to support his claim.
The court of appeals, however, distinguished those cases on the basis that explosion of a bottle is circumstantial evidence that the product was defective when it left the manufacturer's hands, but "it cannot be said
that an order of spare ribs is clearly defective because an unidentified hard object causes harm.,,206
Kneibel is framed in terms of a negligence claim, but the standards appear to be equally applicable to claims based on strict liability. The supreme court's exploding bottle cases certainly demand circumstantial proof of the defect that caused inj ury. 207
However, it is also arguable that in referring to the foreseeability of
the harm and the defendant's obligation to exercise ordinary care
to eliminate or remove harmful bones in the preparation of food,
the court of appeals understates the defendant's duty. Because
there is no indication in the case that the plaintiff bit down on a
piece of bone, the reasonable expectation test perhaps was inapplicable. Arguably, the case simply involved a defect resolvable under
section 2(a) of the Restatement (Third), the provision applicable to
208
manufacturing defects.
If so, the court's concluding analysis is
correct, and the preceding analysis is unnecessary.
The court focused on the use of the reasonable expectations
standard in a negligence action, concluding that there must be a
way to determine whether the defendant breached its duty of ordinary care to eliminate or remove harmful objects in the prepara209
tion of the food.
The court held that there was no way to prove
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See id. (citing Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321,
188 N.W.2d 426 (1971».
206. See id.
207. See, e.g., Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 333,
188 N.W.2d 426, 434 (1971).
208. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 2(a).
209. See Kneibel, 506 N.W.2d at 667.
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21o

the defect without evidence identifying the harmful object.
IT the
plaintiff pled the case as a strict liability claim, the issue is whether
the standards would have differed or only the burden of proof on
the reasonable care issue.
The court's principal focus was on whether the object in the
211
ribs was a foreign or natural substance.
Requiring the plaintiff to
prove a "clear defect" seemed unduly harsh under the circumstances. This may be a case that would be better handled under
section 3 of Restatement (Third), under which the plaintiff might
have been entitled to recover.
Kneibel presents problems because it is unclear just exactly
what caused the plaintiff's injury. The foreign-natural test presents
problems because the plaintiff may have been injured by either a
212
foreign substance or a piece of bone. A reasonable expectations
test may create a jury issue as to whether he should reasonably expect such an injury while eating ribs. The trial court apparently
used the foreign-natural test, which the plaintiff on appeal argued
213
was improperly applied.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court, but on the basis that under either of standard the plaintiff
was not entitled to recover because of his inability to show that the
214
defendant breached its duty of due care.
The flaw in the plaintiff's case, according to the court of appeals, was the plaintiff's fail215
ure to identify the harmful object.
Absent that proof, there was
216
no proof of breach of duty.
A question arises as to whether the plaintiff's claim would have
failed under a strict liability theory as well, and whether it would
have received different treatment under the Restatement (Third).
Had the case proceeded under a strict liability theory, there still
would have been a question as to the appropriate standard for
resolution· of the food cases. Assuming the Restatement's consumer
expectation standard applies, the issue is whether the case would
have been decided differently. In Kneibe~ the court concluded that
the plaintiff's inability to identify the harm-causing agent in the
ribs foreclosed his ability to prove that the defendant failed to ex-

210.
21l.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Seeid.
See id.
See id. at 665.
See id. at 667.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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217

ercise reasonable care.
In a negligence case, the plaintiff has the
burden of proving lack of due care on the part of the food seller.
In a case under section 7, the plaintiff should be entitled to recover
simply by proving that "a reasonable consumer would not expect
218
the food product to contain" the ingredient that caused harm.
The defendant may introduce evidence that it exercised reasonable
care, but only to prove that its exercise of reasonable care made it
unlikely that the product that injured the plaintiff was not con.
d at th·
tammate
e orne 0 f saIe. 219
Section 7 of the Restatement (Third) notes that section 2(a) may
22o
be used to establish the existence of a manufacturing defect.
If
section 2(a) applied, the issue would be whether the plaintiff had
sufficient circumstantial proof of the existence of the defect. 221 Of
course, under section 3 the Elaintiff need not prove the specific defect that caused the injury. 22 In Kneibel the Elaintiff was not responsible for the destruction of the evidence,23 and the critical issue is then whether the plaintiff's circumstantial evidence of the
existence of a defect in the ribs was sufficient to take the case to the
JUry.
There are two possible causes of the plaintiff's injury. One is a
foreign object, in which case there would be a clear case under section 2(a). The other is that the plaintlffwas injured by biting down
on a piece of bone. Bones are common in spareribs. The probabilities seem to be equally balanced. Even though the plaintiff
may not have bitten a piece of bone, one potential explanation is
that the plaintiff simply bit down on one of the ribs or a piece of
rib. With respect to the circumstantial proof in the case, the issue
is whether the plaintiff made a claim that a trier of fact should have
resolved.
The court of appeals rejected the Lee approach, concluding
that explosion of a bottle is circumstantial evidence that the product was defective when it left the defendant's hands, but that "it
cannot be said that an order of spare ribs is clearly defective be217. See id.
218. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 7.
219. See id. Reporters' Note, at 194.
220. See id. cmt. b.
221. See id. § 2(a).
222. See id. § 3.
223. See Kneibel v. RRM Enterprises, 506 N.W.2d 664, 665 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993). When the plaintiff bit down on the hard object, he swallowed reflexively
and destroyed the evidence. See id.
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cause an unidentified hard object causes harm. "224 The discussion
of the burden of proof is somewhat confusing because of the
court's note that there is no evidence in the case suggesting that
the ribs were "clearly defective."225 The usual issue is not whether
the plaintiff is able to prove that a harmful agent is "clearly defective," but rather whether the facts justify an inference that the
product is defective.
Section 7 of the Restatement seems to assume that the harmcausing ingredient, whether foreign or natural, is identified. If it is
not, then perhaps section 2(a), coupled with section 3, is appropriately applied. If so, using the Restatement standard, the plaintiff
would arguably have created a jury issue on the question.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has indicated the continuing
validity of the consumer expectation standard in cases involving
226
manufacturing flaws. There is no reason to think that the court
will adopt a foreign-natural test instead of a consumer expectation
standard in these kinds of cases.
§ 8. LIABILI'IY OF COMMERCIAL SELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR OF
DEFECTIVE USED PRODUCTS

One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing used products who sells or distributes a defective used product
is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the
defect if the defect:
(a) results from the seller's failure to exercise reasonable
care; or
(b) is a manufacturing defect under § 2(a) or a defect that
may be inferred under § 3 and the seller's marketing of the
product would cause a reasonable person in the position of the
buyer to expect the used product to present no greater risk of
defect than if the product were new; or
(c) is a defect under § 2 or § 3 in a used product remanufactured by the seller or a predecessor in the commercial chain
of distribution of the used product.
224. [d. at 667.
225. /d.
226. See Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 441 v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., No. C0-96-594, 1996
WL 689768, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1996) (affirming the trial court's use of
consumer expectation jury instructions as being appropriate for cases involving
manufacturing flaws), review denied, (Minn. Jan. 29, 1997).
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A used product is a product that, prior to the time of sale or
other distribution referred to in this Section, is commercially sold
or otherwise distributed to a buyer not in the commercial chain of
227
distribution and used for some period of time.
Commentary
The comments explain the reason for the deviation from the
basic liability standards in section 2:
American courts have struggled with the question of
whether to hold commercial sellers of used products to
the same legal standards of responsibility for defects as
commercial sellers of new products. Judicial responses
have varied. Some courts hold used-product sellers strictly
liable for harm caused by product defects existing at the
time of sale. A greater number of courts hold commercial
sellers of used products to lesser standards of responsibility. Liability rules applicable to used-product sellers are
less stringent than those applicable to new product sellers
due to the wide variations in the type and condition of
used products. For example, even in the minority of jurisdictions that generally hold commercial used-product
sellers strictly liable for defects, disclaimers of liability may
more readily be given effect in connection with sales of
used products than in connection with sales of new products. Even in jurisdictions that generally apply more relaxed standards of responsibility for used products, factors
that tend to raise a buyer's expectations regarding product quality, such as a seller's advertising a used product as
"re-built" or "re-conditioned," correspondingly tend to
raise the level of the sellers' responsibilities for product
228
defects.
There are several variations in the rules. The rules apply only
229
when a used product is involved. To be "used" within the meaning of the section, the product must have been commercially sold
or otherwise distributed to a buyer who is not in the commercial
chain of distribution, and it must have been used for some period
of time, before the time of the sale or other distribution covered in
230
section 8.
The fact that a product has been tested, such as a rna227.
228.
229.
230.

Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 8.
[d. cmt. a.
See id. § 8.
See id.
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tor vehicle test-driven at a dealership, does not cast the product as
231
used within the meaning of section 8.
Once a new product has
been sold or distributed, "any use of the product by the buyer or
other person not in the chain of distribution, for however short a
period of time, transforms the product into a used product. "232
Section 8 applies only to commercial sellers who are engaged
233
in the business of selling used products. The section is inapplicable to noncommercial private owners of used products who sell
those products to others, nor is it applicable to commercial establishments that make only occasional sales of used equipment out234
side the regular course of business. However, even though those
sellers outside the scope of the Restatement (Third) may be liable
. . 1es. 235
·
un d er general neg1Igence
pnnClp
A seller or distributor of used products is subject to liability
under subpart (a) for harm caused by a used product that results
236
from the seller's failure to exercise reasonable care.
Even if strict
liability does not apply, the seller must exercise reasonable care,
and a consumer of used products has a right to expect that the
seller will do SO.237
Subsections (b) and (c) subject a commercial seller of used
238
products to liability only under limited circumstances.
The reason is that consumers generally do not, and should not, expect
most used products that are sold in obviously used condition to
perform as safely as new products. 239 Several factors influence consumer expectations with respect to used products:
For example, the age and condition of used products and
the commensurate lower prices paid for such products
alert reasonable buyers to the possibility of defects and
the need to monitor the safety aspects of such products
over time according to their age and condition. Given
the awareness of buyers generally regarding the risks of
harm presented by used products in varying stages of
physical deterioration, primary responsibility for allocating these risks may, in the absence of fault on the part of
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See id. cmt. d.
[d.

See id. cmt. c.
See id.
See id.
See id. § 8(a).
See id. cmt. h.
See id.
See id.
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the used-product seller or some special circumstance that
justifies strict liability, be delegated to commercial markets for used products, in which the terms of sale vary
widely depending on the apparent condition of such
24O
products at the time of sale.
However, when the used product is sold under circumstances
where a reasonable buyer would expect the product to perform as
a new product, the Restatement takes a different position:
[U]nder the circumstances described in Subsection (b),
many of the same rationales that support strict liability for
harm caused by mechanical defects in new products support strict liability for mechanical defects in like-new used
products. This section does not adopt the "consumer expectations test" as the governing standard for defining
product defect. This Restatement has rejected that test as
the sole test for defect in § 2 and does not adopt it in this
Section .... The question addressed in this Section is under what circumstances a plaintiff may hold the seller of a
used product to the liability standard applicable to sellers
of new products. When dealing with this more limited
question, Subsection (b) takes the position that when the
seller's marketing of the product would lead a reasonable
consumer to expect the product to present no greater risk
of defect than if the product were new that the law may
treat the used product sale as the functional equivalent of
241
the sale of a new product.
For similar reasons, the remanufacture of a used product will
subject the seller to strict liability. Subsection (c) includes manufacturing defects, design defects and defects that are based on in242
adequate instructions or wamings.
The Reporters' Note following section 8 discusses the difficulty in concluding with any
certainty the exact degree of support for section 8 rules because of
the varied opinion applicability of strict liability to the sale of used
243
products.
Minnesota groducts liability law is filled with cases involving used products,2 although they have not raised the same
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See id.
243. See id. Reporters' Note, at 213.
244. See, e.g., Andrew v. White-Rodgers Co., 465 N.W.2d 102 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991) (discussing the products liability issues arising from an accident involving a
used space heater); Rients v. International Harvester Co., 346 N.W.2d 359 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1984) (discussing products liability issues arising from an accident involving a used tractor).
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issues presented in section 8 of the Restatement.
In Gorath v. Rockwell International, Inc.,245 the plaintiff suffered
injuries when the blade of a guillotine paper cutter into which he
was feeding paper at his place .of employment spontaneously
246
turned around and cut off his hand. The plaintiff claimed he did
247
not touch either of the two hand levers that activated the blade.
The paper cutter was manufactured and sold in 1947, and the first
owner of the machine used it for over twenty years with no mishaps.248 In 1972, the seller sold the paper cutter with a thirty-day
warranty to Gorath's employer, where it was used for over nine
e t h e accl' d
. occurre d .249
years b elore
ent'm question
A two-handed start mechanism was the primary safety device
250
on the machine.
The right lever moved the blade, and the left
lever was a safety feature that insured the operator could not oper251
ate the blade with one hand while the other was under the blade.
Three component parts of the safety lever were not the originally
252
manufactured components.
The plaintiff's experts attributed the accident to the product's
defective design rather than to the parts that had been replaced on
the paper cutter. The manufacturer's expert, however, testified
that the replaced parts could have both prevented the effective use
of the left-hand safety lever and prevented the safety lever from re253
turning to its proper position. The seller in the case denied hav. ever rep Iace d any component parts. 254
mg
The plaintiff brought suit against both the manufacturer and
255
seller of the paper cutter. The trial court granted the seller's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's strict liability, negligence,
256
and implied warranty claims against the seller.
On appeal, the court of appeals noted that Minnesota Statutes
section 544.41 pennitted the dismissal of nonmanufacturing de-

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

441 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
See id. at 130.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 129.
See id. at 129-30.
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fendants, including sellers of used products,257 from strict liability
claims where the product manufacturer is solvent and subject to ju258
risdiction in Minnesota.
The trial court, however, may not enter
a dismissal order against a defendant if the plaintiff establishes one
of the three following statutory exceptions:
(a) That the defendant has exercised some significant
control over the design or manufacture of the product, or
has provided instructions or warnings to the manufacturer
relative to the alleged defect in the product which caused
the injury, death or damage;
(b) That the defendant had actual knowledge of the defect in the product which caused the injury, death or
damage; or
(c) That the defendant created the defect in the product
which caused the i~ury, death or damage. 259
The court of appeals concluded that because the paper cutter
manufacturer's correct identity was known, the seller was not subject to strict liability in tort absent a finding that one of the statu.
tory exceptIons
was app l'lcabl e. 260
The court held that the seller did not exercise significant con261
trol over the product.
The plaintiff argued that the seller's alteration constituted the exercise of significant control, although
the seller denied any alteration and there was no evidence to the
contrary.262 In a related argument, the plaintiff also argued that a
factual dispute existed as to whether the original product defect
263
was due to the manufacturer's design or the seller's modification.
According to the court of appeals, the argument failed on the facts
because the plaintiff did not present evidence that tended to show
the seller made any modifications. Also, it failed because it did not
establish a reasonable inference that any modification caused the
plaintiff's injury.264 Without showing that the product seller created the defect, the plaintiff also failed to show that the seller had
265
actual knowledge of any defect in the product.
As a result, the
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

See id. at 132.
See id. at 131.
MINN. STAT. § 544.41, subd. 3 (1996).
See Garath, 441 N.W.2d at 134.
See id. at 131.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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plaintiff did not meet the exception in subpart (b) of subdivision
266
3.
The court found its interpretation of the statute to be consistent with the treatment of used product sellers in other jurisdic267
tions.
The court noted that case law from other jurisdictions
"holds that the seller of used products should be held in the case if
the salesperson was more than a passive middleman and had some
involvement with the condition of the product. "268 The cases noted
269
by the court of appeals, Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., a
1975 Illinois Supreme Court case, and Crandell v. Larkin and Jones
Appliance CO.,270 decided by the South Dakota Supreme Court in
1983, take the general position that sellers of used products should
not be held strictly liable based on the fact that they, unlike retailers and wholesalers of new products, are ordinarily not in a position to apply pressure on the product manufacturer to make its
271
products safer.
The South Dakota Supreme Court noted in
Crandell that a product manufacturer of a reconditioned or rebuilt
product could be subject to strict liability in order to protect the
consumer's reasonable expectations of safety under those circum272
stances.
The plaintiff in Gorath also asserted that the seller was negligent in failing to inspect the cutter, in failing to warn the purchaser
about the product's design defects, and in selling a dangerous
274
273
product.
The court of appeals held that all three claims failed.
First, the court held that sellers do not have an obligation to inspect the products they sell unless ther either know or have reason
27
to know the products are dangerous.
The statement is consistent
with the position taken by the Restatement (Second) of Torts in section
402. It provides:
A seller of a chattel manufactured by a third person, who
neither knows nor has reason to know that it is, or is likely
to be, dangerous, is not liable in an action for negligence
for harm caused by the dangerous character or condition
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

See id. at 132.
See id. (citations omitted).
See id. (citations omitted).
329 N.E.2d 785, 787 (Ill. 1975).
334 N.W.2d 31,34 (S.D. 1983).
See Peterson, 329 N.E.2d at 787; Crandell, 334 N.W.2d at 34.
See Crandell, 334 N.W.2d at 34.
See Corath, 441 N.W.2d at 132, 133.
See id.
See id. at 132.
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of the chattel because of his failure to discover the danler
2
by an inspection or test of the chattel before selling it.
In Crothers v. Cohen,277 also cited authority in Gorath,278 the court
of appeals held that the seller could be held liable for failing to inspect the used car for latent defects before selling it to the plain279
tiff.
The trial court instructed the jury that a seller "has a duty to
use ordinary care to discover obvious defects which would constitute a menace or source of danger. The seller is not required to
disassemble the vehicle to make this observation.,,28o The court of
appeals approved the instruction because it was based on Kothe v.
Tysdale,281 a 1951 Minnesota Supreme Court case that established
the basic duty of a vendor or lessor who intends to use the vehicle
on the public highways.282 The duty is:
[T] 0 exercise reasonable care in supplying the purchaser
or the lessee with a vehicle that will not constitute a menace or source of danger thereon; that liability attaches to
such vendor or lessor for injuries which are the result of
patent defects in the vehicle thus provided, or of defects
therein which could have been discovered by the exercise
of ordinary care; and that such liability exists irrespective
of any contractual obligations between the parties to the
" a l transactIon.
. 283
ongm
The Kothe court also approved the position taken in Egan Chev285
84
rolet Co. v. Brunel by the Eighth Circuit:
A retail dealer who takes a used truck in trade and undertakes to repair and recondition it for resale for use upon
the public highways owes a duty to the public to use reasonable care in the making of tests for the purpose of detecting defects which would make the truck a menace to
those who might use it or come in contact with it and in
making the repairs necessary to render the truck reasonably safe for use upon the public highways, and is charged
276. RFsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 (1965).
277. 384 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. Ct. App.), review denied, (Minn. June 13, 1986).
278. See Gorath, 441 N.W.2d at 132.
279. See Crothers, 384 N.W.2d at 562.
280. [d. at 565.
281. 233 Minn. 163,46 N.W.2d 233 (1951).
282. See id. at 168, 46 N.W.2d at 236.
283. [d.
284. 102 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1939).
285. See Kothe, 233 Minn. at 168, 46 N.W.2d at 236. See also McCleod v. Holt
Motor Co., 208 Minn. 473, 477, 294 N.w. 479, 481 (1940) (approving of the
Eighth Circuit's holding in Egan).
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with knowledge of defects which are patent or discoverable in the exercise of ordinary care . . . . The rule does
not mean-as the appellant seems to fear-that a dealer
in used motor vehicles, who undertakes to recondition a
truck for resale, becomes virtually an insurer of the safety
of the truck he sells, nor does it mean that he is required
to disassemble an entire truck to examine each of its
286
parts .
The duty noted in Egan, however, seems limited to used auto287
If so, that means that sellers of used equipment owe a
mobiles.
duty of care not subject to the Egan limitation for used motor vehi288
cles.
The court of appeals in Gorath also held that the seller in the
case could not be held liable on the basis of a failure to warn
claim. 289 Because of the multiple alterations to the paper cutter
over its thirty year life, the court concluded that "the connection
between the sale of this used product and the accident some 9
years later is too remote to impose liability as a matter of public
policy.,,290 The court concluded that the seller was not liable under
the plaintiff's modified part theory because under that theory, a
seller is liable only for the injuries resulting directly from modifica29
tions it made to the product. ! There was no evidence that the
seller modified or replaced any of the parts on the paper cutter
292
that may have caused the plaintiff's injuries.
Minnesota Statutes section 544.41 deviates from the general
rule that a product seller in the chain of manufacture or distribu293
tion can be held strictly liable.
Its opt-out provision permits dismissal from a products liability suit of a nonmanufacturing defendant where the manufacturer is solvent and subject to jurisdiction
294
in Minnesota.
It does not specifically state what defendants are
covered by the section, and it permits dismissal only of strict liability claims, not claims based on negligence or warranty other than
286. Egan, lO2 F.2d at 375-76.
287. See id. at 375.
288. See Sanders v. Strickler's Research and Eng'g Co., No. C3-92-1181, 1993
WL 71645, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App.), review denied,( Minn. April 29, 1993).
289. See Corath v. Rockwell Infl, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989).
290. Id.
291. See id.
292. See id.
293. See MINN. STAT. § 544.41, subd. 2 (1996).
294. See id.
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implied warranty of merchantability.295 However, Minnesota courts
have held liable defendants who are product sellers other than
manufacturers. 296
To invoke section 544.41, the product manufacturer must be
297
available and subject to suit.
The claim against the manufacturer
298
is based on the manufacturer's sale of a defective product.
The
claim against parties other than the manufacturer depends on
proof that the non-manufacturing party is in the chain of distribu•
299
llon.
The exceptions in subdivision 3 of section 544.41 mean that
the non-manufacturing defendant may be held in on the strict liability claim asserted against it. Yet, it also means that as a preliminary matter a defendant may not be subject to Minnesota'sjurisdic30o
tion unless it is part of the chain of distribution in the first place.
Furthermore, while the Gorath court held that the section applied
to sellers of used products,301 it does so only when the seller is part
302
of the chain of distribution.
If not, the section would be inapplicable because there would be no product manufacturer who would
303
be subject to jurisdiction in Minnesota. If the plaintiff establishes
that the used product seller is actually the manufacturer, then the
used product seller would be subject to strict liability, and the
original manufacturer would be off the hook, and thus section
304
544.41 would have no impact.
In sum, the exceptions in subdivision 3 establish that the
product seller, including a used product seller, may be held liable
under a strict liability theory, along with the original product
305
manufacturer.
If the product seller is in effect treated as the
product manufacturer, then the original manufacturer would not
295. See id.
296. See, e.g., Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 258 N.W.2d 782, 786-87 (Minn.
1977) (holding that there was sufficient evidence to establish retail sellers' duty to
warn against improper use of a space heater); Anderson v. Shaughnessy, 519
N.W.2d 229, 232-33 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (reversing district court's dismissal of a
product seller), rev'd on other grounds, 526 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1995).
297. See MINN. STAT. § 544.41, subd. 2 (1996).
298. See id. subd. l.
299. See id. subd. 3(a).
300. See id. subd. 3.
301. See Gorath v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989).
302. See MINN. STAT. § 544.41, subd. 3 (1996).
303. See id.
304. See id.
305. See id.
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be subject to liability, but the used product seller would be subject
to such liability.306 If the used product seller is part of the chain of
distribution, but simply passed along a defective product, the seller
would not be subject to strict liability because it would be able to
move for dismissal of the strict liability claims against it under sec307
tion 544.41.
If the claim against the non-manufacturing defendant is based
on negligence, or warranty other than implied warranty, section
308
544.41 has no effect.
That leaves as the general rule, for sellers
of used products as well as other sellers, a general obligation to exercise reasonable care.
Melded, the Minnesota common law and statutory rules that
apply to sellers of used goods are similar to the &statement's rules in
section 8.
§ 9. LIABILI1Y OF COMMERCIAL PRODUCT SELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR
FOR HARM CAUSED BY MISREPRESENTATION

One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who, in connection with the sale of a product, makes
a fraudulent, negligent, or innocent misrepresentation concerning
the product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property
309
caused by the misrepresentation.
Commentary
The rules governing fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations are contained in sections 310 and 311 of the Restatement
(Second) oj Torts.'3IO Section 9 provides for the imposition of liability
on product sellers or distributors for fraudulent, negligent, or innocent misrepresentations concerning the product that caused
311
personal injury or property damage.
Section 402B of the Restatement (Second) covers liability for innocent misrepresentations. It
provides:
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by
advertising, labels, or otherwise, makes to the public a
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 9.
See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 310 and 311 (1965).
See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 9.
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misrepresentation of a material fact concerning the character or quality of a chattel sold by him is subject to liability for physical harm to a consumer of the chattel caused
by justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, even
though
(a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and
(b) the consumer has not bought the chattel from or en312
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.
In Minnesota, claims for fraud and misrepresentation are
3ls
commonly mixed with other products liability claims.
Those
claims are separate and distinct from products liability claims based
314
on design defect, failure to warn, or manufacturing flaws.
Fraud
and misrepresentation claims may exist even if the product is oth. not d
e'
315
efWlse
eJ.ectlve.
In Minnesota, the terms "fraud" and "misrepresentation" have
been used interchangeably. As a general proposition, the term
"fraud" is used where the representation is intentional, and
316
"misrepresentation" is used where it is unintentional.
312. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965).
313. See, e.g., Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 685 (Minn. 1990)
(mixing claim of misrepresentation with claims for negligence, breach of express
and implied warranties, and strict liability); Beutz v. AO. Smith Harvestore
Prods., Inc., 431 N.W.2d 528, 529 (Minn. 1988) (mixing claim offraud with claims
for negligence, breach of implied and express warranties, and strict products liability); Brandt v. Marshall Animal Clinic, 540 N.W.2d 870, 873 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995) (mixing claims for fraud and misrepresentation with claims for defective
design, negligence, and breach of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness), review denied, (Minn. Feb. 9, 1996); Parker v. MVBA Harvestore Sys., 491
N.W.2d 904, 905 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (mixing claims of fraud with claims for
negligence, strict products liability, and breach of express and implied warranties).
314. See Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 688. The commentary to the Civil Jury Instruction Guides takes a position pursuant to Bilotta. The comments state that:
submission of a claim for express warranty, along with the design defect
claim, would be appropriate where it is justified by the evidence ....
The same result should be achieved with implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose. In both situations, statements or representations
may provide the basis for liability even if, absent the representations or
statements, the product would not be defective under the reasonable
care balancing approach.
JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 18,jIG 117, Authorities at 83.
315. See Beutz, 431 N.W.2d at 530.
316. See JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 18, JIG 610, Authorities at 407.
There are eleven elements in a fraud or misrepresentation action in Minnesota.
Id. at 408. They are as follows:
1. a representation;
2. the representation must be false;
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LIABILIlY OF COMMERCIAL PRODUCE SELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR
FOR HARM CAUSED BY POST-SALE FAlLURE TO WARN

(a) One engaged in the business of selling or othexwise distributing products is subject to liability for harm to persons or
property caused by the seller's failure to provide a warning after the time of sale or distribution of a product when a reasonable person in the seller's position would provide such a warnmg.
(b) A reasonable person in the seller's position would provide a warning after the time of sale when:
(1) the seller knows or reasonably should know that the
product poses a substantial risk of harm to persons or
property; and
(2) those to whom a warning might be provided can be
identified and may reasonably be assumed to be unaware of
the risk of harm; and
(3) a warning can be effectively communicated to and
acted on by those to whom a warning might be provided;
and
(4) the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify the
. 317
b urd en 0 f proVl'd'mg a warnmg.
Commentary
Section 10 imposes a post-sale duty to warn only when a reasonable Eerson in the product seller's position would provide the
warning. 18 The standard is objective. As applied to the parties in
3. the representation must deal with past or present fact;
4. the fact must be material;
5. the fact must be susceptible of knowledge;
6. the representer must know the fact is false or assert it as of is own
knowledge;
7. the representer must intend to have the other person induced to act
or justified in acting on it;
8. the other person must be induced to act or justified in acting;
9. that person's actions must be in reliance upon the representation;
10. that person must suffer damages; and
11. the misrepresentation must be the proximate cause of injury.

[d.
317.
318.

Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 10.
See id. The Reporters state in their notes that they:

HeinOnline -- 24 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 64 1998

1998] RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS L1ABIUTY

65

the chain of distribution, the reasonableness standard may re~uire
one entity in the chain to provide a warning and not another. 9 A
manufacturer may have an obligation to provide a warning, but a
retailer who does not have knowledge of the dangers created by
320
the product may not.
If a retailer gains knowledge of the risk,
the issue then becomes whether a reasonable person in the re321
tailer's position would provide a warning.
That determination
requires the application of the factors in subpart (b). 322
The Restatement (Third) position is similar to that taken in Minnesota. In Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber CO.,323 the supreme
court considered the issue of whether Goodyear had a post-sale obligation to warn about the dangers created by its multi-piece rim
assembly.324 The court held that it did. Specifically, the court
found:
On the facts of this case, we hold that a continuing
post-sale duty to warn existed and was adequately submitted. Hundreds of thousands of K-rims have been used in
millions of tire changes over the years without incident; of
the 134 or so K-rim explosions which did occur, many are
explained by improper servicing or misuse. Goodyear
steadfastly maintains its K-rim is a safe product if used
properly. Nevertheless, it became evident by the late
1950s that K-rims could be temperamental.... [W] hen
explosions did occur, serious i~ury or death usually resulted; and, therefore, that great care was required in the
handling and servicing of K-rims. Further, Goodyear has
continued over the years in the tire rim business, and, although all K-rim production was discontinued by 1969,
Goodyear continued to advertise its K-rims as late as 1977,
and has continued to sell tires and tubes for use with used
K-rims. Finally, Goodyear undertook a duty to warn of Krim dangers. Under these circumstances, it seem to us
have not drawn a sharp distinction between failure to warn of risk and
failure to inform about safety improvements. Where a newly discovered
risk imposes risk of serious harm and safety improvements can be practically implemented there may in certain instances be a duty to inform the
buyer of the availability of such safety improvements.
[d. Reporters' Note, at 240.
319. See id. cmt. b.
320. See id. § 10 cmt. b.
321. See id.
322. See id.
323. 426 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1988), ecrt. denied, 492 U.S. 926 (1989).
324. See id. at 832-33.
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that Goodyear had a continuing duty to instruct and to
warn, so that users of used K-rims would be apprised of
safety hazards which, at an earlier time, were not fully appreciated. A continuing duty to warn arises only in special
cases. W e th III k th··
IS IS suc h a case. 325
The court's position follows the Restatement (Third), at least in
part. At a minimum, the seller either must know or reasonably
326
should know that the product poses a substantial risk ofharm. In
Hodder, the defendant knew as early as the late 1950s that there
were problems with the rims, including the risk of serious injury or
327
death.
The defendant continued in business and continued to
328
employ the K_rims.
Although it stopped production of the rims
in 1969, Goodyear continued advertising the K-rim and to sell tires
and rims for use with existing rims until 1977; it also provided
329
warnings of K-rim dangers at that time.
Prior warnin&s of the
dangers involved in using of the K-rims were quite graphic. 30
The limitation of the theory to "special" cases has required
subsequent courts faced with the issue to determine the breadth of
the duty the court contemplated in Hodder. The three factors were
critical to the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota in its consideration of the continuing duty to warn issue in Krr
331
ciemba, an intrauterine device case.
In Ramstad v. Lear Siegler Diversi/zed Holdings C07fJ.332 a farmer
sustained injuries when his foot slipped into the intake of a grain
auger. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota held that there was no continuing duty to warn on the part of
333
the manufacturer.
The court read the "special circumstances" in
Hodder-slightly differently. It found:
o

325. Id. at 833 (citations omitted).
326. See id. at 832.
327. See id. at 833.
328. Seeid.
329. See id.
330. See id. at 835.
331. See Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517, 1528 (D. Minn.
1989). The court also held that a continuing duty to test could be imposed on
the manufacturer, although it would, of course, also be limited to "special cases."
The court noted:
Courts should only apply a continuing duty to test when the type of special circumstances identified by the Hodder court exist: knowledge of a
problem with the product, continued sale or advertising of the product,
and a pre-existing duty to warn of dangers associated with the product.
Id.
332. 836 F. Supp. 1511 (D. Minn. 1993).
333. See id. at 1517.
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The special circumstances in Hodder included: (1) the defendant's knowledge of problems with the product since
the late 1950s, including the knowledge that the product
might explode with little provocation; (2) the hidden nature of the danger; (3) the fact that when explosions did
occur, serious injury or death usually resulted; (4) defendant remained in that line of business, continued to sell
parts for use with the product and had advertised the
product within five years of the plaintiff's injury; and (5)
defendant had undertaken a duty to warn of product
334
dangers.
The court's analysis of the special factors led it to conclude
that there was no duty to warn of the dangers presented by the
grain auger:
The court concludes that the special factors which warranted a continuing duty to warn in Hodder do not exist in
the instant case. Hutchinson had notice of only a handful
of other accidents. The danger associated with the auger
was not hidden and was known to users. There is no evidence that Hutchinson had undertaken a duty to warn.
Hutchinson also adopted a new intake design and ceased
marketing a shield for grain augers. The only factor that
favors imposing a continuing duty to warn in this case is
the gravity of the resulting harm. That factor alone, however, is insufficient to satisfy the special circumstances re335
quired by Hodder.
In T.H.S. Northstar Associates v. W.R Grace and CO.,336 an asbestos removal case, the Eighth Circuit held that the defendant manufacturer of fireproofing material had a continuing duty to warn
337
under the circumstances of the case.
The defendant argued that
the necessary "special circumstances" required by Hodder were not
present in the case,338 but the court disagreed:
In Hodder, the Minnesota Supreme Court imposed such a
duty based upon the following facts: (1) the manufacturer
insisted its product was safe if used properly; (2) it became evident to the manufacturer over time that great
care was required in the handling and servicing of the
product, or serious injury would occur; and (3) the manu334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id.
Id.
66 F.3d 173 (8th Cir. 1995).
See id. at 177.
See id.

HeinOnline -- 24 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 67 1998

68

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

facturer continued in the business of selling related products and undertook a duty to warn users of post-sale hazards .... We agree with the district court that the evidence in this case justified submitting the continuingduty-ta-warn issue to the jury. In particular, Grace's pamphlets, letters, and extensive publicity discussing the risks
of asbestos-containing materials and purporting to advise
building owners on how to manage that risk raise a jury issue under Hodder whether to impose a continuing legal
339
duty to warn.
The T.H.S. Northstar interpretation differs slightly from that of
the district courts in Kociemba and Ramstad, although the second
and third factors seem to follow Hodder. The Hodder court limited
34O
its holding to serious risk of personal injury or death. Yet, T.H.S.
Northstar extended the duty to cases involving property damage and
economic loss, although the defendant created a significant health
341
risk by the sale of its products.
The Restatement (Third) makes explicit an apparent assumption
in the Minnesota cases that "those to whom a warning might be
provided can be identified and may reasonably be assumed to be
unaware of the risk of harm. ,,342 This is consistent with two general
principles governing warnings in Minnesota. One limits recovery
343
for failure to warn to nonobvious dangers.
The other gauges the
obligation of a product seller to warn according to the feasibility of
344
effectively reaching the person placed at risk.
339. Id. (citations omitted).
340. See Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 833 (Minn.
1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 926 (1989). The facts of Hodder are limited to serious injury or death. See id.
341. See T.H.S. Northstar, 66 F.3d at 174-75.
342. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 10(b) (2).
343. See Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects, Inc.,
354 N.W.2d 816, 821 (Minn. 1984) (explaining "there is no duty to warn if the
user knows or should know the potential danger"), overruled on other grounds by
Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 687 (Minn. 1990). See also Drager v.
Aluminum Indus. Corp., 495 N.W.2d 879, 884 (Minn. Ct. App.) (holding that
there is no duty to warn when the user is aware of the risk), review denied, (Minn.
April 20, 1993); Willmar Poultry Co. v. Carns Chern. Co., 378 N.W.2d 830, 835
(Minn. Ct. App.1985) (holding there is no duty to warn when a user is aware of
product dangers), review denied, (Minn. Feb. 14 and 19, 1986); Dahlbeck v. DICO
Co., 355 N.W.2d 157, 163 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (no duty to warn when product
dangers are within user's professional knowledge) (citing Strong v. E.!. DuPont de
Nemours Co., 667 F.2d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 1981), review denied, (Minn. Feb. 6,
1985).
344. See Hill v. Wilmington Chern. Corp., 279 Minn. 336,341, 156 N.W.2d 898,
902 (1968) (holding that a manufacturer of an ingredient had no duty to warn
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The third factor in section 10 provides that a warning can be
effectively communicated to and acted on by those to whom a
warning might be provided. It intends to ensure that the seller is
reasonably able "to communicate the warning to those identified as
appropriate recipients."345 If there are sales records identifying the
346
purchasers, then a direct warning might be feasible.
If records
are not available, the seller may have to rely on the public media
347
for warnings.
In addition, as the size of the group to be warned
348
increases, so does the cost. The ability of the seller to warn seems
349
implicit in Minnesota law. As such, the seller's ability to warn is a
35o
question of law for the courts in Minnesota.
The courts use fea351
sibility as one factor to make that determination.
The fourth factor in the Restatement (Third) analysis questions
352
whether the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify a warning.
This issue seems implicit in Minnesota cases emphasizing that the
duty to warn is a question of law for the courts to decide in the first
353
instance.
In Hodder, the court concluded that liability could be
based on a post-sale obligation to warn. This decision is clearly is
354
based on a balancing of the interests.
The balancing act
the ultimate consumer where the manufacturer of the final product knew of the
ingredient's dangerous propensities and placed the product on the market with a
warning label).
345. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 10 cmt. g.
346. See id.
347. See id.
348. See id.
349. See Hil~ 279 Minn. at 341, 156 N.W.2d at 902.
350. See, e.g., Huber v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 430 N.W.2d 465, 467
(Minn. 1988) (determining that a manufacturer's duty to warn is a question of
law); Balder v. Haley, 399 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. 1987) (holding that the existence
of a duty to warn is a legal question); Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395
N.W.2d 922, 924 (Minn. 1986) (holding that whether a duty to warn exists is a legal issue).
351. See Balder, 399 N.W.2d at 81 (no duty to warn where no particular hazard
to warn about potential harm); Hill, 279 Minn. at 341, 156 N.W.2d at 902 (no duty
to warn where no contract with and no opportunity to warn the ultimate consumer).
352. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 10(b)(4).
353. See, e.g., Balder, 399 N.W.2d at 81; Germann, 395 N.W.2d at 924-25.
354. See Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 832-34
(Minn. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 926 (1989). In Bilotta,Justice Simonett's concurring opinion forthrightly balances the interests involved in a design defect
case. See Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 626 (Minn. 1984) (Simonett, j.,
concurring specially). He has taken the same approach in other areas of tort law.
See, e.g., Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165 (Minn. 1989). In Erickson, he
applied a risk-utility inquiry that involved the use of various policy factors, including a cost-benefit analysis, to determine the liability of a hotel owner for a parking
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prompted the court's conclusion that the post-sale duty to warn
should be imposed only in special cases and that this was one of
355
them.
The Restatement makes explicit what is implicit in the Minnesota and federal cases involving post-sale duty to warn issues. It
is explicit in the design cases, where risk versus utility is a critical
Issue.
Comment a following section 10 states that:
As with all rules that raise the question whether a duty
exists, courts must make the threshold decisions that, in
particular cases, triers of fact could reasonably find that
product sellers can practically and effectively discharge
such an obligation and that the risks of harm are sufficiently great to justifY what is typically a substantial postsale undertaking. In deciding whether a claim based on
breach of a post-sale duty to warn should reach the trier
of fact, the court must determine whether the requirements in Subsection (b) (1) through (4) are supported by
proof. The legal standard is whether a reasonable person
would provide a post-sale warning. In light of the serious
potential for overburdening sellers in this regard, the
court should carefully examine the circumstances for and
against imposimr a duty to provide a post-sale warning in a
. I ar case. 3llti
partxcu
Blending Minnesota products liability law with section 10
means that the initial determination of whether there is a jury issue
on post-sale failure to warn first has to be made by the court, keeping in mind the supreme court's cautionary note in Hodder. Once
the court decides that there is a jury issue the case would be submitted to the jury pursuant to instructions that would incorporate
357
the Bilotta risk-utility standard, inviting an evaluation of the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct.
ramp assault. He wrote:
Presumably we do not live in a risk-free society; if this is so, a cost-benefit
analysis is unavoidable. To post security guards at each parking ramp
level 24 hours a day might be the most effective crime deterrent, but the
cost may be prohibitive for both the property owner and the customer.
A parking ramp cannot be a fortress. In this case, for example, plaintiff
apparently considered cost as a factor in choosing the Curtis ramp for
parking rather than another ramp or taking the bus. The question of
how much security is adequate raises, therefore, the further question of
how much risk is an acceptable risk for members of the public.
Id. at 169.
355. See Hodder, 426 N.W.2d at 833.
356. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 10 cmt. a.
357. See Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 626 (Simonett,J., concurring specially).
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LIABILI1Y OF COMMERCIAL PRODUCT SELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR

FOR HARM CAUSED BY POST-SALE FAILURE TO RECALL PRODUCT

One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products is subject to liability for harm to persons or property
caused by the seller's failure to recall a product after the time of
sale or distribution if:
(a) (1) a statute or other governmental regulation specifically requires the seller or distributor to recall the product;
or
(2) the seller or distributor, in the absence of a recall
requirement under Subsection (1), undertakes to recall the

product; and
(b) the seller or distributor fails to act as a reasonable per358
son in recalling the product.
Commentary
The Restatement (Third) imposes liability only when a statute or
359
regulation requires a recall.
If a recall is voluntarily initiated, the
seller or distributor is required to act as a reasonable person in recalling the product.!I6O The restrictive position on recalls is based
on the excessive burden that could be imposed on product sellers
or distributors if any improvement in product safety triggered a recall. 361 Even if a product is deemed defective under sections 2 - 4,
the Restatement leaves recalls to government agencies best equipped
..
362
to m ake th e d etermmatlon.
If recall is specifically required by a statute or regulation, liability may not be imposed under section 11, unless a specific recall
order is initiated by the responsible agency. This is so even though
the agency possesses the unexercised power to do SO.363 If the statute or regulation specifically provides for a product recall, then violation by the seller constitutes negligence under section 4 of the
364
Restatement.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 11.
See id.
See id.
See id. cmt. a ..
See id. § 11.
See id. cmt. h.
See id.
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The Re~orters' Note regarding section 11 cites Gregory v. Cincinnati, Inc., 65 a 1995 Michigan Supreme Court decision, as the
most significant case that supports the general rule of nonliability
.
g66
for failure to recall a product.
In Comstock v. General Motors
Corp.g67 the Michigan Supreme Court held that once a manufacturer discovers a postmanufacture latent defect, the manufacturer
g68
has a duty to warn of those defects.
In Gregory, the court questioned whether the obligation should be extended to include
g69
product recalls.
The differences, however, convinced the Gregory
court to reject the plaintiff's argument. The court noted:
In this case, plaintiff does not allege that the press
brake should have had a point-of-manufacture warning attached to it, nor does he contend that Cincinnati
breached the duty to warn of a latent defect in accordance
with Comstock. Instead, he maintains that Cincinnati had a
duty to repair, fix, or recall the product, reasoning that, if
a duty to warn exists under Comstock, a duty to repair also
must exist. We disagree.
We find Comstock substantially different from this case
because Comstock premised the postmanufacture duty to
warn on the basis of latency. In the case at bar, plaintiff
did not allege that the defect was latent, but instead contended
that Cincinnati knew or should have known of the dangerous condition of this product absent certain safety devices. We are persuaded that resolution of this risk-utility
test (knew or should have known) forecloses consideration of a latent defect discovered post manufacture. If the
manufacturer should have known of the problem, liability
attaches at that point, not post manufacture.
In Prentis, we held that design defect cases require a
risk-utility balancing test. With the focus on conduct
rather than simply the product, proof of a defect by the
risk-utility test resolves any issue of latency because the result of the test is a finding that the manufacturer either
knew or should have known of the danger at the point of
manufacture. Accordingly, a design defect cannot, practically speaking, be deemed undiscoverable at the point of
manufacture. In other words, constructive knowledge
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

538 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. 1995).
See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 11 Reporters' Note, at 248.
99 N.W.2d 627 (Mich. 1959).
See id. at 634.
See Gregory, 538 N.W.2d at 330.
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imputed to the manufacturer under the state of the art at
the time of design renders the concept of latency at issue
in Comstock moot in a design defect case. There being no
issue of latency, the question becomes whether any postmanufacture duty is imposed.
Because a prima facie case is established once the riskutility test is proven, we are persuaded that it is unnecessary and unwise to impose or introduce an additional duty
to retrofit or recall a product. Focusing on postmanufacture conduct in a negligent design case improperly shifts
the focus from point-of-manufacture conduct and considers postmanufacture conduct and technology that accordingly has the potential to taint a jury's verdict regarding a
defect.
Moreover, we believe the duty to repair or recall is
more properly a consideration for administrative agencies
and the Legislature who "are better able to weigh the
benefits and costs involved in locating, recalling, and retrofitting products," as well as other economic factors affecting businesses and consumers. Courts have traditionally not been suited to consider the economic effect of
such repair or recall campaigns. In this case, with liability
premised on the risk-utility test, a continuing duty instruction adds nothing to plaintiff's case but potential confusion.
In any event, when appropriate, i.e., when the protection of vital interests was deemed necessary, policymakers
have explicitly delegated such authority to administrative
agencies. Plaintiff did not rely on and cites no statute imposing such a duty to repair or recall so as to provide a
basis for a legal duty in a negligence action. If he had,
and in the appropriate case, failure to follow a recall order mandated by statute and agency might provide the
basis for a duty to recall in a negligence action.
Cases that have imposed a duty to repair or recall have
been few and have primarily been reserved for extraordinary cases, i.e., airplane safety, in which the potential
danger is severe and widespread. We elect not to follow
such precedent in the instant case. Indeed, other courts
have been unwilling to impose such an onerous duty except where there is an assumption of the duty or some
special, controlling relationship between the manufac-
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370

turer and the owner of the machine.
One of the "extraordinary cases" noted by the Michigan Supreme Court was Kociemba 371 from the United States District Court
372
for the District of Minnesota.
The Kociemba court discussed the
duty to recall in the context of a discussion of a continuing duty to
test an intrauterine device. The court stated:
This Court has already held that the duty to test is a
subpart of the duty to warn. It is logical that a continuing
duty to warn would have as a subpart a continuing duty to
test. Although Minnesota courts have up until now only
recognized a continuing duty to warn, recognizing a continuing duty to test which is subsumed as a part of the
continuing duty to warn is a consistent extension of existing law. Therefore, this Court holds that its instructions
to the jury concerning a manufacturer's continuing duty
to test is not erroneous.
Of course, any continuing duty to test would also be
limited to "special cases." Courts should only apply a continuing duty to test when the type of special circumstances
identified by the Hodder court exist: knowledge of a problem with the product, continued sale or advertising of the
product, and a pre-existing duty to warn of dangers associated with the product.
Limiting the continuing duty to test to cases where the
manufacturer has knowledge of problems with a product
alleviates defendant's concern that this duty will impose a
crushing burden on manufacturers to retest products. If a
manufacturer has no information concerning potential
dangers associated with a product, it will be under no duty
to continually test the product. Conversely, if a manufacturer does obtain sufficient credible information that a
product already in use is potentially dangerous, the manufacturer should test that product to determine the extent
of any danger, and then issue an appropriate warning or
373
product recall.
370. Id. at 333-35 (citations and footnotes omitted).
371. Kociemba is known as the intrauterine device case. See Kociemba v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517, 1528 (D. Minn. 1989).
372. See Gregory, 538 N.W.2d at 334-35 n.33. Other "extraordinary cases" have
been those with potential severe and widespread danger, such as airplane safety
cases. See id. at 334-35 and n.34 (citing Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d
232 (3d Cir. 1964); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451 (2d
Cir.1969».
373. Kociemba, 707 F. Supp. at 1528-29.
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As the Gregory court noted, Kociemba's discussion is only a

"suggestion" that the obligation to recall would be imposed by the
374
Minnesota Supreme Court.
The suggestion is based on the
375
court's opinion in Hodder-.
The caution expressed by the court in
Hodder and other post-sale obligation to warn cases, however, indicate that the court would perhaps take a conservative approach on
the question.

§ 12.LIABILI1Y OF SUCCESSOR FOR HARM CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE
PRODUCTS SOLD COMMERCIALLY BY PREDECESSOR

A successor corporation or other business entity that acquires
assets of a predecessor corporation or other business entity is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by a defective product sold or otherwise distributed commercially by the
predecessor if the acquisition:
(a) is accompanied by an agreement for the successor to assume such liability; or
(b) results from a fraudulent conveyance to escape liability
for the debts or liabilities of the predecessor; or
(c) constitutes a consolidation or merger with the predecessor; or
(d) results in the successor's becoming a continuation of
376
the predecessor.
Commentary
The Restatement rule is derived from both products liability and
377
corporate law principles.
Where a successor purchases the assets
of the predecessor piecemeal, and there is no subsequent continuity of operations between the two corporations or other business
entities, the successor is not liable for harm caused by a defective
378
product sold by the predecessor. The rule of nonliability is based
primarily on the fact that the successor does not fall within the basic rule in section 1 of the Restatement. Section 1 applies only to
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

See Gregory, 538 N.W.2d at 334-35 n.33.
See Kociemba, 707 F. Supp. at 1528 (citing Hodder, 426 N.W.2d at 833).
Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 12.
See id. cmt. a.
See id.
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"[ 0] ne ... who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to lia b 1·l·Ity Clor h arm .... "379
Corporate law will provide protection, within limits, to a tort
plaintiff with a judgment against the predecessor corporation at
the time of a transfer of assets and dissolution of that corpora380
tion.
However, tort claimants who attempt to recover only after
the transfer of assets to a successor company will face difficulty in
381
bringing their claims within the applicable law. Their claims usually accrue after the lawful distribution of assets by the predecessor,
and as such, they were not judgment creditors at the time of the
transfer of assets. These claimants usually have no recourse against
382
the shareholders of the predecessor.
If they are unable to sue
the successor corporation, or reach other funds provided by existing insurance or statute, the tort claimants' only remedy may be
383
against retailers and wholesalers in the chain of distribution.
The Restatement enumerates the limited circumstances under
which the successor corporation may be held liable for a defective
product sold by the predecessor corporation. The circumstances
include:
Few precedents recognize tort claims against the successor corporation for harm caused by defective products
sold by the predecessor unless the transaction by which
productive assets are acquired meets criteria established
by one of several traditional exceptions. These exceptions
apply generally to creditors whose claims accrue after dissolution of the predecessor, and are not limited to products liability claimants. They fall into two basic categories:
those in which some conduct of the successor, in addition
to acquiring the predecessor's assets, justifies holding the
successor responsible (the successor either contractually
agrees to be liable or knowingly participates in a fraudulent asset transfer); and those in which the successor itself
can be said to have sold or distributed the defective products because the successor constitutes the same juridical
entity as the predecessor, perhaps in somewhat different
form (the successor merges with, or constitutes a "mere
continuation" of, the predecessor). Under this Section, a
products liability claimant has a recognized claim against
379.
380.
381.

382.
383.

Id. (emphasis in original).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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a successor for harm caused by defective products distrib384
uted by the predecessor in these circumstances.
The Restatement's rationale is based on efficiency and fairness
385
considerations.
Minnesota law governing successor liability was
provided by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Niccum v. Hydra Tool
Corp.,386 which followed the earlier decision of JF. Anderson Lumber
Co. v. Myers. 387 Both cases parallel the Restatement. Niccum specifically notes:
[W] here one corporation sells or otherwise transfers all of
its assets to another corporation, the latter is not liable for
the debts and liabilities of the transferor, except: (1)
where the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume such debts: (2) where the transaction amounts to a
consolidation or merger of the corporation; (3) where the
purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the
selling corporation; and (4) where the transaction is entered into fraudulently in order to escape liability for such
debts. 388
The Niccum court also concluded that the legislature, through
the enactment of a 1981 statute governing transferee liability, intended to limit any additional expansion of successor liability beyond the traditional exceptions established by the supreme court
389
in JF. Anderson.
The statute, subdivision 4 of section 302A.661,
reads as follows:
The transferee is liable for the debts, obligations, and liabilities of the transferor only to the extent provided in
the contract or agreement between the transferee and the
transferor or to the extent provided by this chapter or
390
o th er statutes 0 f th IS state.
The Reporters' Note to the statute demonstrated the limitation:
Subdivision 4 of this section is aimed at limiting the civil
liabilities of transferors assumed by transferees to those
agreed to between the parties or imposed by law, even if
the transferee is operating the corporation in exactly the
same manner as it was operated by the transferor. This
o

384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.

[d.
See id. cmt. b.
438 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1989).
296 Minn. 33, 206 N.W.2d 365 (1973).
Niccum, 438 N.W.2d at 98.
See id. at 99.
MINN. STAT. § 302A.661, subd. 4 (1996).
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limits, for example, exposure to product liability claims
391
for items manufactured by the transferor.
In Niccum, the plaintiffs asked the court to expand the third
exception, the mere continuation rule, to include cash-for-assets
392
sales.
The court rejected the argument,393 and instead applied
the liberal products liability case of Turner v. Bituminous Casualty
394
Co., a Michigan Supreme Court decision.
The Niccum court also
rejected the product line exception adopted by the California Supreme Court in Ray v. Alad Carp. 395 The exception holds a successor, who continues to manufacture a product of the business it acquired, strictly liable for products manufactured by the
predecessor, regardless of the means of acquiring the predecessor
or any possible assignment of fault. 396

§ 13. LlABILI1Y OF SUCCESSOR FOR HARM CAUSED BY SUCCESSOR'S
OWN POST-SALE FAlLURE TO WARN
(a) A successor corporation or other business entity that
acquires assets of a predecessor corporation or other business
entity, whether or not liable under the rule stated in § 12, is
subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by
the successor's failure to warn of a risk created by a product
sold or distributed by the predecessor when:
(1) the successor undertakes or agrees to provide seIVices for maintenance or repair of the product or enters into
a similar relationship with purchasers of the predecessor's
products giving rise to actual or potential economic advantage to the successor, and

(2) a reasonable person in the position of the successor
would provide a warning.
(b) A reasonable person in the position of the successor
would provide a warning when:
(1) the successor knows or reasonably should know that

the product poses a substantial risk of harm to persons or
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.661, General Comment (West 1985).
See Niccum, 438 N.W.2d at 99.
See id. at 100.
244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).
560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977).
See Niccum, 438 N.W.2d at 99-100.
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property; and
(2) those to whom a warning might be provided can be
identified and can reasonably be assumed to be unaware of
the risk of harm; and
(3) a warning can be effectively communicated to and
acted upon by those to whom a warning might be provided;
and
(4) the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify the
.
397
b urd en 0 f proVl·d·mg a warnmg.
Commentary
Unlike section 12, this section of the Restatement imposes liability on a successor corporation for its own failure to warn when the
specified conditions are met and when a reasonable person in the
39B
successor's position would provide a warning.
Liability under
section 13 is similar to the liability imposed by section 10 for postsale failure of a product seller to warn, even when the product was
399
not defective at the time of sale.
The rationale for imposing liability on the successor under these circumstances is based on the
fact that the successor is frequently in a favorable position to discover problems with the use of the predecessor's product and to
act in preventing harm to consumers or their property.400 Furthermore, "[w]hen the relationship between the successor and pretransfer purchasers of the predecessor's products gives rise to actual or potential economic benefit to the successor, it is both fair
and efficient to require the successor to act reasonably to prevent
such harm. "401
In Niccum, the supreme court held that Hodder was inapplica402
ble to post-sale failure to warn claims brought against a successor.
Instead, the court followed Travis v. Harris Carp.,403 in which the
Seventh Circuit listed factors to use in determining whether to impose a duty to warn on a successor:
Succession to a predecessor's service contracts, coverage
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 13.
See id. cmt. a.
Seeid.
See id.
[d.
See Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96,100 (Minn. 1989).
565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977).
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of the particular machine under a seIVice contract, seIVice
of that machine by the purchaser corporation, a purchaser corporation's knowledge of defects and of the location or owner of that machine, are factors which may be
considered in determining the presence of a nexus or relationship effective to create a duty to warn. 404
Niccum arose out of injuries sustained by the plaintiff while op405
erating a press brake.
The press brake was designed by the Wisconsin Machine Corporation, which in February of 1973 sold certain designs and patents, including the press brake design, to the
406
Wisconsin Equipment Corporation.
The Wisconsin Machine
407
Company dissolved in December of 1973.
In May of 1973, Wisconsin Equipment manufactured and sold a press brake to Alloy
408
Hard Facing & Engineering.
In 1985, it was owned by the plain409
tiff's employer, but the chain of previous ownership is unknown.
Mter the sale of the press brake, HTC, Inc., purchased all the
41o
assets of Wisconsin Equipment.
HTC was a wholly owned sub411
sidiary of Hydra Tool Corp., the defendant in the suit.
The purchase agreement between HTC and Wisconsin Equipment was
412
structured as a purchase of assets for cash.
The agreement specifically stated that HTC would not assume liability for injuries
413
caused by Wisconsin Equipment products already on the market.
Rather, Wisconsin Equipment was to retain liability for those inju414
Wisconsin Equipment dissolved in 1977, but HTC had no
ries.
415
prior knowledge that Wisconsin Equipment would dissolve.
Applying the Travis list to the facts of the case, the Niccum
court held that no duty to warn existed. It specifically noted:
Hydra Tool never succeeded to any seIVice contracts held
by WEC and never seIViced any of the press brakes under
a seIVice contract. Hydra Tool was not aware of any particular defects associated with the press brake. Hydra
Tool did not know the location of the machine at the time
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.

[d. at 449.
See Niccum, 438 N.W.2d at 97.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 98.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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Niccum was injured. Hydra Tool also developed its own
customer lists and did not use those supplied by WEC.
Under these facts we find no independent duty to warn
416
on the part of respondent Hydra Tool.
The Reporters' Note indicates that the Reporters:
have not made the existence of a service contract a sine
qua non for the imposition of a duty to warn on a successor corporation. Other similar relationships with purchasers of the predecessor's products giving rise to actual
or potential economic advantage to the successor may suffice to create a duty to act reasonably and provide warn•
417
mgs.
It is not clear if the Minnesota courts would make the existence of service contracts an absolute prerequisite for imposition of
a duty to warn on a successor corporation. The Restatement (Third)
approach, however, is consistent with the supreme court's willingness to engage in balancing the relevant factors in deciding duty
lssues.
§ 14. SELLING OR OTHERWISE DISTRIBUTING AS ONE'S OWN A
PRODUCT MANUFACTURED BY ANOTHER

One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes as its own a product manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as though the seller
418
or distributor were the product's manufacturer.
Commentary
419

The rule in section 14 is derived from section 400 of the Re420
statement (Second) oJ Torts.
The rule is recognized in a clear major421
ity ofjurisdictions.
The rules governing manufacturer liability of
chattels in the Restatement (Second) oj Torts were fault-based and
treated product manufacturers differently from other sellers in the
416.
417.
418.
419.

[d. at 1Q0-01.
Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 13 Reporters' Note, at 278.
!d. § 14.
See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 14 cmt. a (citing REsrATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965».
420. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965) (stating that "[o]ne
who puts out as his own product a chattel manufactured by another is subject to
the same liability as though he were its manufacturer").
421. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 14 Reporters' Note, at 281.
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utlOn. 422
Section 400 incorporates sections 394-398 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts by reference to outline the manufacturer's potentialliability.423
The adoption of section 402A subjected all sellers to strict liability claims. As such, section 400 had questionable validity.
However, Minnesota and other states have special rules limiting the
liability of nonmanufacturer parties in the chain of distribution
under a strict liability theory. These states may use the negligence
rules of the Restatement to prevent the nonmanufacturer parties
from opting out of liability.
Section 544.41 of the Minnesota Statutes distinguishes sellers
in the chain of distribution from product manufacturers ap.d exempts them from liability if the product manufacturer is solvent
424
and subject to jurisdiction in Minnesota.
However, there are
specific exceptions to the rule. These exceptions follow:
Subd. 3. A court shall not enter a dismissal order
relative to any certifying defendant even though full com422. See id. cmt. a.
423. SeeREsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965). Section 394 states that
"a manufacturer of a chattel which he knows or has reason to know to be, or to be
likely to be, dangerous for use ... subject to the liability of a supplier of chattels
with such knowledge." [d. § 394. Section 395 sets out the standard negligence
formula, making a manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the
manufacture of a chattel liable if the manufacturer recognizes that the chattel,
unless carefully made, will involve an "unreasonable risk of causing physical harm
to those who use it for a purpose for which the manufacturer should expect it to
be used .... " [d. § 395. Section 396 makes the manufacturer subject to liability
under sections 394 and 395 even though the dangerous character of the chattel is
discoverable "by an inspection which the seller or any other person is under a
duty to the person injured to make." [d. § 396. Section 397's rule is a special application of the rule in section 395. See id. § 397. It imposes an obligation to warn
on the manufacturer of a chattel compounded under a secret formula or a formula which, although disclosed, is not likely to be understood by users of the
chattel. See id. Section 398, which is also a special application of the general negligence rule in section 395, applies to chattels manufactured under a plan or design that makes the chattel dangerous for the uses for which it is manufactured.
See id. § 398. It makes the manufacturer liable for physical harm caused by the
manufacturer's "failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan
or design," and extends the manufacturer's liability "to others whom he should
expect to use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable use for physical
harm." [d. § 398. Section 399, which stands independent of section 400, makes
the seller of a chattel that is manufactured by a third person subject to liability
when the seller sells the chattel, "knowing that it is, or is likely to be, dangerous."
[d. § 399. Section 399 incorporates the rules in sections 388 - 390 of the Restatement (Second) by reference. See id.
424. See MINN. STAT. § 544.41, subd. 3 (1996).
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pliance with subdivision 1 has been made where the plaintiff can show one of the following;
(a) That the defendant has exercised some significant control over the design or manufacture of the product, or has provided instructions or warnings to the manufacturer relative to the alleged defect in the product
which has caused the injury, death or damage;
(b) That the defendant had actual knowledge of the
defect in the product which caused the injury, death or
damage; or
(c) That the defendant created the defect in the
425
product which caused the injury, death or damage.
These exceptions apply to prevent dismissal on the strict liability claim asserted against the nonmanufacturing defendant. It
seems clear that the negligence rules set out in section 400, and by
reference, sections 394-398, establish liability rules that are broader
than the specific exceptions in subdivision 3 of section 544.41. Section 400 uses standard negligence rules to impose liability on sell426
ers who offer as their own products manufactured by others.
Those rules do not require that a defendant exercise "some si
nificant control over the design or manufacture of the product," 7
nor do they require a showing that the defendant provided instructions or warnings to the manufacturer concerning the alle~ed defect in the product that caused the injury, death, or damage. 28 The
rules do not require a showing of actual knowledge of the defect,
nor do they require a showing that the defendant created the de429
fect in the product.
Minnesota has not specifically adopted section 400 of the Restatement (Second). However, an earlier case, Tiedje v. Haney,430 was
cited in the Restatement Appendix as one of the decisions that supported a broadening of the early rule in the Restatement of Torts
431
covering the liability of product sellers.
Tiedje arose out of the
sale of a drug that contained poison which, when ingested by the
432
plaintiff, caused severe injuries.
The plaintiff brought suit

a-

425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.

Id.
See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965).
MINN. STAT. § 544.41, subd. 3(a) (1996).
See id. subd. 3(b).
See id. subd. 3(c).
184 Minn. 569, 239 N.W. 611 (1931).
See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 app. at 449 (1965).
See Tiedje, 184 Minn. at 570, 239 N.W. at 612.
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against all the defendants who manufactured and sold the plaintiff
4S3
the harmful tablets.
The druggist argued that the evidence con- .
clusively established that the drug he sold was a proprietary medicine, and that he was relieved by statute from liability for selling the
434
drug.
The statute provided that a druggist was liable for the quality of all drugs, chemicals, and medicine he sold other than proprietary medicines and other articles sold in their original pack435
ages.
The court explained the common law liability of a druggist
as follows:
At common law, a druggist is bound to exercise toward
his patrons that degree of care which is commensurate
with the hazards and dangers to which his patrons are exposed .... It has been said that the ordinary care which a
druggist is bound to exercise in filling his prescriptions
and in the sale of drugs and medicines is the highest possible degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, and diligence,
and the employment of the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of the
business, in order that human life may not be exposed to
the danger following the substitution of deadly poison for
harmless medicine .... As to the quality of nonproprietary medicines, the statute has now imposed responsibility
upon the vendor. In other respects, and as to proprietary
medicines, the law requires the same degree of care which
was required prior to the enactment of section 5813.
In connection with the sale of proprietary medicines in
the original package, the druggist is not required to analyze the medicine or drug when sold for the purpose for
which compounded, and if the manufacturer is a reputable one, he may rely, under ordinary circumstances, on
the rectitude of the manufacturer and the correctness of
his cOPlpound. Ordinary care under such circumstances
436
does not require a greater degree of diligence.
The rules are different with respect to the druggist's sale of
drugs sold under his own name. Those rules state:
[W]here the druggist obtains from a manufacturer tablets
or medicine which he does not sell under the name of the
manufacturer, but under his own name, accompanied by
a statement that it was manufactured or prepared for him,
433.
434.
435.
436.

See id.
See id. at 573,239 N.W. at 613.
See id.
Id. at 573-74, 239 N.W. at 613.
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in our opmlOn the druggist assumes a responsibility
equivalent to that of the manufacturer of the drugs, and
the rule in that regard laid down in Wills-on v. Faxon . ..
applies. It is true that in that case the druggist sold a
harmful preparation under a label which indicated that
the druggist was the manufacturer thereof, but we think
that he is equally responsible where he sells the medicine
as prepared or manufactured for himself and does not
437
disclose the name of the manufacturer.
Minnesota has also adopted, in general terms, the negligence
principles in the Restatement (Second) of Torts in a variety of pre438
McCormack cases.
Those cases establish bedrock products liability
law in Minnesota. Coupled with Tiedje, the cases would support
application of section 14. Given that background, there is no reason to presume that the Minnesota courts would decline to follow
the rule in section 14 in an appropriate case, or that the negligence
theory it adopts would be insufficient to block dismissal of a nonmanufacturing product seller in a case involving section 544.41 of
the Minnesota Statutes.

§ 15. GENERAL RULE GoVERNING CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN
PRODUCT DEFECT AND HARM

Whether a product defect caused harm to persons or property
is determined by the prevailing rules and principles governing cau••
439
satton m tort.
Commentary
Sections 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts require the pU!E0rted defect in the product to cause injury to person
or property.
The Restatement takes the position that the rules
generally governing causation in tort law also apply in products liability cases. This does not include the exception for the special
rule on causation in section 16, which covers cases involving an in437. [d. (citation omitted).
438. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Draper, 274 Minn. 1l0, 117, 142 N.W.2d 628, 633
(1966) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 298, 302-303 (1965) for
negligence in products liability cases in Minnesota); Gresser v. Taylor, 276 Minn.
440,444, 150 N.W.2d 869, 872 (1967) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
344 (1965» (holding that a golf course was negligent for failing to exercise reasonable care toward invitees).
439. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 15.
440. See id. §§ 1, 5-8.
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441

creased risk of harm created by a product defect.
In Minnesota,
the standard causation rule in negligence cases also applies to strict
442
liability cases.
The last two comments to section 15 cover two issues. The first
concerns the relationship of misuse, alteration, and modification of
443
a product to the causation issue.
The second concerns causation
and proportionate liability.444 Comment b covers misuse, alteration, and modification of a product. It notes that once the plaintiff
establishes the existence of a product defect, an issue may arise as
to whether a third party's misuse, alteration, or modification of the
product "contributed to the plaintiff's harm in such a way as to absolve the defendant from liability, in whole or in part. "445 The issue
should be determined "under the prevailing rules and principles
governing causation or the prevailing rules and principles governing comparative responsibility, as the case may be."446
The Reporters' Note following section 15 notes the differing
ways in which product misuse, alteration, and modification have
been treated in products liability cases involving misuse or proxi447
mate cause issues.
Factual variances make the cases difficult to
448
reconcile, which typically creates a jury question.
Furthermore,
while the plaintiff has the burden of persuasion, the Note recognizes that "more often than not as a practical matter the defendant
must raise the issue of causation and argue that even if the desi~
had been different the same harm would have occurred anyway." 9
In Minnesota, the misuse, alteration, or modification of a
product may prevent the plaintiff from proving the existence of a
defect for which the product manufacturer is liable, either because
the defect may have arisen due to alterations after manufacture, 450
441. See id. §§ 15-16.
442. See JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 18,JIG 116, at 80. The instruction uses the direct cause instruction in JIG 140. See id. (citing JURY INSTRUCTION
GUIDES, supra note 18, JIG 140, at 113). A direct cause is "a cause which had a
substantial part in bringing about the" accident. [d.
443. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 15 cmt. b.
444. See id. cmt. c.
445. [d. cmt. b.
446. [d.
447. See id. Reporters' Note, at 286.
448. See id.
449. /d. at 286-87.
450. See, e.g., Rients v. International Harvester Co., 346 N.W.2d 359, 362-63
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a plaintiff must prove that the product
reached him without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold by
the manufacturer).
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or because the plaintiff's misuse of the product was so unforeseeable that the manufacturer neither owed a duty to design the
product to make it safe for that use451 nor to warn against the mis452
However, if the plaintiff establishes that the product is deuse.
fective, the misuse issue arises again, but as an asgect of contribu4
tory negligence under the Comparative Fault Act.
Because the misuse, alteration, or modifications issues usually
go to the issue of whether a product is defective in the first place,
and if it is, whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in using the product, only in unusual cases is it likely that those issues
will relate to the causation question. Two examples, however, illustrate how proximate cause could be implicated. In Laubach v.
/saacson,454 a thirteen-year-old boy was burned when he and three of
his friends poured gasoline antifreeze on a skateboard and ignited
455
it.
The court of appeals concluded that the manufacturer of the
antifreeze owed no duty to warn that antifreeze was explosive be456
cause the use the boys made of it was not foreseeable.
The plaintiffs, however, also argued that the design of the antifreeze bottle
was defective because the bottle could be resealed and stood upright, which allowed storage of a partially used bottle. They also
argued that the shape of the bottle acted as a "flamethrower,"
457
which made it an unreasonably dangerous product.
The court
rejected the argument on causation grounds:
While a different design may have precluded storage of a
partially used bottle and may have caused the contents to
behave differently while burning, we conclude these alleged defects are not causally related to Daniel's injuries.
An act or a failure to act is a "proximate cause" when
451. See Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 626 n.2 (Minn. 1984)
(Simonett,j., concurring specially).
452. See, e.g., Huber v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 430 N.W.2d 465, 468
(Minn. 1988) (holding it not foreseeable that safety device permanently attached
to fully assembled machine would be removed and manufacturer therefore had
no duty to warn against such misuse); Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395
N.W.2d 922, 925 (Minn. 1986) (finding that manufacturer had duty to warn
where it was foreseeable that detachable safety device would be removed and that
there was a risk it might be reattached improperly).
453. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. la (1996) (mandating that misuse is subject to comparison as an element of "fault" under the Comparative Fault Act).
454. No. C0-91-1984, 1992 WL 31367 (Minn. Ct. App.), review denied, (Minn.
Apr. 29, 1992).
455. See id. at *1.
456. See id. at *2.
457. See id.
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the consequences naturally follow in unbroken sequence
without an intervening cause. Further, proximate cause
exists if the negligent conduct was a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm ....
The boys admitted they were looking for something to
burn and were attracted to the antifreeze bottle because it
said "FLAMMABLE." An unopened bottle differently designed would not have deterred them from prying the cap
off and lighting the contents on fire. The design of the
bottle was not a substantial factor in bringing about Dan458
iel's injuries.
In the second case, Rimts v. International Harvester CO.,459 the
plaintiff was injured when a tractor manufactured by International
460
Harvester overturned while he rode it.
The tractor was manufactured in 1955 and bought by the plaintiff from a dealer in used
461
farm implements in 1972.
In 1977, after numerous alterations to
the tractor, including replacement of the narrow front wheels with
462
a wide front axle, the accident occurred.
The court of appeals
noted the plaintiff's obligation to prove a causal link between the
alleged defect and the injury.463 The plaintiff introduced expert
testimony that the axle was defective because it used a cotter key to
hold the tie rod pins, and that other, safer designs existed to per464
form the function.
The court of appeals noted the impact of the
other modifications of the tractor:
It is uncontroverted ... that numerous modifications and
repairs had been made on the axle. The brakes were
worn. The steering gear arm, previously modified by removal of a piece with a cutting torch, broke at a weld.
The grease fitting on the steering arm, abraded by the
added rock box, was not accessible or functional. The tie
rods and steering knuckles were bent. Considering this
uncontroverted evidence, even if a jury found a design defect, it would be sheer speculation for a jury to find that
the design defect caused the accident rather than any of
465
these other possible causes.
458.

[d. at *2 (citations omitted).

459.
460.

464.

346 N'w.2d 359 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
See id. at 360.
See id.
See id. at 360-61.
See id. at 362.
See id.

465.

[d.

461.

462.
463.
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The second issue addressed in the comments to section 15 is
proportionate liability.466 In cases involving generic toxic sulr
stances, plaintiffs are unable to identify which manufacturer among
several made the product that caused the plaintiff's injuries. Some
courts have altered traditional causation rules and have permitted
the plaintiff to recover without identifying the manufacturer who
was the causal producer. These courts instead permit recovery
against all producers of the product, according to their relative
467
market shares.
The comment notes that courts have considered
a variety of factors in determining whether a proportional liability
rule should be adopted. Those factors include:
(1) the generic nature of the product; (2) the long latency period of the harm; (3) the inability of plaintiffs to
discover which defendant's product caused plaintiff's
harm, even after exhaustive discovery; (4) the clarity of
the causal connection between the defective product and
the harm suffered by plaintiffs; (5) the absence of other
medical or environmental factors that could have caused
or materially contributed to the harm; and (6) the availability of sufficient "market share" data to support a reasonable apportionment of liability.466
The American Law Institute "leaves to developing law the
question of whether, given the appropriate factors, a rule of proportional liability should be adopted.,,469 However, the comment
states that if a court does decide to adopt such a theory, "the liability of each defendant is prorerly limited to the individual defendant's share of the market.,,47
Proportional liability in the form of alternative liability has
been rejected by the Minnesota Court of Appeals471 and the Eighth
Circuit, applying Minnesota law.472 The Minnesota Court of Ap466. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 15 cmt. c.
467. See id.
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. See Bixler v. Avondale Mills, 405 N.W.2d 428,432 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
472. See Souder v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 939 F.2d 647, 650 (8th Cir.
1991). The issue was also raised in Erickson v. Whirlpool Corp., 731 F. Supp.
1426, 1430 (D. Minn. 1990), but the court declined to rule on it. See id. at 143l.
In dictum, the court discussed the theory but found it lacking because the defendants in the case had not been found to be negligent. See id. at 1431. Also, because the primary impact of the alternative liability theory in Summers v. Tice, 199
P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1948) is to shift the burden of proof to the defendants, and because the plaintiff had not previously suggested that the case be submitted to the
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peals rejected an alternative liability theory in Bixler v. Avondale
Mills,473 a case where severe burns were sustained by a minor wearing a homemade cotton flannelette nightshirt that caught on
474
fire.
The plaintiffs brought suit against the retailer of the material and five fabric mills that were possible suppliers of the material. 475 The retailer and one of the mills settled pursuant to Pier.
. d .477
nnger-type
re 1eases. 476 Th e 0 th er £our ml·11s remame
Prior to the settlements, the plaintiffs moved to amend their
complaint to add the other four mills and to add a count in market-share liability.478 The supreme court reversed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment for the defendants on the marketshare liability issue, ruling that consideration of the issue was pre479
mature.
Following additional discovery, which failed to identify
the manufacturer of the material, the defendants again moved for
summary judgment. This time, the trial court granted summary
judgment, concluding that alternative liability was inapplicable in
the case.480 The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the
elements of the alternative liability theory, as defined by the Michi482
gan Supreme Court in Abel v. Eli Lilly and CO.,481 were not met.
The Abel court listed three primary elements for alternative liability:
First, it must be shown that all the defendants have acted
tortiously. . .. [S]econd, that the plaintiffs have been
harmed by the conduct of one of the defendants (in orjury on that basis, the court refused to allow the plaintiff a "second bite at an altogether different apple," after having litigated the case instead on an aggregation
theory. Erickson, 731 F. Supp. at 1430-31.
473. 405 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
474. See id. at 429.
475. See id.
476. See id. Pieninger releases address the problem of piecemeal settlements.
See Peter B. Knapp, Keeping the Pieninger Promise: Fair Settlements and Fair Trials, 20
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1, 13 (1994). Generally under such releases, a plaintiff settles with those defendants so willing, but preseIVes all causes of actions against any
nonsettling defendants. See id. In return, the plaintiff releases all settling defendants, agrees to discharge the claim to the extent a jury later determines the settling defendants are partially responsible for the injuries, and agrees to indemnify
all settling defendants against future claims of contribution. See id.
477. See Bixler, 405 N.W.2d at 429.
478. See id.
479. See id.
480. See id. at 430.
481. 343 N.W.2d 164, 171 (Mich.1984), cen denied sub nom., E.R. Squibb &
Sons, Inc. v. Abel, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
482. See Bixler, 405 N.W.2d at 430-31.
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der to support this second requirement, the plaintiffs
must bring before the court all the actors who may have
caused the injury in fact); third, that the plaintiffs,
through no fault of their own, are unable to identify
which actor causes the injury.483
First, the court of appeals in Bixler concluded that the evidence
failed to establish that the manufacture of one hundred percent
cotton flannelette is a tortious act. 484 Second, the court concluded
that not all of the companies that supplied cotton flannelette to
485
J.C. Penney were before the court.
Third, the court noted that
one of the tortfeasors, J.C. Penney, was identified, and that the
486
plaintiff was not faultless.
Unlike the DES cases, where the danger was not discoverable until years later,487 the court noted that the
plaintiffs had ample opportunity to initiate discovery to attempt to
discover the manufacturer of the flannelette. 488
In Souder v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,489 the Eighth Circuit
also rejected alternative liability in a wrongful death action brought
against several asbestos manufacturers for the death of a pipefitter
490
who died of lung cancer.
Ten defendants moved for summary
judgment in the case on the ground that the plaintiff failed to show
specific evidence that the pipefitter was exposed to their materi491
The plaintiff argued that she demonstrated causation pursuals.
ant to the alternative liability theory, which, she argued, justified
shiftin~ the burden of proof on the causation issue to the defen42
dants.
Without citing Bixler, the Eighth Circuit noted that in
Leuer v. Johnson,493 the Minnesota Court of Appeals specifically rejected the alternative liability theory494 as formulated by the Cali495
fornia Supreme Court in Summers v. Tice.
The Summers court
483. Abe~ 343 N.W.2d at 173 (citations and footnote omitted). In this case,
the plaintiffs were daughters of woman who had taken DES, a synthetic estrogen
product, during pregnancy. See id. at 166. They were suing the manufacturers of
the synthetic estrogen product known. See id.
484. See Bixler, 405 N.W.2d at 43l.
485. Seeid.
486. Seeid.
487. See, e.g., Abel, 343 N.W.2d at 166. DES is a synthetic estrogen product.
See id.
488. See id.
489. 939 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1991).
490. See id. at 649.
491. See id. at 650.
492. See id.
493. 450 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
494. See Souder, 939 F.2d at 650.
495. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
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shifted the burden of proof on the causation issue to two hunters
who negligently fired their shotguns in the direction of a third
hunter, when it was unclear which hunter fired the shot that struck
496
the plaintiff.
While the Minnesota Supreme Court had not yet
ruled on the issue, the Eighth Circuit was not convinced that the
supreme court would rule differently than the court of appeals on
the alternative liability theory.497
That leaves alternative liability at least as a possibility in Minnesota. However, as the Eighth Circuit noted in Souder, the Minnesota Supreme Court has only incidentally cited Summers on two occasions, neither adopting nor rejecting it as an appropriate theory
498
in products liability cases.
In Hoven v. Rice Memorial Hosp.,499 the
supreme court rejected the California Supreme Court's opinion in
500
Ybarra v. Spangard.
This decision was a significant factor for the
50l
court of appeals in rejecting Summers v. Tice in the Leuer case.
In general, the appellate courts in Minnesota have demonstrated continuing antipathy to burden of proof shifting devices.
The only case in which the supreme court shifted the burden of
proof where there were several potential wrongdoers was Mahowald
502
v. Minnesota Gas CO. Mahowald involved a natural gas explosion
caused by a pipe leak that could have been caused by anyone of
503
several defendants who worked near the gas line.
Using the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the court shifted the burden of proof on
the negligence issue to the gas company. In so doing, it found that
the gas company had not caused the injury because the company
possessed superior knowledge of its gas distribution system, inspected the system, and was responsible for the system's safety.504
505
So far, Mahowald has been confined to its facts.

496.
497.
498.

See id. at 4.
See Souder, 939 F.2d at 650.
See id.

499. 396 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1986) (refusing to adopt the Ybarra analysis).
500. 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944) (shifting the burden of proof on the negligence
issue to health care professionals who all attended the plaintiff in the course of a
surgical procedure that resulted in an unexplained injury to his ann).
501. See Leuer v.Johnson, 450 N.w'2d 363, 365 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (noting
that "because the Summers decision had as its basis Ybarra, and because Ybarra has
been consistently rejected by the Minnesota Supreme Court, we must reject Summers as well").
502. 344 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. 1984).
503. See id. at 858.
504. See id. at 863.
505. See Lever, 450 N.W.2d at 366.
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§ 16. INCREASED HARM DUE TO PRODUCT DEFECT
(a) When a product is defective at the time of sale and the
defect is a substantial factor in increasing the plaintiff's harm
beyond that which would have resulted from other causes the
product seller is subject to liability for the increased harm.
(b) If proof supports a determination of the harm that
would have resulted from other causes in the absence of the
product defect, the product seller's liability is limited to the increased harm attributable solely to the product defect.
(c) If proof does not support a determination under Subsection (b) of the harm that would have resulted in the absence
of the product defect, the product seller is liable for all of the
plaintiff's harm attributable to the defect and other causes.
(d) A seller of a defective product who is held liable for
part of the harm suffered by the plaintiff under Subsection (b),
or all of the harm suffered by the plaintiff under Subsection
(c), is jointly and severally liable with other parties who bear legal responsibility for causing the harm, determined by applicable rules of joint and severalliability.506
Commentary
Section 16 requires the plaintiff in an enhanced injury case to
prove the existence of a product defect under the rules established
507
in sections 1-4 of the Restatement. If the plaintiff alleges a design
508
defect, the factors provided in the Restatement contro1.
Under the
rule in section 16(a), the plaintiff must prove that the defect was a
substantial factor in increasing the harm suffered by the plaintiff
509
when compared to potential harm from other causes.
Under
subsection (b), if the proof supports a finding of the harm that the
plaintiff would have suffered from other causes absent the product
defect, then the liability of the product seller is limited only to the
5lo
increased harm that is attributed solely to the product defect.
Under subsection (c), if the proof does not support that determination, the product seller is liable both for the harm attributed to
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.

Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 16 (emphasis in original).
See id.
See id. § 2 cmt. f.
See id. § 16(a).
See id. § 16(b).
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5I1
the product defect and the other causes.
The Reporters' Note
explains that section 16(c) "does not fonnally shift any burden of
proof to the defendant.,,512 If the plaintiff proves that a defect in
the product increased the plaintiff's harm beyond what would have
occurred if the product had not been defective, and at the close of
the case the proof is insufficient to support a detennination of what
harm the plaintiff would have suffered in absence of a product defect, the defendant then is liable for all of the hann the plaintiff
51s
sufIered.
Subsection (d) finds the seller of a defective product, who is
liable for part of the plaintiff's hann as detennined according to
subsection (b) or all the hann under subsection (c), jointly and
severally liable with the other parties who caused hann to the
514
plaintiff.
The rule of joint and several liability is required because of the lack of another practical method to apportion responsibility that reflects the causal contributions of the tortfeasors who
515
caused the plaintiff's injuries.
The joint and several liability detennination is, of course, subject to any applicable state limitations
516
of the rule.
Under Minnesota's Comparative Fault Act, a defendant's joint and several liability is limited to no more that four
517
times its percentage of fault when its fault is 15 percent or less.
Therefore, a defendant whose fault is 10 percent, would be liable
to the plaintiff for no more than 40 percent of the plaintiff's dam51B
ages.
In the products liability context, however, if a party in the
chain of manufacture and distribution is unable to pay its fair share
of the judgment, that share is reallocated only to the remaining
parties in the chain, and not to the plaintiff or other parties in the
. 519
sUlt.

The position taken in section 16(c), the majority view, is referred to in the Reporters' Note as the Fox-Mitchell view. This view
is named after two early cases that outlined the position now pro511. See id. § 16(c).
512. [d. Reporters' Note, at 300.
513. See id.
514. See id. § 16(d).
515. See id.
516. See id. § 16 cmt. e.
517. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subds. 2-3 (1996).
518. The application of the rules limiting joint and several liability is not entirely clear in Minnesota law. See Michael K. Steenson, Joint and Several Liability
Minnesota Style, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 969 (1989).
519. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 3 (1996); Marcon v. Kmart Corp., No. C2-971319,1998 WL 49162 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 1998).
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vided in section 16(c): Fox v. Ford Motor CO.,520 a 1978 Tenth Circuit
case, and Mitchell v. Volkswa~enwerk, AG,521 a 1982 Eighth Circuit
case applying Minnesota law. 22 In Mitchel~ the court rejected the
defendant's argument that the plaintiff in an enhanced injury case
should be required to prove the designer was the sole cause of the
enhanced injury; it also rejected that the plaintiff would not otherwise have suffered injuries absent a defect. The Mitchell court
stated:
By placing the burden of proof on a plaintiff to prove that
the designer was the sole cause of not only an enhanced
indivisible injury, but, in addition, that he would not otherwise have received injuries absent a defect, the injured
victim is relegated to an almost hopeless state of never being able to succeed against a defective designer. The public interest is little served. We write to reaffirm that Larsen
was not intended to create a rule which requires the
plaintiff to assume an impossible burden of proving a
negative fact. A rule of law which requires a plaintiff to
prove what portion of indivisible harm was caused by each
party and what might have happened in lieu of what did
happen requires obvious speculation and proof of the
impossible. This approach converts the common law
rules governing principles of lellal causation into a morass
_c,'
.
52!P
o f COll~USlOn
an d uncertamty.
Mter examining Minnesota law on the rule ofjoint and several
liability, the court's assessment of Minnesota law was as follows:
[U]nder Minnesota law the plaintiffs' burden of proof
should be deemed satisfied against the manufacturer if it
is shown that the design defect was a substantial factor in
producing damages over and above those which were
probably caused as a result of the original impact or collision. Furthermore, the extent of the manufacturer's liability depends upon whether or not the injuries involved
are divisible such that the injuries can be clearly separated
and attributed either to the manufacturer or the original
tortfeasor. If the manufacturer's negligence is found to
be a substantial factor in causing an indivisible injury such
as paraplegia, death, etc., then absent a reasonable basis
to determine which wrongdoer actually caused the harm,
520.
521.
522.
523.

575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978).
669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982).
See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 16 Reporters' Note, at 300.
Mitchell, 669 F.2d at 1204-{)5.

HeinOnline -- 24 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 95 1998

96

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

the defendants should be treated as joint and several tort524
feasors.
The court concluded that under Minnesota law, the defendants seeking apportionment of damages have the burden of proof
on the issue. The burden of proof is as follows:
[T]his placement of the burden of proof is justified by
considerations of fairness. IT we were to impose upon an
injured party the necessity of proving which impact in a
chain collision did which harm, we would actually be expressing a judicial policy that it is better that a plaintiff, injured through no fault of his own, take nothing, than that
a wrongdoer pay more than his theoretical share of the
damages arising out of a situation which his wrong has
helped to create. In other words, the rule is a result of a
choice made as to where a loss due to failure of proof
shall fall-on an innocent plaintiff or on defendants who
525
are clearly proved to have been at fault.
The position of the Mitchell court differs from the Restatement
on the burden of proof issue.
Mitchell has not specifically been adopted by the Minnesota
Supreme Court, although it was cited with approval in Rebehn v.
General Motors Corp.,526 an unpublished court of appeals decision.
During the course of trial in Rebehn, both parties presented extensive evidence on the issue of whether the plaintiff would have suffered his spinal cord injury if certain components of the truck,
such as the sea~ back and steering column, had been designed differently.527 The plaintiff requested the following jury instruction at
trial:
You are instructed that the term "crashworthiness"
means the protection that a motor vehicle affords its passengers against a personal injury or death as a result of a
motor vehicle accident.
A manufacturer is under a duty to use reasonable care
in the design of its vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to
an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision.
Collisions with or without the fault of the user are clearly
524.

[d. at 1206 (citing Mathews v. Mills, 288 Minn. 16, 178 N.W.2d 841

(1970».
[d. at 1208.
526. No. CX-94-1568, 1995 WL 146662, at *1 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App.), review denied, (Minn. May 31,1995) (citing Mitchell).
527. See id. at *1. The plaintiffs pickup truck hit a bridge, causing his injuries.
525.

See id.
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foreseeable by the manufacturer and are statistically inevitable. This duty of reasonable care and design rests on
common law negligence that a manufacturer of an article
should use reasonable care in the design and manufacture of his product to eliminate any unreasonable risk of
foreseeable injury. The duty of reasonable care in design
should be viewed in light of the risk. While all risks cannot
be eliminated, nor can a crash-proof vehicle be designed
under the current state of the art, there are many common sense factors in design which are or should be well
known to the manufacturer that will minimize or lessen
the injurious effects of a collision. The standard of reasonable care as applied in other negligent situations is
also applicable to the plaintiffs claim that the motor vehicle in issue did not provide reasonable occupant protection to plaintiffJohn Rebehn.
You are instructed that the plaintiff has the burden of
proving that the alleged defect was a substantial factor in
producing damages over and above those which were
probably caused as the result of the original impact or collision. The plaintiff does not have the burden of proving
what injuries plaintiff John Rebehn would have incurred
in the absence of the alleged defect(s) in the motor vehicle in issue. Thus, in this case, plaintiff must present sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to reasonably find that
the vehicle contained one or more defects and that the
defects were substantial factors in producing the injuries
which ultimately resulted in damage to the spinal cord
that caused Mr. Rebehn's paralysis and/or paraplegic
condition. If the plaintiff fails to show that the defects
were a substantial factor, there can be no recovery against
defendant General Motors Corporation relative to plaintiffs claim that the motor vehicle was not "crashworthy"
or that the vehicle did not provide reasonable occupant
protection. However, if the defects are shown to be a substantial factor, then and in that event, defendant General
Motors Corporation is considered to be a joint tortfeasor
and you should not attempt to apportion the plaintiff's total damages between defendant General Motors Corporation, plaintiff John Rebehn, and other entities who may
be found to be at fault who are not parties to this litiga-
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528

llon.
The trial court rejected the requested instruction in favor of
the standard design defect instruction inJIG 117.529 The trial court
also used a special verdict form that asked the jury to determine
whether the truck was in a defective condition and if so, whether
the defect was a direct cause of the plaintiff's spinal cord injury.530
In addition, the jury was also asked to determine whether the plaintiff was at fault, and if so, whether his fault was a direct cause of his
own injury.53) Assuming the questions were answered in the affirmative, the jury was then asked to apportion fault between the
532
defendant and plaintiff.
However, the jury found that the truck
533
was not defective. The court of appeals accepted Mitchell, but determined that the trial court did not err in giving the general design defect instruction over the specific crashworthiness instruction
requested by the plaintiff. The court held that the general instruc534
tion adequately incorporated the plaintiff's theory of defect.
The seat belt issue in products liability cases has prompted a
variety of legislative and judicial approaches, particularly on the is535
By statute, proof of seat belt evidence is insue of plaintiff fault.
admissible in Minnesota:
Proof of the use or failure to use seat belts or a child passenger restraint system as described in subdivision 5, or
proof of the installation or failure of installation of seat
belts or a child passenger restraint system as described in
subdivision 5 shall not be admissible in evidence in any
litigation involving personal injuries or property damage
resulting from the use or operation of any motor vehi536
cleo
The statute consequently bars the introduction of seat belt
evidence to establish the plaintiff's contributory negligence in an
537
enhanced injury case.
However in Olson v. Ford Motor CO,538 the
Minnesota Supreme Court also held that the statute precludes the
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.

Id. at *1 n.2.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 16 Reporters' Note, at 313-14.
MINN. STAT. § 169.685, subd. 4 (1996).
See id.
558 N.W.2d 491 (Minn. 1997).
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plaintiff in an enhanced injury case from introducing evidence that
properly worn seat belts were defective and resulted in increased
5Sg
injuries.
In Olson, the plaintiff was injured in a two-car colli540
sion.
The plaintiff alleged he was wearing his seat belt at the
time of the accident and the seat belt failed, materially contribut541
ing to his injuries.
He argued that the seat belt statute was inapplicable to crashworthiness claims. The court, however, rejected
the argument because it found the statute clear~ worded; it prohibited the introduction of any seat belt evidence. 2
The Comparative Fault Act takes the position that an
"unreasonable failure to avoid aggravating an injury or to mitigate
damages may be considered only in determining the damages to
which the claimant is entitled. It may not be considered in determining the cause of an accident.,,54s That means that the plaintiff's
negligent failure to avoid an i~ury by using a safety device that
would have reduced injuries is not compared to the defendant's
fault in causing the accident. However, the plaintiff's fault will be
compared to the defendant's with respect to the damages the
544
plaintiff sustained.
The plaintiff would thus be entitled to recover even if more at fault than the defendant.

§ 17.

APPORTIONMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN OR AMONG
PLAINTIFF, SELLERS AND DISTRIBUTORS OF DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS,
AND OTHERS

(a) A plaintiff's recovery of damages for harm caused by a
product defect may be reduced if the conduct of the plaintiff
combines with the product defect to cause the harm and the
plaintiff's conduct fails to conform to generally applicable rules
establishing appropriate standards of care.
(b) The manner and extent of the reduction under Subsection (a) and the apportionment of plaintiff's recovery among
multiple defendants are governed by generally applicable rules
apportioning responsibility.545
.

539.
540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.

See id. at 497.
See id. at 493.
See id.
See id. at 497.
MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. la (1996).
See Foley v. City of West Allis, 335 N.W.2d 824, 829 (Wis. 1983).
Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 17.
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Commentary
The comments to section 17 make a number of points concerning defenses in products liability cases, while leaving the form
546
of comparative fault up to each jurisdiction.
Section 17 and its
comments coincide with Minnesota law on most issues. The comments note that product misuse, product alteration, and product
modification relate to three different issues in products liability
cases. 547 They relate to the issue of whether the product is defective, and if so, whether the defect was a direct cause of the plaintiff's injury.546 They also relate to the plaintiff's contributory negligence if the plaintiff in some way alters, misuses, or modifies the
549
product.
The &statement does not allocate the burden of proof
for the misuse, modification, and alteration issues; it leaves the issue to local law. 550
Comment d addresses the issue of whether there should be
separate treatment for certain forms of plaintiff misconduct m
products liability cases. Comment d notes:
Some courts accord different treatment to special categories of plaintiff conduct. For example, some decisions
hold that when the plaintiff's negligence consists in the
failure to discover a product defect, reduction of damages
on the basis of apportionment of responsibility is improper, reasoning that a consumer has a right to expect a
defect-free product and should not be burdened with a
duty to inspect for defects. Other decisions hold that apportionment of responsibility is improper when the product lacked a safety feature that would protect against the
risk that resulted in the injury in question, reasoning that
defendant's responsibility should not be diminished when
the plaintiff engages in the very conduct that the product
design should have prevented. On the other hand, some
decisions hold that a plaintiff's assumption of the risk is a
complete defense to a products liability action, not merely
a basis for apportionment of responsibility. Product misuse, alteration, and modification have been treated by
some courts as an absolute bar to recovery and by others
as a form of plaintiff fault that should be compared with
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.

See id. crnts. a-d.
See id. crnt. c.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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that of other parties to reduce recovery. 551
Under the Restatement approach, all forms of plaintiff misconduct when the plaintiff fails to conform to the applicable standard
552
of care are subject to apportionment.
The purpose of the approach is twofold: it is first intended to avoid the stilted approach
to defenses that has produced a significant amount of appellate
litigation devoted to tigeonholing the plaintiff's conduct into an
exempted category,55 and second, to facilitate the allocation of
fault in multiple party litigation where parties other than the plain554
tiff and product seller are involved. Although the Restatement refuses to slot plaintiff misconduct into separate categories, the trier
of fact is nonetheless able to take varying degrees of plaintiff mis555
conduct into consideration in its allocation offault.
Minnesota's basic approach to Rroducts liability defenses is set
5
out in the Comparative Fault Act. 6 Minnesota has a Wisconsin557
modified form of comparative fault in which a plaintiff is barred
from recovery only if the plaintiff's fault is greater than the party
558
from whom recovery is sought.
While the act requires individual
comparisons of fault,559 aggregation of fault is permitted in joint
560
duty cases, such as joint ventures.
Whether aggregation of the
fault of parties in the chain of manufacture and distribution has
561
not yet been answered by the supreme court.
The broad definition of "fault" in the Comparative Fault Act
aligns Minnesota with the Restatement. It defines:
"Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward the person or property of
the actor or others, or that subject a person to strict tort
liability. The term also includes breach of warranty, unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an express
551. [d. cmt. d.
552. See id.
553. See id.
554. See id.
555. See id.
556. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1996).
557. See Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 393 (Minn. 1977).
558. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1996).
559. See Cambern v. Sioux Tools, Inc., 323 N .W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1982).
560. See Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc., 295 Minn. 200, 208-09, 203
N.W.2d 841, 846-47 (1973).
561. In Marcon v. Kmart Corp., No. C2-97-1319, 1998 WL 49162 (Minn. Ct.
App. Feb. 10, 1998), the court of appeals treated parties in the chain of distribution as a unit for purposes of applying the loss reallocation statute, MINN. STAT. §
604.02, subd. 3 (1996). See id. at *4.
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consent or primary assumption of risk, misuse of a product and unreasonable failure to avoid an i~ury or to mitigate damages, and the defense of complicity under section 340A.801. Legal requirements of causal relation
apply both to fault as the basis for liability and to contributory fault. The doctrine of last clear chance is abolished.
Evidence of unreasonable failure to avoid aggravating
an injury or to mitigate damages may be considered only
in determining the damages to which the claimant is entitled. It may not be considered in determining the cause
o f an acCl'den t. 562
The Act makes negligence, strict liability, and implied warranty
subject to comparison, along with various aspects of contributory
negligence, including secondary assumption of risk, product misuse, unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages,
563
and the defense of complicity under the Civil Damages Act.
The
listing of potential defenses does not mean that the defenses are
separately considered in litigation, however. The defenses collapse
into the single defense of contributory negligence making the single defense issue in products liability cases whether plaintiffs have
exercised reasonable care for their own safety564 leaving defendants
free to prove and argue the ways in which the plaintiffs failed to do
so.
Minnesota is somewhat equivocal about whether there should
be exceptions to the general rule that all forms of contributory
negligence, either by act or omission, are subject to comparison.
In Busch v. Busch Construction, Inc.,565 a pre-Comparative Fault Act
case, the Minnesota Supreme Court tailored the available defenses
in products liability cases to protect "the consumer's reliance on
the product's safety." The court stated:
To insure protection of this interest, we hold that a consumer's negligent failure to inspect a product or to guard
against defects is not a defense and thus may not be compared with a distributor's strict liability. All other types of
consumer negligence, misuse, or assumption of the risk
562. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. la (1996).
563. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. la (1996) (citing section 340A.801 of the
Civil Damages Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 340A.801-.802 (1996).
564. See JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 18, JIG 202, Authorities at 55-58
(Supp. 1997).
565. 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977).
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must be compared with the distributor's strict liability un566
der the statute.
The Busch exception may no longer be good law in light of the
Comparative Fault Act's language requiring the comparison of
"acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others.,,567 The failure
to inspect or to guard against product defects is certainly an
"omission" that may be subject to comparison under the Act. 568
While the continued viability of the Busch exception is questionable after the passage of the Comparative Fault Act in 1978, the
Minnesota Supreme Court clearly perceives that it has the authority
to alter the rules governing comparative fault to except from the
comparison certain forms of plaintiff misconduct. In Tomfohr v.
Mayo Foundation,569 the Minnesota Supreme Court responded to a
certified question from the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota concerning a wrongful death case resulting from
the suicide of a psychiatric patient at the defendant hospital. The
question was whether it is error, as a matter of law, "for the trial
court not to submit a capacity based instruction to the jury concerning the patient's comparative fault?,,57o
In response, the supreme court noted the liberal application
of comparative fault principles in Minnesota, even in situations
571
where other jurisdictions have refused to apply comparative fault.
As examples, the court noted the Comparative Fault Act's inclusion
of the defenses of consumer ne~ligence, assumption of risk, and
misuse in products liability cases, 2 the flexible standard applied to
gauge the fault of injured children,573 and its limitation of defenses
in cases involving the breach of statutes intended to protect a spe574
The court also noted its willingness to use a
cific class of persons.
reduced capacity standard in comparative fault assessments where
566.
567.

[d. at 394.
MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1a (1996).
568. See id.
569. 450 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. 1990).
570. [d. at 122.
571. See id. at 123.
572. See id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1a. (1988); Seim v. Garavalia,
306 N.W.2d 806, 809 (Minn. 1981».
573. See id. (citing Toetschinger v. Inhot, 312 Minn. 59, 63-65, 250 N.W.2d
204,207-08 (1977».
574. See id. at 124. (citing Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806, 811 (Minn.
1981»; Zerbyv. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 140-41,210 N.W.2d 58, 64 (1973); Dart v.
Pure Oil Co., 223 Minn. 526,535,27 N.W.2d 555, 561 (1947».
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the plaintiff suffers from a mental deficiency or mental disorder. 575
Having established its credentials for flexible comparative fault
interpretation, the court concluded that because the hospital owed
a duty to protect against the very harm that occurred (the patient's
suicide), it could not assert the patient's contributory negligence as
576
a defense in the wrongful death action.
However, the court hastened to add that while the certified question was answered in the
negative, the ruling was limited to the fact paradigm presented in
the case: "an attempted suicide committed by a mentally ill patient
admitted to a locked hospital ward where the medical staff was
aware of his suicidal ideations. ,,577
The court also cautioned that its decision should not be construed as a per se rejection of a "capacity-based comparative fault
standard" in other settings:
[O]ur holding today only stands for the proposition that
cases may exist, such as this one, where a trial judge may
rule, as a matter of law, that the patient could not be at
fault because he lacked the capacity to be responsible for
his own well being, and that the obligation of self care was
transferred to the health care provider when it admitted
.
..
578
th e patIent mto Its care.
Whether Tomjohr's approach would be applied by the court in
a case where the Busch exception is directly presented is uncertain.
The factual differences and attendant policy distinctions between
the two cases, together with the court's apparent intent to hold the
line in establishing these sorts of exceptions, likely invalidate the
Busch exception.
§ 18. DISCLAIMERS, LIMITATIONS, WAIVERS, AND OTHER
CONTRACTUAL EXCULPATIONS AS DEFENSES TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY
CLAIMS FOR HARM TO PERSONS
Disclaimers and limitations of remedies by product sellers or
other distributors, waivers by product purchasers, and other similar
contractual exculpations, oral or written, do not bar or reduce otherwise valid products liability claims against sellers or other dis-

575. See id. at 124. (citing Quick v. Benedictine Sisters Hosp. Ass'n, 257 Minn.
470,485,102 N.W.2d 36, 47 (1960».
576. See id. at 125.
577. Id.
578. Id.
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105

579

Commentary
Section 18 of the Restatement (Third) states that disclaimers and
limitations of liability by product sellers or other distributors will
not bar or reduce otherwise valid products liability claims against
580
sellers or distributors of new products.
Section 21 covers dis.
£
h
.
I
581
CI almers or arm to property or economIc oss.
Comment d notes that section 18 applies in cases where
"commercial product sellers attempt unfairly to disclaim or otherwise limit their liability to the majority of users and consumers who
are presumed to lack information and bargaining power adequate
. .
"582
to protect th elr mterests.
Section 18 is limited, however:
This Section does not address whether consumers, especially when represented by informed and economically
powerful consumer groups or intermediaries, with full information and sufficient bargaining power, may contract
with product sellers to accept curtailment of liability in
exchange for concomitant benefits, or whether such consumers might be allowed to agree to substitute alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms in place of traditional adjudication. When such contracts are accompanied by alternative nontort remedies that serve as an adequate quid
pro quo for reducing or eliminating rights to recover in
tort, arguments may support giving effect to such agreements. Such contractual arrangements raise policy questions different from those raised by this Section and re. care fiu I consl'deratlOn
. b y th e courts. 58S
qUIre
The Reporters' Note refers to various sources that suggest alternatives to products liability litigation to resolve disputes, some
584
legislative and some private.
Section 18 takes no position on the
579. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 18.
580. See id.
581. See id. § 18 cmt. a & § 21.
582. Id. § 18 cmt. d.
583. Id.
584. See id. Reporters' Note, at 331-32 (citing Jeffrey O'Connell, Elective NoFault Liability by Contract: With or Without an Enabling Statute, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 59,
65-71 (1975); Jeffrey O'Connell, Offers that Can't be Refused: Foreclosure of Personal
Injury Claims by Defendants' Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw.
U. L. REv. 589 (1982); 2 A.L.I., REpORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONAL Ir-{JURY 517-536 (1991); The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of

HeinOnline -- 24 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 105 1998

106

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

prudence of the proposals. Rather, it covers "only ... traditional
disclaimers that function unfairly to deny or limit liability to persons who lack either information or bargaining power to protect
. mterests.
.
"585
th elr
Minnesota law is the same. While the Minnesota Supreme
Court has not had the occasion to specifically hold disclaimers of
liability invalid in products liability cases, the principles supporting
the adoption of strict liability as enunciated by the court in McCormack v. Hankscra!, CO.,586 and as applied in cases involving property
damage claims,57 make it certain that Minnesota would adopt the
same position with respect to disclaimers in personal injury cases.

§ 19. DEFINITION OF "PRODUCT"
For purposes of this Restatement:
(a) A product is tangible personal property distributed
commercially for use or consumption. Other items, such as
real property and electricity, are products when the context of
their distribution and use is sufficiently analogous to the distribution and use of tangible personal property that it is appropriate to apply the rules stated in this Restatement.
(b) Services, even when provided commercially, are not
products.
(c) Human blood and human tissue, even when provided
588
commercially, are not subject to the rules of this Restatement.
Commentary
Section 19 of the Restatement (Third) defines a product for pur58g
poses of its liability rules.
The plaintiff may diminish the significance of the issue when the theory of recovery is design defect or

1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1-300aa-24 (1994); Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty
Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc Remedy or a
Window for the Future?, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 387 (1987».
585. Id. Reporters' Note, at 332.
586. 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967). For the policy justifications see
supra note 21 and accompanying text.
587. See Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 14-16 (Minn.
1992).
588. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 19.
589. See id. cmt. a.
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failure to warn, since risk-utility principles apply to those claims,590
but the issue nonetheless remains important because of the continuing viabili~ of strict liability theory in cases involving manufacturing defects. 91 Whether or not something is a "product" is a
592
question of law for the court.
Under the definition most products will be tangible personal
property:
Component parts are products, whether sold or distributed separately or assembled with other component parts.
An assemblage of component parts is also, itself, a product. Raw materials are products, whether manufactured,
such as sheet metal; processed, such as lumber; or gathered and sold or distributed in raw condition, such as un593
washed grave1 and farm produce.
The comments to section 19 note the division of authority on
the issue of whether living animals may be products for purposes of
594
deciding the tort liability of a commercial seller. For example, in
cases where diseased livestock are sold and have to be destroyed,
595
the plaintiff's claim is for the damage to the product itself.
The
Restatement (Third) treats that claim as economic loss not covered
596
under the its liability rules.
However, if the diseased animals
cause harm to other animals, that harm to other property is com597
pensable under the Restatement.
59B
Section 19 also distinguishes between services and products.
Services, even if provided commercially, are not deemed to be
products for purposes of the Restatement (Third).599 It is irrelevant if
the service that is performed relates to a commercially distributed
600
product.
The comments use the example of a person who contracts to inspect, repair, and maintain machinery owned by an60l
other.
In such a case the service provider is considered separate
602
from the provider of the product.
590.
591.
592.
593.
594.
595.
596.
597.
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.

See id.
See id. Reporters' Note, at 338.
See id. cmt. a.
[d. cmt. h.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. cmt. f.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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Blood and human tissue, while they meet the requirements of
section 19 (a), are excluded from the Restatement (Third) under
603
subpart (c) for policy reasons.
Most jurisdictions address the issue legislatively, exempting sellers of blood and human tissue from
strict liability. Such sellers do remain liable under negligence rules
604
as providers of professional services, however.
Intangible personal property includes two primary catego.605
..
l carts.
h
606
. 0 fb 00 ks ,maps, or naVlgatlona
nes.
1n
0 ne consIsts
general, liability is not imposed for information contained in a
book, although the book is clearly a product, because the plaintiff's
claim is based on the information in the book and not the book itself. 607 Free speech concerns have led most courts to refuse to im60B
pose strict liability on book sellers.
The second category of intangible property "involves the
transmission of intangible forces such as electricity and X rays.,,609
A majority of courts have held that the transmission of electricity
becomes a product only when it is delivered to the plaintiff's house
610
through the meter.
In cases involving injury caused by X rays and radiation treatment, the claim is based on the improper administration of the
treatments by medical technicians, rather than on an allegation
611
that the X rays are themselves harmful.
Courts have refused to
impose liability in those cases absent a showing that the X rays or
forms of radiation treatment were defective or that the technicians
.
612
were neg11gent.
The application of products liability principles to improvements to real property has been problematic. Housing contractors
who build one house at a time do not readily fit the pattern of a
mass producer of products, and, according to the comments, "nor
is such a builder perceived to be more capable than are purchasers
of controlling or insuring atlainst risks presented by weather conditions or earth movements." 3 However, courts have treated sellers
603.
604.
605.
606.
607.
608.
609.
610.
611.
612.
613.

See id. cmt. c.
See id.
See id. cmt. d.
See id.
See id.
See id.
[d.
See id.
See id.
See id.
[d. cmt. e.
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of improved real property as product sellers in some contexts. An
example would be a building contractor that sells a building con614
taining appliances or other manufacturing equipment.
Under
those circumstances, the builder, along with the manufacturer of
the equipment and other distributors, are all held to be product
sellers, though the built-in equipment may have become an attachment to real property.615 A builder may also be a product seller
with respect to the building itself, when, for examgle, the building
is prefabricated and put together on- or off-site. 6 Courts could
also impose strict liability on a mass producer of new homes, such
. a Iarge sc al e h
·
.
617
as a contractor m
ousmg
proJect.
Minnesota products liability law has tracked section 19 of the
Restatement,6lB although without a formal definition of the term
"product." Minnesota courts have applied products liability law,
including strict liability theory, to a variety of products that fit
within the definition of tangible personal property.619
620
In Harmon Contract Glazing, Inc. v. Liblfy-Owens-Ford CO. two
unsecured wood crates containing heavy glass panes fell off a
trailer, killing one man and injuring another, while the men were
621
assisting in unloading the trailer that held the crates.
LibbyOwens-Ford Company (LOF) manufactured· and sold the glass and
622
Harmon Contract Glazing purchased it.
Harmon purchased the
623
glass for office building installation.
The trial court held that the
crating, bracing, and shoring of the glass panes were an integral
part of the product shipped by LOF. 4 The court therefore tried
625
the case as a products liability case.
LOF argued that the case involved negligent loading procedures, rather than the negligent de-

614. See id.
615. See id.
616. See id.
617. See id.
618. See Hofstedt v. International HaIVester Co., 256 Minn. 453, 460, 98
N.W.2d 808, 813 (Minn. 1959) (holding that a manufacturer of a chattel may be
liable to those who use the chattel if the manufacturer fails to exercise reasonable
care in the design of the chattel).
619. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 19 Reporters' Note, at 340-44.
620. 493 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, (Minn. Feb. 12,
1993).
621. See id. at 148.
622. See id.
623. See id.
624. See id. at 149.
625. See id.
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626
sign of a product.
The court of appeals agreed, holding that "a
product's packaging does not extend to the method used to secure
or load it for shipment."627 The court concluded that the products
involved were the glass panes, which could also include the wood
628
crates, because LOF sold them as a unit.
Harmon argued that
the crate was a part of the product's "package," but the court of
appeals rejected the argument and decided that the ~lass and bracing system "were not sold as an integrated whole." 29 The court
viewed the bracing as simply the method of securing the load for
630
shipping.
More generally, the court observed that the method
used to secure a product for shipping cannot be viewed as an inte631
gral part of the product itself.
In light of the Restatement (Third) comments noting that the
significance of determining whether a product is involved is lessened because of the risk-utility principles that govern design and
defect claims,632 the court's opinion in the Harmon case is interesting for the distinction it draws between a manufacturer's duty as a
shipper and the manufacturer's duty as a product designer.
Distilled to its essential point, the Harmon court's holding is
that the manufacturer's added responsibility to keep informed of
current scientific knowledge imposes a greater duty on it as a
6s3
manufacturer than as a shipper or loader of products.
The trial
court's submission of the case to the jury under a products liability
failure to warn theory meant that the defendant "was allocated uncompromising duties it would not have had under simple negli,,634
gence.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not treated electricity as a
product for products liability purposes, although the possibility
remains open. The court has also determined that strict liability
principles applicable to abnormally dangerous activities do not apply to electricity, although the court has held gower companies to a
6
high standard of care regarding power lines.
626. Seeid.
627. [d.
628. Seeid.
629. [d.
630. Seeid.
631. Seeid.
632. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 19 cmt. a.
633. See Harmon Glass Glazing, 493 N.W.2d at 151.
634. [d.
635. See Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co., 307 Minn. 26, 33, 239 N.W.2d
190, 194 (1976).
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6~6

In ZumBerge v. Northern States Power Co., a 1992 court of appeals case, the plaintiffs brought suit against NSP for a decline in
performance of, and various ,Physical problems with, their dairy
herd caused by stray voltage.6~ The plaintiffs sued on negligence,
638
breach of warranty, and strict liability theories.
The court of appeals' opinion focused on the relationship between the plaintiffs
and NSP. 6~9 The trial court had concluded that the provision of
electricity was a sale of goods under Article 2 of the V.C.C., a ques640
tion the court of appeals noted is undecided in Minnesota.
However, the court of appeals also noted that even if the sale of
electricity is controlled by Article 2, that determination did not re64
solve die plaintiff's claim. ! The court of appeals was concerned
that the supreme court's limitations on the right to recover for
economic loss in commercial transactions might limit the plaintiff's
right to recover. The majority, however, concluded that the plaintiff's claims did not fit the erevailing definition of "economic loss"
so as to bar their recovery. 2 There was no indication in the case
that the electricity failed to perform according to the purposes for
which it was sold.64~ Rather, the plaintiffs' claim was based on
NSP's failure to control or to warn the plaintiffs of injurious stray
644
voltage. Therefore, their claim arose independent of the transaction, entitling the plaintiffs to recover for their losses free from the
limitations on recovery for economic loss imposed by the supreme
645
court in cases involving commercial transactions.
Minnesota products liability cases involving real property or
improvements to real property frequently involve the Minnesota
statutes of repose and limitations for improvements to real property.646 If the plaintiff seeks to recover, either under a strict liability
636. 481 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
637. See id. at 105.
638. See id.
639. See id. at 106-07.
640. See id. at 107.
641. See id. at 108.
642. See id.
643. See id.
644. See id.
645. See id.
646. See MINN. STAT. § 541.051 (1996) (containing a statute of limitations and
repose for actions based on improvements to real property). The statute reads as
follows:
Subd. 1. (a) Except where fraud is involved, no action by any
person in contract, tort, or otherwise to recover damages for any injury
to property, real or personal, or for bodily injury or wrongful death,
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or negligence claims, and the basis for the claim is an improvement
to real property, the two-year statute of limitations and ten-year
outside statute of repose present significant obstacles to recovery.647
There is an exception, adopted in 1990, for manufacturers or suppliers of "any equipment or machinery installed upon real proparising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement
to real property, nor any action for contribution or indemnity for
damages sustained on account of the injury, shall be brought against
any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, materials, or observation of construction or construction of the
improvement to real property or against the owner of the real property more than two years after discovery of the injury or, in the case of
an action for contribution or indemnity, accrual of the cause of action,
nor, in any event shall such a cause of action accrue more than ten
years after substantial completion of the construction. Date of substantial completion shall be determined by the date when construction
is sufficiently completed so that the owner or the owner's representative can occupy or use the improvement for the intended purpose.
(b) For purposes of paragraph (a), a cause of action accrues
upon discovery of the injury or, in the case of an action for contribution or indemnity, upon payment of a final judgment, arbitration
award, or settlement arising out of the defective and unsafe condition.
(c) Nothing in this section shall apply to actions for damages resulting from negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection
of the real property improvement against the owner or other person in
possession.
(d) The limitations prescribed in this section do not apply to the
manufacturer or supplier of any equipment or machinery installed
upon real property.
Subd. 2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision 1, in the
case of an action which accrues during the ninth or tenth year after
substantial completion of the construction, an action to recover damages may be brought within two years after the date on which the action accrued, but in no event mayan action be brought more than 12
years after substantial completion of the construction.
Subd. 3. Nothing in this section shall be construed as extending
the period prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any
action.
Subd. 4. This section shall not apply to actions based on breach
of the statutory warranties set forth in section 327A.02, or to actions
based on breach of an express written warranty, provided such actions
shall be brought within two years of the discovery of the breach.
[d.

647. See Farnham v. Nasby Agri-Systems, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 759 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989); Thorp v. Price Bros. Co., 441 N.W.2d 817 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989);
O'Connor v. M.A. Mortenson Co., 424 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Sartori
v. Harnischfeger Corp., 432 N.W.2d 448 (Minn. 1988); Citizen's Sec. Mut. Ins. Co.
of Red Wing v. General Elec. Corp., 394 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986);
Kemp v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 390 N.W.2d 848 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Moen v.
Rexnord, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 988 (D. Minn. 1987), afj'd, 845 F.2d 1027 (8th Cir.
1988).
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erty.,,648 The exception was intended to exclude routine products
649
liability cases from the scope of section 541.051.
The statutes of repose and limitations aside, products liability
claims have been brought in Minnesota for a defective manufac. spnn
. kl er system,651 and
ture d h orne, 650 a d e £
ectlve
an·Improper1y
652
installed fumace.
In the last case, O'Laughlin v. Minnesota Natural
Gas CO.,65S the Minnesota Supreme Court cited Schipper v. Levitt &
654
Sons, Inc., a landmark 1965 New Jersey Supreme Court case holding a mass producer of homes liable for failure to properly install a
mixing valve for hot water delivery to sink tapS.655 While Minnesota
has not formally articulated a rule for the application of products
liability principles to real estate improvements, the supreme court
has imposed liability under varying theories for defects in those
.
656
Improvements.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not firmly decided if it will
apply products liability theory to services that are improperly performed. The court appeared to apply strict liability in O'Laughlin
for the services that a contractor performed in installing a furnace,657 but in Valley Farmers' Elevator v. Lindsay Brothers Corp.,658 the
court examined hybrid transactions in greater detail. The Valley
Farmers' case involved a dispute over a grain storage system the

648. Act of May 3, 1990, ch. 555, § 13, 1990 Minn. Laws 1562 (amending
MINN. STAT. § 541.051, subd. 1).
649. See MINNESOTA I~URY COMPENSATION STUDY COMMISSION, REpORT TO THE
LEGISlATURE 20-21 (1990).
650. See Zimprich v. Stratford Homes, Inc., 453 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990).
651. See Red Wing Motel Investors v. Red Wing Fire Dep't, 552 N.W.2d 295
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996), review denied, (Minn. Oct. 29, 1996).
652. See O'Laughlin v. Minnesota Natural Gas Co., 253 N.W.2d 826 (Minn.
1977).
653. 253 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1977).
654. See id. at 831 n.3 (citing Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314
(NJ.1965».
655. See Schipper, 207 A.2d at 321-23.
656. See, e.g., Fudally v. Ching Johnson Builders, Inc., 360 N.W.2d 436, 439
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming a jury verdict based on a breach of contract
claim for negligent construction of a porch); Patton v. Yarrington, 472 N.W.2d
157, 161 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that smoke detectors were
"improvements" within the meaning of MINN. STAT. § 541.051 and that wrongful
death action based on defect in the improvement was brought in a timely fashion).
657. See O'Laughlin v. Minnesota Natural Gas Co., 253 N.W.2d 826, 830-31
Minn. 1977).
658. 398 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1987).
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659
plaintiff purchased from the defendant.
Flaws in the system re660
sulted in damage to one of the storage bins.
Valley alleged negligent design of the system and failure to warn about the need for
an automatic switch to control the aeration fans in the system, and
66
strict liability for the damage to the grain storage bin. ! The plaintiff argued on appeal that the economic loss it sustained was compensable under negligence and strict liability theories because the
transaction between it and the defendant was a hybrid commercial
transaction involving the provision of services and the sale of
662
goods.
The court noted that it could discern virtually no distinction
between the plaintiff's claim that Lindsay should have installed an
automatic shut-off device to stop the aeration fan after frost accumulation, and the claims advanced in O'Laughlin, which involved a
furnace that was improperly installed
a contractor who failed to
include a metal liner in the chimney.66 To clarify the law in Minnesota, the supreme court adopted the "predominant factor" test,
664
the application of which is usually a question of law for the court.
As applied, the court concluded that the transaction between the
plaintiff and defendant was predominantly a sale of goods. 665
The impact of the decision on O'Laughlin is not clear. It may
be that the court's decision in O'Laughlin, which appeared to impose strict liability on a contractor for the services he performed,666
is now suspect because of Valley Farmers,.667 Mter all, the supreme
court noted that the two cases were indistinguishable on their facts,
althou~ O'Laughlin involved property damage and not personal
injury.
In addition, O'Laughlin can be viewed as a case involving
669
a product that was defective as installed.
The plaintiff paid for a
finished product that should have worked as intended, but because
670
.
of installation defects did not.
However, even if the supreme court continues to impose strict

bi

659.
660.
661.
662.
663.
664.
665.
666.
667.
668.
669.
670.

See id. at 554.
See id.
See id. at 555.
See id.
See O'Laughlin, 253 N.W.2d at 830-31.
See Valley Farmers', 398 N.W.2d at 556.
See id.
See O'Laughlin, 253 N.W.2d at 826.
See Valley Farmers', 398 N.W.2d at 555-56.
See id.
See O'Laughlin, 253 N.W.2d at 832.
See id.
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liability for the kinds of sernces performed by contractors in personal injury cases, then classification of the case as involving sales
or sernces would be irrelevant, because strict liability theory can
apply to both, depending on the circumstances. Conversely, in
cases involving economic loss, classification of a case as involving
the sale of goods rather than sernces makes the case subject to the
Uniform Commercial Code and its limitations on liability. In fact,
the plaintiff in Valley Farmers', once subject to the U.C.C., lost because the four-year statute of limitations on its claim had run,67!
whereas the statute of limitations for improvements to real prop672
erty would not have run.
The supreme court has held that strict liability does not apply
673
in pure professional sernces cases.
However, in City of Mounds
View v. Walijarvi,674 a city sued an architect for negligence and
breach of express and implied warranties for an addition to the city
675
hall designed by the architect and his firm.
One of the issues on
appeal was whether an architect's agreement to design a structure
includes an implied warranty that the structure will be fit for its in676
tended purpose.
The reasoning underlying the majority rule applied to architects and other vendors of professional sernces, including doctors,
engineers, attorneys, and others, is that such professionals are constantly required to exercise skilled judgment in dealing with some677 The uncertamty
.
.
.
wh at mexact
SCIences.
m akes compI ete accuracy
impossible in every instance. Following the majority rule, the supreme court concluded that liability could not be imposed except
according to the prevailing standard of care applicable to professionals:
We have reexamined our case law on the subject of professional sernces and are not persuaded that the time has
yet arrived for the abrogation of the traditional rule.
Adoption of the city's implied warranty theory would in
effect impose strict liability on architects for latent defects
671. See Valley Farmers', 398 N .W.2d at 557.
672. See id. at 556.
673. See Jenson v. Touche Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d 720, 728 (Minn. 1983)
(holding that it is inappropriate to impose a strict liability standard on the defendant because it would result in using a consumer protection statute to secondguess the professional judgment of accounting practitioners).
674. 263 N.W.2d 420 (Minn. 1978).
675. See id. at 421.
676. See id. at 422.
677. See id. at 424.
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in the structures they design. That is, once a court or jury
has made the threshold finding that a structure was
somehow unfit for its intended purpose, liability would be
imposed on the responsible architect in spite of his diligent application of state-of-the-art design techniques. If
every facet of structural design consisted of little more
than the mechanical application of immutable physical
principles, we could accept the rule of strict liability which
the city proposes. But even in the present state of relative
technological enlightenment, the keenest engineering
minds can err in their most searching assessment of the
natural factors which determine whether structural components will adequately serve their intended purpose.
Until the random element is eliminated in the application
of architectural sciences, we think it fairer that the purchaser of the architect's services bear the risk of such un678
foreseeable difficulties.
The Restatement (Third)'s policy judgment with respect to hu679
man blood and tissue appears to be supported by Minnesota law.
In Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc.,68o a serum hepatitis case arising from a blood transfusion, the supreme
court held that "the furnishing of blood is more in the nature of a
service than in the sale of goods," and that warranty principles were
inapplicable as a matter of public policy:
We find it difficult to give literal application of principles
of law designed to impose strict accountability in commercial transactions to a voluntary and charitable activity
which serves a humane and public health purpose. The
activities involved in the transfusion of whole blood, a
component of the living body, from one human being to
another may be characterized as sui generis in that the
sequence of events involve acts common to legal concepts
of both a sale and a service. Moreover, it seems to us that
under the facts in the case before us it would be unrealistic to hold that there is an implied warranty as to qualities
of fitness of human blood on which no medical or scientific information can be acquired and in respect to which
plaintiffs' physician has the same information, knowledge,
68
and experience as the supplier. )
678.
679.
680.
681.

Id.
See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 19 ernt. c.
270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965).
Id. at 159, 132 N.W.2d at 811.
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The second case involving the issue is Doe v. Travenol Laborato683
ries, Inc.,682 a federal district court case applying Minnesota law.
The plaintiff, a hemophiliac, contracted the AIDS virus through a
684
blood transfusion.
The court noted the supreme court's conclusion that provision of blood is a service and not a sale, but resolved
the case on the basis of the blood shield statute in the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act,685 adopted some four years after Balkowitsch
686
was decided.
The court read the statute, which stated that the
use of any part of a body "shall be construed, for all purposes whatsoever, as a rendition of a service by each and every person participating therein ... " as a legislative effort in light of Balkowitsch to
protect entities such as the defendant in the case from being sub687
jected to liability without fault.
The blood shield statute was repealed in 1992,688 leaving Balkowitsch as the prevailing law in Minnesota. It is consistent with the
limitations most states have imposed on the liability of blood and
689
tissue suppliers.

§ 20. DEFINITION OF "ONE WHO SELLS OR OTHERWISE DISTRIBUTES"
For purposes of this Restatement:
(a) One sells a product when, in a commercial context, one
transfers ownership thereto either for use or consumption or
for resale leading to ultimate use or consumption. Commercial
product sellers include, but are not limited to, manufacturers,
wholesalers, and retailers.
(b) One otherwise distributes a product when, in a commercial transaction other than a sale, one provides the product
682. 698 F. Supp. 780 (D. Minn. 1988).
683. See id.
684. See id. at 781.
685. MINN. STAT. § 525.928 (1986) (repealed 1992). The statute read as follows:
The use of any part of a body for the purpose of transplantation in the
human body shall be construed, for all purposes whatsoever, as a rendition of a service by each and every person participating therein and shall
not be construed as a sale of such part for any purpose whatsoever.
"Part" was defined in section 525.921, subd. 6, as "organs, tissues, eyes, bones, arteries, blood, other fluids and any other portions of a human body." Id.
686. See Doe, 698 F. Supp. at 784.
687. See id. at 783.
688. See Act of May 27,1991, ch. 202, § 42,1991 Minn. Laws 562.
689. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 19 cmt. c.
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to another either for use or consumption or as a preliminary
step leading to ultimate use or consumption. Commercial
nonsale product distributors include, but are not limited to,
lessors, bailors, and those who provide products to others as a
means of promoting either the use or consumption of such
products or some other commercial activity.
(c) One also sells or otherwise distributes a product when,
in a commercial transaction, one provides a combination of
products and services and either the transaction taken as a
whole, or the product component thereof, satisfies the criteria
in Subsection (a) or (b). 690
Commentary
Section 20 of the Restatement (Third) applies the current understanding concerning the kinds of product sellers and distributors
691
subject to its products liability provisions.
It specifically includes
commercial product sellers, such as: manufacturers, wholesalers,
and retailers, although the Restatement does not limit section 20 ex692
clusively to those sellers.
Section 20 defines sale to include a
transfer of ownership "either for use or consumption or for resale
· to u ItImate
.
. ,,693
Iead mg
use or consumptIon.
694
Sales may occur at all levels in the chain of distribution. The
definition is broad enough to include product give-aways as part of
695
a commercial sales promotion. The commercial sale need not be
the last transaction in order for the seller to be subject to a products liability claim. One person could, for example, buy a product
696
at a store and give it to a friend, who is subsequently injured.
Section 20 subjects commercial lessors of new or almost-new
697
used products to the rules governing sellers of new products.
Rental of a new or almost-new product on a short term basis, where
the lessee does not have a chance to inspect the product, and
where the lessor draws the product from a pool of new and almostnew units, with no attempt made by the leasing agent to distinguish
690.
691.
692.
693.
694.
695.
696.
697.

See id. § 20.
See id. cmt. a.
See id. cmt. h.
[d. § 20(a).
See id. cmt. h.
See id.
See id.
See id. cmt. c.
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the units on the basis of age or condition, makes the lessor subject
to strict liability.698
The Restatement (Third) also includes other nonsale product
distributors, including certain forms of bailments, where there is a
699
charge for use of a product.
Bailors furnishing products that are
an integral part of their sales or marketing operations, however,
are strictly liable for the harm caused by defective products that are
7OO
bailed even if there is no separate charge for their use.
Commercial bailors who provide products for use as a convenience but
do not charge for the products' use, such as a grocer who provides
701
shopping carts, are not subject to the strict liability rules.
Cases involving combinations of sales and services may be
702
problematic. If the sales component is clearly kept separate from
a service provided along with the product, the person who provides
the services and products may be deemed to be a product seller. 703
The Restatement (Third) comments use the example of a lawn-care
firm that bills separately for a fertilizer that is applied to the lawn of
a customer, or a company that replaces a component part and bills
704
separately.
However, courts differ in their treatment of transactions if the
parties do not clearly separate the sales from the services aspects. 705
The judicial treatment depends on which of two categories the
706
transaction fits.
In cases where a product is consumed during the
course of providing a service, such as a case where hair dye is used
by a hair stylist, the product will usually be treated as a sale of
707
dye.
But when the product is not consumed or permanently
transferred to the customer, such as defective scissors that cut the
customer, the transaction will be treated as solely furnishing a serv. 708
Ice.
In contrast, Minnesota products liability law has been applied
to a variety of product sellers and distributors, although it has not
been worked out as completely. It is clear that products liability
698.
699.
700.
701.
702.
703.
704.
705.
706.
707.
708.

See id.
See id. cmt. f.
See id.
See id. Reporters' Note, at 365.
See id. cmt. d.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Seeid.
See id.
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law will be applied to parties in the chain of manufacture and distribution, although parties lower in the chain may move for dismissal if the product manufacturer is solvent and subject to Minne709
sota jurisdiction.
It has been applied to leases of defective
products,710 and bailments,711 although the issue of whether strict
liability applies to either a lease or a bailment for compensation
712
has not yet been decided by the supreme court.
In dealing with the sales-service hybrid transactions, the supreme court adopted the "predominant factor" test in Valley Farmers 713 The application of the test depends largely on whether there
714
is an identifiable product that is sold in the transaction.
In
715
McCarthy Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc. the supreme court, applying Valley Farmers', held that a well company hired to restore a
creamery's artesian well to its original capacity performed a service
rather than entered into a sale of goods:
We conclude that the predominant purpose of the
McCarthy Well-St. Peter Creamery contract was the provision of services. The creamery hired McCarthy Well to restore the creamery's artesian well to its original capacity.
709. See MINN. STAT. § 544.41 (1996).
710. See, e.g., Clark v. Rental Equip. Co., 300 Minn. 420, 220 N.W.2d 507
(1974) (concerning scaffolding without a safety railing); Rediske v. Minnesota Valley Breeder's Ass'n, 374 N.W.2d 745, 747 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (involving a defective solid animal waste recycling system).
711. See Butler v. Northwestern Hosp., 202 Minn. 282, 285, 278 N.W. 37, 38
(1938) (involving a plaintiff-patient who sustained hot water bums due to defect
in clamp in proctolysis delivery system). The Butler-court took the position that:
It is well established that one who furnishes an instrumentality for a special use or service impliedly warrants the article furnished to be reasonably fit and suitable for the purpose for which it is expressly let out, or for
which, from its character, he must be aware it is intended to be used and
is liable for injuries to the bailee or third persons for injuries proximately resulting from any defect due to his want of due care.
Id. (citations omitted).
712. SeeWegscheiderv. Plastics, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 167,170 (Minn. 1980). The
plaintiff, a truck driver, was injured when he fell off a tanker trailer while unloading it. See id. at 169. The plaintiff's employer owned the tractor used to pull the
tanker trailer. See id. The tanker trailer was supplied by Plastics, Inc. See id. The
plaintiff had requested a jury instruction based on section 402A, but because the
plaintiff had assumed the risk of injury, the court concluded that it was unnecessary to "address the issue of whether strict liability as stated in § 402A should be
applied to cases such as this, where the defective product was not sold but merely
supplied by defendant to plaintiff. n Id. at 170.
713. See Valley Farmer's Elevator v. Lindsay Bros. Corp., 398 N.W.2d 553, 556
(Minn. 1987).
714. See id.
715. 410 N.w.2d 312 (Minn. 1987).
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Toward this end, McCarthy Well pulled a liner out of the
well casing, airlifted sand out of the well, televised the
well, attempted to remove a donut from the well casing,
exploded dynamite at the bottom of the well, and installed a new pump. Mter installing the pump, McCarthy
Well billed the creamery $34,573.27; of this amoun~ only
$8,329.45 is identified as the cost of the new pump.71
Because the court held that the transaction was not a
"commercial transaction," the creamery was entitled to recover un717
der a negligence theory for the economic loss it sustained.
8
In Butler v. Northwestern HospitaC the plaintiff-patient, in the
hospital for an appendectomy, sustained serious bums due to de719
fect in a clamp that was used in a proctolysis delivery system.
The
clamp that was used to prevent the hot water drip was ordinarily
used in the administration of enemas, but the clamp was being
used for the usual purpose of preventing the flow of water. 720 The
court took the position that:
It is well established that one who furnishes an instrumentality for a special use or service impliedly warrants
the article furnished to be reasonably fit and suitable for
the purpose for which it is expressly let out, or for which,
from its character, he must be aware it is intended to be
used and is liable for injuries to the bailee or third persons for injuries proximately resulting from any defect
due to his want of due care. 721
However, the court did not impose liability on the basis of
strict liability in tort, but concluded that the evidence was sufficient
to establish that the defect in the clamp was "discoverably defec~;
uve. ,,722
§ 21. DEFINITION OF "HARM TO PERSONS OR PROPER1Y": RECOVERY
FOR ECONOMIC Loss

For purposes of this Restatement, harm to persons or property
716. [d. at 315. The court also noted in a footnote that "the purchase and installation of the pump was not a separate transaction. This was a single agreement
executed over an extended period of time, of which the pump was but one part."
[d. at n.1.
717. See id. at 312.
718. 202 Minn. 282, 278 N.W. 37 (1938).
719. See id. at 284-85,278 N.W. at 37.
720. See id.
721. [d. at 285,278 N.W. at 38.
722. [d. at 287,278 N.W. at 39.
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includes economic loss if caused by harm to:
(a) the plaintiff's person;
(b) the person of another when harm to the other interferes with a legally protected interest of the plaintiff; or
(c) the plaintiff's property other than the defective product
.ItseIf.723
Commentary
The comments to section 21 note the two constraints that
prompted the limitations on the right to recover for economic
10ss.72 The first is that "~roducts liability lies at the boundary between tort and contract." 25 Some losses seem to straddle the two
theories, but are more appropriately assigned to contract law and
the remedies of the V.C.C., with its attendant limitations on recov726
ery, including notice, privity, and disclaimer limitations.
The
second constraint is that there are some forms of economic loss
that "have traditionally been excluded from the realm of tort law
even when the plaintiff has no contractual remedy for a claim.,,727
Economic loss that arises from personal injury is included in
728
the Restatement (Third)'s definition of harm to the person.
Subpart (b) includes actions for loss of consortium or wrongful
death,729 and both are clearly covered under Minnesota products
liability law. 730 It also includes losses such as injury to reputation,
subject to rules of legal causation, even where the plaintiff has not
suffered personal injury.731 Minnesota does not appear to have a
723. Proposed Finetl Draft, supra note 6, § 2l.
724. See id. cmt. a.
725. Id.
726. See id.
727. Id.
728. Seeid.§21(b).
729. See id. cmt. c.
730. See, e.g., Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 400 (Minn. 1977)
(affirming ajury award for loss of consortium); Horvath v. Liquid Controls Corp.,
455 N.W.2d 60, 64 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that if death of employee was
causally related to the negligence of designer and installer of work facility, the
cause of action is governed by the wrongful death statute, MINN. STAT. § 573.02
(1996».
731. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 21 illus. 1. It provides the following example:
A machine that is used to anesthetize dental patients is delivered to Dr.
Smith with the labels for nitrous oxide and oxygen reversed. Dr. Smith,
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analogue.
Part (c) includes as harm to property, damage to "the plaintiffs property other than the defective product itself.,,732 Harm to
the defective product itself is not included as a recoverable element
733
of damage under products liability principles.
Damage to the
product itself is excluded from the Restatement (Third) because "the
law covering commercial transactions sets forth a comJlrehensive
scheme governing the rights of the buyer and seller.,,7 Harm to
the product itself is not covered even where the product is in a de735
fective condition that makes it unreasonably dangerous.
The
comments note that a plausible argument exists that such cases
should be covered by products liability law, but that a majority of
jurisdictions to consider the issue have taken the position that
736
those losses should be covered by the U.C.C.
Minnesota law
737
agrees.
Even a catastrophic loss that results in death will not justify recovery for damage to the product by the owner under a
products liability theory.738 If there is harm to other property, section 21 permits recovery not only for the harm to the product but
L'
•
'den tal economIC
. 1oss. 739
a1so J.or
Inci
The comments set aside the asbestos cases:
In the case of asbestos contamination in buildings, most
courts have taken the position that the contamination
constitutes harm to the building as other property. The
serious health threat caused by asbestos contamination
has led the courts to this conclusion. Thus, actions seekbelieving she was administering oxygen to a patient, mistakenly administered nitrous oxide which caused the patient to die. Due to the adverse
publicity arising from accurate media reporting of the case, Dr. Smith
suffered a sharp drop in her practice and substantial economic loss. Dr.
Smith's damages for economic loss are recoverable in tort from the seller
of the machine under Subsection (b).

Id.
732. Seeid.§21(c).
733. See id. cmt. d.
734. Id.
735. See id.
736. See id. Reporters' Note, at 371.
737. See SJ. Groves & Sons v. Aerospatiale Helicopter, 374 N.W.2d 431, 434
(Minn. 1985) (holding the V.C.C. is designed to provide remedies for unsatisfactory results of products and that plaintiff should not be allowed to seek remedies
under tort theories).
738. See id.
739. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 21 cmt. e. The determination of
when incidental economic loss will be compensable is controlled by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 430-461 (1965).
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ing recovery for the costs of asbestos removal have been
held to be within the purview of products liability law
rather than commercial law. 740
From Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Curp.,741 to Lloyd F. Smith
Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc.,742 and 80 South Eighth Street Limited Partnership
v. Carey-Canada, Inc.,743 the Minnesota Supreme Court has been in
the process of developing a set of rules to govern claims for eco744
nomic loss and property damage.
740. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 6, § 21 cmt. e.
741. 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981).
742. 491 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1992).
743. 486 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1992).
744. In Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Nishika Ltd., 565 N.W.2d 16 (Minn.
1997), a suit was brought in Texas state court by four independent companies that
were involved in the three-dimensional photography business. See id. at 18. Two
individuals who together owned the four companies, developed a plan for managing a three-dimensional photography company through their four businesses. See
id. One of the individuals met with 3M officials to obtain assistance with the film
development process. See id. Because of problems in the development of the
process, the company ultimately failed. See id. at 19.
The jury concluded that 3M breached an express warranty for the emulsion used in the development process and implied warranties for the emulsion
and backcoat sauce used in the process, and that the breaches directly caused
harm to each of the plaintiffs. See id. The jury fixed damages at $50,000,000 for
the group. See id. Damages were reduced by the 49% fault attributable to the
plaintiffs. See id.
Nishika and American 3D, two of the plaintiffs, did not deal directly with
3M. See id. They did not use, purchase, or otherwise secure the 3M products at
issue in the case. See id. Nishika was not even in existence at the time the goods
were sold by 3M. See id.
The Texas Supreme Court certified two questions to the Minnesota Supreme Court:
1. For breach of warranty under [Minn. Stat. § 336.2-318], is a seller liable to a person who never acquired any goods from the seller, directly
or indirectly, for pure economic damages (e.g. lost profits), unaccompanied by any injury to the person or the person's property?
2. If the answer to Question 1 is "yes," may several such persons, who
mayor may not be related, and who mayor may not include the buyer of
the goods, recover damages jointly as a single economic unit?
[d. The Minnesota Supreme Court answered the first question in the negative.
Minnesota Statutes section 336.2-318, the privity provision in the V.C.C.,
states that a seller's warranty, express or implied, "extends to any person who may
reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured by breach of the warranty." MINN. STAT. § 336.2-318 (1996). The term
"person" includes corporations and other business organizations. See Nishika, 565
N.W.2d at 19 (citing MINN. STAT. § 336.2-318). The court held that although in
the past it had permitted recovery of lost profits from a remote seller's breach of
warranty, and had permitted plaintiffs who had not purchased, used, or otherwise
acquired a product to recover as third-party beneficiaries for property damage, it
had never permitted recovery by a plaintiff "seeking lost profits unaccompanied
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745

The set of rules the supreme court has developed coincide
with the rules in the Restatement. In 80 South Eighth Street, the supreme court, on certified questions from the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota, held that the owner of a building with fireproofing containing asbestos was not barred from recovering for "damages relating to the maintenance, removal and
746
replacement" of the fireproofing.
Rather than slotting the claim
into the economic loss decisions that would have barred recovery
by the plaintiff, the court concluded that the policies of tort law
747
should apply due to the dangers presented by asbestos.
While
that decision can be disputed, the court's policy analysis makes it
748
clear, as does the Restatement, that the asbestos cases are unique.
The court viewed one objective of tort law as being deterrence of
749
unreasonable risks of harm.
Building owners should be encouraged to abate asbestos hazards rather than waiting for personal injury to occur. 750 The court intended for its decision to accomplish
· . 751
th at 0 b~ectJ.ve.
A few months after 80 South Eighth Street, the supreme court
decided Den- Tal-Ez, further refining the economic loss doctrine in
a case involving property damag;e caused by an electrical defect in a
753
dental chair that caused a fire, 52 but no personal injuries.
Suit
was brought by the dentist who owned the chair, the owner of the
building where the dentist practiced, and other tenants in the
building against the manufacturer of the chair and the chair's mo754
tor.
The court held that the property damage they sustained was
compensable:
[W]e hold that the U.C.C. provides the exclusive remedy
by physical injury or property damage and who never used, purchased, or otherwise acquired the goods in question." Id. at 20. The court concluded that construing the statute to reach such claims would constitute an expansion of warranty beyond the intent of the legislature. See id.
745. For a more detailed analysis, see Jacquelyn K. Brunmeier, Note, Death by
Footnote: The Life and Times of Minnesota's Economic Loss Doctrine, 19 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 871 (1993).
746. See 80 S. Eighth Street, 486 N.W.2d at 398.
747. See id. at 397.
748. See id.
749. See id. at 398.
750. See id.
751. See id.
752. See Lloyd F. Smith v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 12-13 (Minn.
1992).
753. See id. at 12-13.
754. See id. at 13.
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for other property damages arising out of a sale of goods
only when that sale fits Hapka's narrow definition of a
"commercial transaction," i.e., where the parties to the
sale are dealers in the same goods or, to use a more precise term, "merchants in goods of the kind." In actions
for damages to other property which arise from a sale of
goods between parties who are not "merchants in goods
of the kind," such as in the case here, the tort remedies of
negligence and strict liability are always available, even if
the parties can sue under the U.C.C. as well. And, of
course, an action for damage to the defective Rroduct itself its always limited to a V.C.C. based recovery.755
The Den-Tal-Ez court narrowly interpreted its earlier decision
in Hapka v. Paquin Farms,756 a claim by potato farmers for the economic loss they sustained because of diseased seed potatoes grown
from defective seed purchased from the defendants. 757 The Hapka
court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover for the
economic loss they sustained because they entered into a commercial transaction for the purchase of the seed,758 and that the V.C.C.
controls "exclusively with respect to damages in a commercial
transaction which involves property damage only.,,759 Den-Tal-Ez
limits Hapka to transactions between "merchants in goods of the
kind.,,760
In response to the court's decision in Hapka, the legislature
enacted a specific statute to deal with the issue of economic loss
arising from the sale of goods:
(a) Economic loss that arises from a sale of goods
that is due to damage to tangible property other than the
goods sold may be recovered in tort as well as in contract,
but economic loss that arises from a sale of goods between
parties who are each merchants in goods of the kind is
not recoverable in tort.
(b) Economic loss that arises from the sale of goods,
between merchants, that is not due to damage to tangible
property other than the goods sold may not be recovered
in tort.
(c) The economic loss recoverable in tort under this
755.
756.
757.
758.
759.
760.

Id. at 17.
458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990).
See id. at 684.
See id. at 688.
Id.
SeeDen-Tal-Ez, 491 N.W.2d at 15.
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section does not include economic loss due to damage to
the goods themselves.
(d) The economic loss recoverable in tort under this
section does not include economic loss incurred by a
manufacturer of goods arising from damage to the manufactured goods and caused by a component of the
761
goods.
Subpart (a) of the statute permits recovery for economic loss
arising from a sale of goods due to "damage to tangible property
762
other than the goods sold" in tort as well as contract.
However,
there is an exemption from tort liability for the economic loss arising from "a sale of goods between parties who are each merchants
in goods of the kind."763 Consequently, damage to other property
is not recoverable in tort where the transaction is between merchants in goods of the kind. 764
Subpart (b) precludes recovery in tort for economic loss arising from the sale of goods between merchants, where the loss is
"not due to damage to tangible property other than the goods
sold."765 The converse seems to be that where the sale of goods is
not between merchants, economic loss other than loss due to damage to tangible property other than the goods sold may be compensable in tort.
Subpart (c) states that the economic loss that is recoverable in
tort under the section "does not include economic loss due to
damage to the goods themselves.,,766 Finally, subpart (d) defines
the recoverable economic loss under the section to exclude
"economic loss incurred by a manufacturer of goods arising from
damage to the manufactured goods and caused by a component of
767
the goods."
In Regents of the University of Minnesota v. Chief Industries, Inc. ,768
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the impact of section 604.10 on a case involving a products liability claim by the
University of Minnesota for property damage allegedly caused by a
761. Act of May 5, 1993, ch. 91, § 2, 1993 Minn. Laws 274 (amending MINN.
§ 604.10).
762. MINN. STAT. § 604.10 (1996).
763. Id.
764. See id.
765. Id.
766. Id.
767. Id.
768. 106 F.3d 1409 (8th Cir. 1997).

STAT.
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769
grain dryer that caught fire because of a defective solenoid.
A
subsidiary of Chief Industries manufactured the ~ain dryer.770 The
solenoid was manufactured by Parker-Hannafin. 71 The University
brought suit against both companies, alleging strict liability, failure
772
to warn, and negligent design and manufacture.
The sole issue
the Eighth Circuit considered was whether the University was "a
773
merchant in goods of the kind" under the statute.
The court
concluded that a person need not be an actual dealer of a product
in order to be a "merchant in goods of the kind.,,774 The court focused instead on the University's specialized knowledge with respect to the grain dryer in concluding that the University fit the
definition:
In the present case, the University's knowledge and
experience with respect to grain dryers constituted
"knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction." Minn. Stat. § 336.2-104(1).
The University had purchased a number of such units
over the prior thirty years, and had the advantage of a
centralized purchasing department that solicited bids for
the purchase. Before purchasing the unit, the Southwest
station's superintendent (who had been responsible for
other such purchases) consulted a prominent expert in
grain drying, who provided advice on such specifications
for the unit as fan size and BTU requirements.
To be sure, not all large, sophisticated purchasers are
necessarily merchants in goods of the kind they buy, just
as an informed and careful individual consumer does not
become a "merchant." But based on the particular and
undisputed facts of this case, we agree with the district
court that the University possessed specialized knowledge
with respect to the grain drying unit, and that "[t]his
knowledge informed the University of the risks posed by
the product and the potential damage to both the product and other property that could result from product
failure." The district court properly concluded that, as a
matter of law, the University was a merchant of goods of

769.
770.
771.
772.
773.
774.

Seeid.at1410-11.
See id. at 1410.
See id.
See id.
Seeid.at1411.
See id. at 1412.
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775
the kind and that section 604.10 bars any action in tort.
776
Judge Lay dissented in the case.
Based on the legislative history and relevant supreme court authority, he argued that the University was not a merchant in goods of the kind for purposes of the
777
statute.
He interpreted Den-Tal-Ez as providing a "narrow definition" of "commercial transaction.,,778 Den-Tal-Ez held that the
U.C,C. provides the exclusive remedy only in cases where the parties to the sale are dealers in the same goods or merchants in goods
779
of the kind.
Because the University and Parker-Hannafin were
not both dealers in goods of the kind, Judge Lay would not have
applied U.C.C.limiting principles. He explained:
Section 604.10 (a) governs this claim. When it enacted
§ 604.10 in 1991, had it so desired, the Minnesota legislature could have chosen the broad term "merchant" as
generally defined by § 336.2-104(1) instead of "merchants
in goods of the kind." The legislature'S choice instead to
incorporate the limiting language manifests its intent to
narrow application of the economic loss doctrine. There
is no inconsistency in this obvious, clarifYing provision,
with § 336.2-104(1). The intended purpose of § 604.10
was to overcome Hapka's broad language, based on §
336.2-104(1), so that ordinary consumers will not be denied their "economic loss arising from the sale of
goods.,,780
The case is not binding on the Minnesota courts, of course,
which leaves the final interpretation of the statute to the Minnesota
Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION

The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability provides a
yardstick for measuring products liability law in each individual
state. Minnesota's law is largely similar to the rules set out in the
Restatement. While Minnesota has not yet adopted all of the positions in all of the rules, the Minnesota Supreme Court has taken
positions on the rules governing liability, which are substantially
775.
776.
777.
778.
779.
1992).
780.

Id. at 1412 (citation omitted).
See id.
See id. at 1412-13,1415.
See id. at 1413.
See Lloyd F. Smith Co v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 17 (Minn.
Chief Industries, 106 F.3d at 1413 (footnotes omitted).
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the same. It no longer seems possible to argue that negligence
principles do not control in cases involving design defect and failure to warn. The strict liability vernacular may still be used in design defect cases, but the important question is whether the supreme court's statement in Kallio v. Ford Motor CO.,781 that proof of a
feasible alternative is not part of the plaintiff's prima facie case in a
design case,782 establishes a meaningful wall between the theories.
Any realistic appraisal of the supreme court and court of appeals
decisions in design defect cases, including Kallio, will have to bow
to the reality and practical necessity of establishing the feasible alternative in most cases. In failure to warn cases the supreme court
has acknowledged that negligence principles control strict liability
failure to warn cases. In other words, they really are negligence
cases. The only detail that has to be developed in the Minnesota
failure to warn cases is the appropriate division of responsibility between judge and jury.
A section-by-section comparison requires an understanding of
Minnesota products liability law and an appraisal of any gaps in the
law. The Restatement (Third) is more likely to be a gap filler than an
impetus for any significant change in the law. In areas where the
law is not fully roughed out, such as cases involving post-sale duty
to warn, the Restatement may provide useful guidelines for resolving
those cases. In others, such as economic loss cases, it provides reaffirmation of economic loss rules that have been worked out in this
state over the course of some twenty years.
The Restatement (Third) should be an excellent resource for
evaluating the evolution of Minnesota products liability law and a
roadmap, although not the only one, for the development of the
law in the future.
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407 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1987).
See id. at 97.
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